By Kevin D. Williamson
Wednesday, July 08, 2020
Conservatives are big on “Chesterton’s fence.” That’s G.
K. Chesterton’s principle that you cannot reform what you do not understand,
that you should not for the sake of convenience knock down a fence until you
understand why it was put up in the first place.
When encountering a fence in his way, Chesterton writes,
“the more modern type of reformer goes gaily up to it and says, ‘I don’t see
the use of this; let us clear it away.’ To which the more intelligent type of
reformer will do well to answer: ‘If you don’t see the use of it, I certainly
won’t let you clear it away. Go away and think. Then, when you can come back
and tell me that you do see the use of it, I may allow you to destroy it.’”
If you are interested in what defunding the police looks
like, Seattle has provided an excellent example in the form of CHOP, the few
blocks of the city’s Capitol Hill neighborhood that the city’s supine municipal
government ceded to the occupation of a left-wing militia, which declared
itself the law of the land. Seattle mayor Jenny Durkan, useless as teats on a
boar hog, declared that the scene in CHOP was just a big block party. The block
party soon broke out in gunfire and other acts of violence, and it ended with
the murder of children. Seattle did not send a platoon of social workers into
militia-occupied Seattle to restore order — Seattle sent the police.
Call them Chesterton’s cops.
If they would be reformers rather than deformers, the
people who are calling for the abolition of city police departments — “Yes, We
Literally Mean Abolish the Police” reads the helpful New York Times
headline — should begin by trying to understand why it is we have police
departments in the first place. (They are not interested in being reformers;
that Times headline is followed by the underline: “Because reform won’t
happen.”) As I wrote a few months ago, the familiar city police department is a
relatively new kind of institution: We have had courts, bailiffs, and sheriffs
going back into antiquity (a duke runs a duchy, a count runs a county, a
sheriff runs a shire — he is a shire reeve), but there were no police
departments until Robert Peel organized the Metropolitan Police in London in
1829. His program of “policing by consent” was a response to particular
problems in his time and presents
some useful principles for our own.
Before there were police, there were many different
competing models for providing security. The old Mafia, for example, performed
many of the functions of a modern municipal government, from adjudicating
disputes to policing public morality as a kind of Sicilian mutaween. The
Mafia way of doing things remains pretty common in much of the world: The
Taliban, for example, represents a similar combination of moral police,
social-service provider, adjudicator, and criminal gang. The shortcomings of
that way of managing community life are reasonably well-understood — the
Sheriff of Nottingham was the corrupt villain of the Robin Hood stories, Wyatt
Earp was both a lawman and a career criminal, hired marshals tended to defer to
their paymasters. The king’s court was not reliably impartial. As legal
practice was regularized, a bureaucratic and professional police force evolved
to accompany it. The problems that the modern police department was created to
mitigate are very much still with us, and proposals to simply abolish them are
fundamentally unserious.
Those police forces have serious problems. In many
cities, the local police have through acts of unjustified and excessive
violence lost the confidence of at least part of the population, usually in
low-income non-white neighborhoods. Practically every big-city police
department in this country has been penetrated by organized-crime syndicates at
one time or another, from Los Angeles’s Rampart unit, which at its nadir was
little more than a gang with badges, to the NYPD detectives acting as enforcers
and hit men for the Lucchese and Gambino crime families. Less dramatic forms of
police corruption — soliciting and accepting bribes, extortion of drug-dealers
and other criminals, sexual exploitation, covering up the crimes of other
police officers — remain distressingly common. The headlong foolishness of the
police-abolition movement should not blind us to the severe and widespread
problems of modern police departments.
Those are problems that could be partially contained
through a combination of increased surveillance, professional independent
review, and reducing the political power of public-sector unions, which
reliably (and successfully) fight against enhanced discipline and oversight.
But many reform efforts, including the police-abolition project, promise to
recreate pre-Peel problems — some would-be reformers are blinded by ideology,
some are unwilling or unable to do the necessary intellectual work.
For example, the idea of “violence interrupters” has
enjoyed a slight resurgence in recent months, but the actual scholarship on the
experience of programs such as Chicago’s “CeaseFire” project provides very
little reason for optimism. A 2009 report sometimes cited as documenting the successes
of such programs contains a narrative of failure that would be hilarious if it
were not tragic: In a quest for “culturally appropriate messengers,” CeaseFire
hired former criminals and gang members, in some cases recruiting them while
they were still in prison awaiting release; some of those criminals were not quite
as reformed as one might hope (“Some violence interrupters struggled to adjust
to a nonviolent lifestyle”) and ended up as “persons of extreme interest” in
the very violence they were supposed to be mitigating. Program administrators
asked employees to warn them about any criminal activity in order to “avoid a
painful termination process or CeaseFire’s reputation being tarnished.” Because
there was money changing hands, politicians tried to control the hiring process
for patronage purposes. Hiring criminals estranged CeaseFire from the Chicago
police, who wanted the program to function in part as a network of paid
informers. Staff were taken away from program tasks to “work on perennial
funding crises.”
(Please
do read the entire report.)
The nexus of political patronage and criminality as a
means of attempting to keep the peace would have been familiar in the pre-Peel
era. Relying on the informal criterion of “community standing” rather than on
public institutions with formal rules, accountability, and oversight —
imperfectly realized as those may be — is not entirely unlike how things were
done in lawless parts of the Old West or in Mafia-run Sicily a century or two
ago. More to the point, it is precisely how things were being run in
militia-occupied Seattle, with predictably disastrous results. That does not
suggest a very fruitful avenue of reform.
The current atmosphere of chaos is both the fuel and the
fire. As of June, murders were up 34 percent year-over-year in Chicago, and
shootings were up 42 percent. In 2019, murders in Dallas spiked 30 percent,
reaching a ten-year high, and the city’s violent crime is rising in 2020.
Cleveland’s homicide rate is up 55 percent year-over-year. Violent crime in
Denver increased 21 percent during
the coronavirus lockdown.
Reform is a never-ending task. But we cannot address the problems with the police departments if we ignore the problems to which the police departments were a response to begin with.
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