By Noah Rothman
Friday, April
29, 2022
As the dyspeptic mania that overtook center-left political commentators following Elon
Musk’s takeover of Twitter subsides, enterprising partisans in the infotainment
sector have found a new way to keep the outrage going. You see, Musk posted a meme, and that meme was bad.
The eccentric entrepreneur posted an image
featuring stick figures reenacting the partisan realignment that has taken
place in the United States over the past decade and a half. One stick
figure—“me,” as it was labeled—stood near the “center” of the partisan spectrum
in 2008, though slightly closer to the left than the right. By 2012, the left
was running away from “me,” and the center had inched in his direction. As of
2021, however, our stationary protagonist found himself far closer to the
equally stagnant “right” while the “woke ‘progressive’” now on the far left
heckled him as a “bigot,” an outburst that contributes to this observable
drift.
It’s a reductive and provocative political
document, as all memes are. But it flagrantly disregards a bit of
pseudo-academic conventional wisdom that maintains that it is the American
right that became extreme while the left only passively observed the coarsening
of our political culture. This line of reasoning harkens back to a theory that
that polarization is exclusive to the right: “asymmetric polarization.”
In the last decade, Brookings Institution
scholar Thomas Mann and American Enterprise Institute’s Norm Ornstein set out
to “prove” that the Republican Party had self-radicalized. In 2012, the pair
set out to stigmatize the common observation that “both sides” had succumbed to
their fringes. “Democrats have become more of a status-quo party,” they wrote of the governing party, which was at the time trying to convince
the public to ratify the status quo. By contrast, “Republicans are now more
conservative than they have been in more than a century.” By mid-decade, this
observation crystalized into the aforementioned notion of asymmetric
polarization. If journalists didn’t uncritically
promote the idea that polarization and radicalization were Republican
phenomena, Ornstein wrote, they would abdicate their responsibility to properly
inform the voting public about existing political trends.
Musk’s errant musing gave those who are
still beholden to this theory an opportunity to publicly flog it once more.
Though the left has drifted leftward over the years, Fletcher School
Professor Dan Drezner wrote, “the conceptual blinders required to think conservatives
haven’t moved even further to the right is, to use a 2008-era term,
amazeballs.” The Washington Post’s Philip Bump trotted out DW-NOMINATE data, which doesn’t measure ideology but
gauges roll-call votes to assess partisan and ideological sentiments, to
empirically support the charge, even though “it’s not a great measure of what
Musk is talking about anyway.” The Economist data
journalist G. Elliot
Morris promoted a number of graphical
representations of the GOP’s radicalization, including some that appeared in reputable
publications despite the subjectivity of their
assumptions. Among them, is this rigorous analysis:
Crucially, even among these advocates of
asymmetry, one aspect of the Mann-Ornstein thesis has fallen by the wayside—the
notion that polarization was a Republican problem alone. In the new telling,
polarization is now only more pronounced on the right than the
left. But the thesis suffers still because its proponents do not define their
terms when they bandy about accusations of “polarization.” That’s a problem
because the word has a very different contextual definition today than it did
in 2012.
In Mann and Ornstein’s telling, the GOP
had become both “ideologically extreme,” “dismissive of the legitimacy of its
political opposition,” and procedurally reckless. Fans of this
theory—one of the few that explained how “a
moderate” like Barack Obama could become such a lightning rod—focused to a
prohibitive degree on the GOP’s rigid conservatism. No less a figure than Obama
himself described the Republican Party as afflicted by an ideological “fever.” The symptoms being Republicans’ opposition to tax increases, a
pathway to citizenship for illegal migrants, and infrastructure spending; e.g.,
an ideological attachment to limited government.
In the years since, the theory of
asymmetric polarization has sloughed off the ideological elements that were
once central to it. Its adherents had no choice if the idea was to remain
operative. Not only have progressive Democrats grown more progressive, but
conservative Republicans have become less conservative. Donald Trump campaigned
for and assumed the leadership of the GOP while backing the provision of
government stimulus, attacking reforms designed to preserve the nation’s
unfunded entitlements, and endorsing the Obamacare individual mandate to
purchase health insurance. He mocked his principled opponents—“it’s not called
the conservative party,” the future
president barked—and he won the argument. The prudential
small-government conservatism that was once so indicative of the GOP’s
radicalization disappeared.
At the same time, the left grew ever more
ideologically progressive, as Pew
Research Center demonstrated as early as 2017. This inconvenient finding was
handily dismissed by Morris as “a measure of how consistent voters
are in their beliefs, not how extreme those beliefs are.” If Morris cannot
render a value judgment about the left’s increasingly extreme policy
prescriptions, allow me.
As they wandered the wilderness in the
Trump years, the progressive left incubated visionary plans for the country.
Among them, the retrofitting of every freestanding structure in the nation to
render them all climate-friendly. They backed the elimination of fossil fuels
without a ready alternative. They endorsed “free” college and job training for
those displaced by the decimation of the existing commercial economy. They
supported a guaranteed income for the indolent, the nationalization of the
health-care industry, the unconstitutional confiscation of wealth simply
because it exists, and cultural warfare—an omnidirectional crusade against organic social covenants that they resent—on a wildly
impractical scale. Joe Biden, who was thought at one time to represent a
bulwark against the left’s most ill-considered ideas, turned out to be no such
thing.
As New York Times columnist
Ross Douthat observed, it’s inaccurate to say the GOP as a party hasn’t shed
its commitment to dogmatic conservatism, though the party has become
more comfortable wielding the procedural levers of the state in an unprincipled
fashion to attain its desired outcomes. But if that suffices for “asymmetric
polarization,” the concept has no socially scientific value as it is too
malleable to be consistently measured. Moreover, the right’s commitment to
procedural warfare is precisely what advocates of “asymmetric polarization”
helped incept into existence.
“Also, stop lending legitimacy to Senate
filibusters,” Mann and Ornstein advised Democrats in 2012. The filibuster in
the hands of Republicans “became a routine weapon of obstruction.” It was used
to block unobjectionable nominees to secure unrelated objectives, prevent the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (which the Supreme Court later
deemed structurally
unconstitutional) from doing its work, and used (albeit
unsuccessfully) to prevent duly enacted laws from coming into force.
The ultimate logic of this admonition
compelled Democrats to scuttle the filibuster for some judicial nominees—an act
of procedural warfare if there ever was one. Republicans picked up that ball
and ran with it, and their attachment to the norms of polite governance has
grown more tenuous with each passing year. It would, however, be an act of
blind partisanship to acknowledge only the right’s reaction to
the erosion of norms and evaluate them in a vacuum.
While it may be gauche to cast aspersions on “both sides” these days, doing so benefits from being both consistent and demonstrable. The only pity is that this valuable corrective was occasioned by a dumb meme on the Internet.
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