The Terrifying Lebanon Scenarios

By Jonathan Schanzer

Saturday, July 27, 2024

 

Twelve Israelis were killed in a Hezbollah attack on the Druze village of Majd al-Shams on Saturday. The majority of the dead were children. Hezbollah has attempted to deny responsibility. The Israeli public is not buying it. Israelis of all stripes are demanding action.

 

The expected Israeli response could very well mark the most serious escalation in the unnamed and unofficial war between Israel and Hezbollah. Iran’s most powerful proxy began attacking Israel on October 8, one day after Hamas (another Iranian proxy) slaughtered 1,200 Israelis. While all eyes have been on Gaza, there can be no doubt that this is a a coordinated two-front effort on the part of Iran’s proxies. Hezbollah has fired thousands of drones, rockets, and missiles at Israel over the past nine months. The group has forced an estimated 100,000 Israeli citizens from their homes.

 

The Israelis have wanted to respond to Hezbollah since the first weeks of the war. The Biden White House has restrained the Benjamin Netanyahu government. But after today, Team Biden is not likely to restrain the Israelis any longer. It’s also notable that Biden is now a lame duck, which means that he holds considerably less sway over Israel’s military calculus.

 

Without knowing exactly what Israel’s response might be, here are some potential scenarios we might expect.

 

1.      Israel Responds, Hezbollah Absorbs: While there could be some tough hours or days ahead, there is a chance that Hezbollah restrains itself. Perhaps more accurately, there is a chance that Iran restrains Hezbollah. This would be the rational decision. But it would require Tehran and its most powerful proxy to believe that they would pay a price for any further escalation. While this is certainly possible, it seems unlikely. Thanks to weak American responses after nine months of Iranian aggression, and an Israeli government that has yet to make a consequential decision related to the undeclared war in the north, the Iranian axis is not deterred.

 

2.      A Hostage Deal Dials Everything Back: We continue to hear about efforts by the CIA, Mossad, Egyptian intelligence, and the Hamas-financing government of Qatar to reach a hostage deal. Hezbollah has indicated for months that if there is a ceasefire in Gaza—one that results from a hostage deal or is struck under other terms—the group would cease firing upon Israel. A deal is far from certain, and even if one is reached, it is likely still several weeks away. Thus, the chances of a hostage deal dialing back a wider war in the north seems unlikely right now.

 

3.      Amos Hochstein Prevails: For the last several months, the White House has deployed energy envoy Amos Hochstein to try to reach a diplomatic deal between Israel and Lebanon/Hezbollah to prevent a wider war. Hochstein brokered a 2022 maritime gas deal between Israel and Lebanon that yielded Lebanon the Qana gas field. That deal was supposed to prevent escalations like the one we are witnessing now. But with the benefit of hindsight, Hochstein’s effort should be seen for what it is: a failed attempt to appease Hezbollah. His current stab at haggling with the government of Lebanon with the goal of convincing Hezbollah to withdraw from south Lebanon to territory north of the Litani River and halting its aggression, are ongoing. But the Lebanese regime is a caretaker government that wields no power in a failing state controlled by Hezbollah. The terms that Hochstein is trying to reach are already spelled out in UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which should have been implemented nearly two decades ago. Iran and Hezbollah have refused. The Lebanese government has not even tried to change the equation. And the West has stood by and watched. Of course, the fear of a devastating war could yield a situation in which cooler heads prevail. But it’s hard to believe that Hochstein has the answers.

 

4.      A Limited War in Southern Lebanon: The conventional wisdom holds that neither Hezbollah nor Israel want a full-blown conflagration, given the devastation that such a war would likely leave in its wake. This is not wrong. The estimates suggest that thousands of Lebanese and Israeli citizens would die, with billions of dollars of damage incurred on both sides. This is why my Lebanese friends are convinced that there would be some sort of gentleman’s agreement in the war to come. Israel would only strike Hezbollah assets and infrastructure south of the Litani River, and Hezbollah would only strike Israeli assets in the country’s northern third. Unfortunately, the likelihood is low that both sides willingly exercise restraint in the event of an escalation. This is simply not how wars work—particularly between these two foes. Their wars have long been marked by escalation through miscalculation.

 

5.      A Big War in the North: This may be the most likely scenario if things escalate quickly. And it’s not pretty. Hezbollah has 200,000 rockets in its arsenal, thousands of drones, and an estimated 1,500 precision guided munitions that can strike military assets or even strategic infrastructure in Israel. To be clear: skyscrapers could fall. Hezbollah’s Radwan forces are highly trained and lethal; they have trained alongside the Russian and Iranian militaries. They could try to cross into Israel to conquer Israeli towns. The Israelis know what’s coming. They have plans to deal with all of it, and the future of Lebanon looks bleak as a result. But the Israeli forces are tired from nine months of fighting, the nation’s arsenal is depleted to one extent or another from the Gaza war, and there are concerns that this new war could be long and brutal. Israeli officials say privately that they would prefer to wait a year for this war. Hezbollah knows this. So does Iran. And they may believe that a war right now would be one they have the best chance of winning. This is likely yet another grave miscalculation on the part of the Iranian Axis—once again they will have started a conflagration Israel cannot afford not to win—and one that could have grave consequences for the region.

 

6.      The Ring of Fire: There are no guarantees that a war in the north stays in the north. It’s not often acknowledged, but Israel is currently at war on no less than seven fronts. Iranian proxy forces in Gaza, Lebanon, West Bank, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen continue to attack Israel with various levels of intensity. And don’t forget that the Iranian regime fired more than 300 missiles and drones at Israel in mid-April. The activation of this “ring of fire” might be more likely if Hezbollah finds itself on the ropes in a war with Israel. Indeed, Iran is not likely to simply watch from afar if its most valued proxy is in mortal danger. It’s a fair bet that under this scenario, Israel would get help from British, US, Jordanian and Saudi missile defense—as we witnessed when Iran attacked Israel. But that may be of little consolation if there is a steady stream of incoming projectiles from across the Middle East. To be clear, this scenario is a regional war.

 

7.      Nuclear Breakout: There is a school of thought in Israel which holds that there is only one reason Iran would deploy its most powerful proxy to wage war against Israel. Specifically, Hezbollah would only engage in a fight to the finish with Israel to prevent Israel from striking Iran as it endeavors to dash to a nuclear bomb. We continue to hear estimates from various agencies and officials that Iran is weeks away from what it needs to build a bomb. Assessing Iran’s calculus for such a dangerous move is not simple. But such a scenario cannot be dismissed.

 

The above scenarios are not exhaustive. But they provide a sense of the very, very dangerous moment at which the Middle East currently stands. There are still opportunities to prevent an escalation. Most of them hinge on Iran and Hezbollah standing down. And there is scant evidence to suggest that this is their inclination at the moment.