By Jeffrey Goldberg
Sunday, July 27, 2014
Things change, of course—the only constant in the Middle
East is sudden and dramatic change—but as I write it seems as if Israel is
losing the war in Gaza, even as it wins the battle against Hamas’s rocket
arsenal, and even as it destroys the tunnels meant to convey terrorists
underground to Israel (and to carry Israeli hostages back to Gaza).
This is not the first time Israel has found itself losing
on the battlefield of perception. Why is it happening again? Here are six
possible reasons:
1. In a fight between a state actor and a non-state
actor, the non-state actor can win merely by surviving. The party with tanks
and planes is expected to win; the non-state group merely has to stay alive in
order to declare victory. In a completely decontextualized, emotion-driven
environment, Hamas can portray itself as the besieged upstart, even when it is
the party that rejects ceasefires, and in particular because it is skilled at
preventing journalists from documenting the activities of its armed wing. (I am
differentiating here between Hamas's leadership and Gaza's civilians, who are
genuinely besieged, from all directions.)
2. Hamas’s strategy is to bait Israel into killing
Palestinian civilians, and Israel usually takes the bait. This time, because of
the cautious nature of its prime minister, Israel waited longer than usual
before succumbing to the temptation of bait-taking, but it took it all the
same. (As I’ve written, the seemingly miraculous Iron Dome anti-rocket system
could have provided Israel with the space to be more patient than it was.)
Hamas’s principal goal is killing Jews, and it is very good at this (for those
who have forgotten about Hamas's achievements in this area, here is a reminder,
and also here and here), but it knows that it advances its own (perverse)
narrative even more when it induces Israel to kill Palestinian civilians. This
tactic would not work if the world understood this, and rejected it. But in the
main, it doesn’t. Why people don’t see the cynicism at the heart of terrorist
groups like Hamas is a bit of a mystery. Here is The Washington Post on the
subject:
The depravity of Hamas’s strategy seems lost on much of the outside world, which — following the terrorists’ script — blames Israel for the civilian casualties it inflicts while attempting to destroy the tunnels. While children die in strikes against the military infrastructure that Hamas’s leaders deliberately placed in and among homes, those leaders remain safe in their own tunnels. There they continue to reject cease-fire proposals, instead outlining a long list of unacceptable demands.
3. People talk a lot about the Jewish lobby. But the
worldwide Muslim lobby is bigger, comprising, among other components, 54
Muslim-majority states in the United Nations. Many Muslims naturally sympathize
with the Palestinian cause. They make their voices heard, and they help shape a
global anti-Israel narrative, in particular by focusing relentlessly on Gaza to
the exclusion of conflicts in which Muslims are being killed in even greater
numbers, but by Muslims (I wrote about this phenomenon here).
4. If you've spent any time these past few weeks on
Twitter, or in Paris, you know that anti-Semitism is another source of Israel’s
international isolation. One of the notable features of this war, brought to
light by the ubiquity and accessibility of social media, is the open, unabashed
expression of vitriolic Jew-hatred. Anti-Semitism has been with us for more
than 2,000 years; it is an ineradicable and shape-shifting virus. The reaction
to the Gaza war—from the Turkish prime minister, who compared Israel's behavior
unfavorably to that of Hitler's, to the Lebanese journalist who demanded the
nuclear eradication of Israel, to, of course, the anti-Jewish riots in
France—is a reminder that much of the world is not opposed to Israel because of
its settlement policy, but because it is a Jewish country.
5. Israel’s political leadership has done little in
recent years to make their cause seem appealing. It is impossible to convince a
Judeophobe that Israel can do anything good or useful, short of collective
suicide. But there are millions of people of good will across the world who
look at the decision-making of Israel’s government and ask themselves if this is
a country doing all it can do to bring about peace and tranquility in its
region. Hamas is a theocratic fascist cult committed to the obliteration of
Israel. But it doesn’t represent all Palestinians. Polls suggest that it may
very well not represent all of the Palestinians in Gaza. There is a spectrum of
Palestinian opinion, just as there is a spectrum of Jewish opinion.
I don’t know if the majority of Palestinians would
ultimately agree to a two-state solution. But I do know that Israel, while
combating the extremists, could do a great deal more to buttress the moderates.
This would mean, in practical terms, working as hard as possible to build
wealth and hope on the West Bank. A moderate-minded Palestinian who watches
Israel expand its settlements on lands that most of the world believes should
fall within the borders of a future Palestinian state might legitimately come to
doubt Israel’s intentions. Reversing the settlement project, and moving the
West Bank toward eventual independence, would not only give Palestinians hope,
but it would convince Israel’s sometimes-ambivalent friends that it truly seeks
peace, and that it treats extremists differently than it treats moderates. And
yes, I know that in the chaos of the Middle East, which is currently a vast
swamp of extremism, the thought of a West Bank susceptible to the predations of
Islamist extremists is a frightening one. But independence—in particular
security independence—can be negotiated in stages. The Palestinians must go
free, because there is no other way. A few months ago, President Obama told me
how he views Israel's future absent some sort of arrangement with moderate
Palestinians:
[M]y assessment, which is shared by a number of Israeli observers ... is there comes a point where you can’t manage this anymore, and then you start having to make very difficult choices. Do you resign yourself to what amounts to a permanent occupation of the West Bank? Is that the character of Israel as a state for a long period of time? Do you perpetuate, over the course of a decade or two decades, more and more restrictive policies in terms of Palestinian movement? Do you place restrictions on Arab-Israelis in ways that run counter to Israel’s traditions?
Obama raised a series of prescient questions. Of course,
the Israeli government's primary job at the moment is to keep its citizens from
being killed or kidnapped by Hamas. But it should work to find an enduring
solution to the problem posed by Muslim extremism. Part of that fix is
military, but another part isn't.
6. Speaking of the Obama administration, the cause of a
two-state solution would be helped, and Israel's standing would be raised, if
the secretary of state, John Kerry, realized that such a solution will be
impossible to achieve so long as an aggressive and armed Hamas remains in place
in Gaza. Kerry's recent efforts to negotiate a ceasefire have come to nothing in
part because his proposals treat Hamas as a legitimate organization with
legitimate security needs, as opposed to a group listed by Kerry's State
Department as a terror organization devoted to the physical elimination of one
of America's closest allies. Here is David Horovitz's understanding of Kerry's
proposals:
It seemed inconceivable that the secretary’s initiative would specify the need to address Hamas’s demands for a lifting of the siege of Gaza, as though Hamas were a legitimate injured party acting in the interests of the people of Gaza — rather than the terror group that violently seized control of the Strip in 2007, diverted Gaza’s resources to its war effort against Israel, and could be relied upon to exploit any lifting of the “siege” in order to import yet more devastating weaponry with which to kill Israelis.
I'm not sure why Kerry's proposals for a ceasefire seem
to indulge the organization that initiated this current war. Perhaps because
Kerry may be listening more to Qatar, which is Hamas's primary funder, than he
is listening to the Jordanians, Emiratis, Saudis, and Egyptians, all of whom
oppose Hamas to an equivalent or greater degree than does their ostensible
Israeli adversary. In any case, more on this later, as more details emerge
about Kerry's efforts. For purposes of this discussion, I'll just say that
Israel won't have a chance of winning the current struggle against Hamas's
tunnel-diggers and rocket squads if its principal ally doesn't appear to fully
and publicly understand Hamas's nihilistic war aims, even as it works to shape
more constructive Israeli policies in other, related areas.
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