National Review
Online
Friday, May 13,
2022
It’s a measure of Finland’s
unwillingness to do anything to provoke its giant neighbor to the east that the
Finns never seriously contemplated joining NATO, even during the Yeltsin
years, when Russia could have put no significant obstacles in its way. That
sentiment — buttressed by an ingrained belief that, when the chips were down,
it could only count on itself — is giving way. Alarmed by the danger posed by a
revanchist Russia, Finland is now ready to join the Atlantic Alliance.
Like the Balts and Poles to their south, the Finns understand Russia all too
well, and they know that Putin would be tempted to keep going were he to
prevail in Ukraine. Proposals made by the Kremlin last winter, which would have
led to an effective unwinding of NATO’s expansion after the Cold War, were not
bluster and would not have ended the matter even if Moscow had got its way.
And it’s a measure of how undeniably
threatening Russia has now become that Sweden, which spent far too long denying
or ignoring that threat for its own good, looks set, probably, to follow
Finland’s example.
If either or both countries decide to sign
up to NATO, they should be welcomed unequivocally. For reasons of
geography alone (and they have more to contribute than that), they will
bolster the defense of NATO’s exposed Baltic flank. As things currently stand, the Baltic states are linked to Poland, and
thus the rest of NATO, by a narrow corridor (near the Polish city of
Suwalki) that separates Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave from Moscow’s Belarusian
client-state. Should Russia seal that “Suwalki gap,” the Balts would, for most
practical purposes, be on their own.
Bringing Finland, just a few miles across
the Baltic Sea from Estonia, into the alliance would go a long way to reducing
the danger that Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia could be cut off from their
allies. It thus ought to reduce the danger that today’s less risk-averse Russia
would be tempted to try its luck by “detaching” the Baltic trio and then daring
the rest of the West to respond.
The strength of that temptation should not
be underestimated. If Russia can demonstrate that, when put to the
test, NATO’s will to stand by its collective defense obligations does not
apply to some of its most vulnerable members, other NATO states will
start to ask whether they, as well, are too insignificant to matter. Once those
questions start to be asked, it won’t be long before NATO, an alliance
that preserved the peace throughout the Cold War and has served the U.S. and
the broader West well, will almost certainly begin to unravel. Should that
occur, we will all be living in an infinitely more dangerous world.
Reducing such temptations is the essence
of deterrence. While Finland has not spent as much as it should on defense
(that’s changing), it has well-equipped armed forces, and the combination of
its history and its geography has meant that it has maintained conscription.
Finland’s regular armed forces are small, but mobilizing reserves would take
their numbers to over 250,000, with potentially hundreds of thousands more
behind them.
Should Sweden follow Finland’s lead, the
risk of the Baltic states’ being left isolated would drop still further, not
least because of the way that Swedish territorial waters, and the strategically
placed island of Gotland, which lies roughly between Sweden and Latvia, could
then be open to NATO. Sweden has, belatedly, been increasing defense spending
in the last few years and has only recently reintroduced conscription, but both
its air force and naval resources would be an immediate and useful boost to
NATO’s defensive capabilities.
For Sweden and Finland to join the
alliance will take time. To start with, membership must be approved by their
parliaments, and those of all NATO’s members — 32 parliaments in total.
That will be an invitation to meddling — and perhaps worse — by Moscow. Western
diplomats will need to be busy. Turkey has already signaled its opposition
to admitting the Nordic duo because of the support they have
allegedly shown to Kurdish and Turkish opposition groups. In the meantime,
interim security arrangements for Sweden and Finland of the type now being
discussed or put into place by the U.S., the U.K., France, and others should be
made as unambiguous as possible. The clearer they are, the better the deterrent
they will be.
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