Monday, June 11, 2012
As hostilities in Syria roll on unabated, the civilian
casualties rise because of combat operations in urban areas and execution-style
killings. In response, calls for U.S. military intervention of one sort or
another to aid the opposition increase, while the Obama administration dithers
over whether to continue relying on the United Nations Security Council and
former U.N. secretary general Kofi Annan.
But what are the American interests at stake, and what is
the best way to protect them? Although it is easy to concentrate on the
stomach-churning television images, we should operate on the basis of strategy,
not emotion. That does not mean doing nothing. But neither does it mean
knee-jerk reactions instead of careful analysis.
Syria’s Assad family–Baath party dictatorship had nothing
to recommend it before the current conflict, other than its being the devil we
knew. Now, it is increasingly an Iranian satellite under Tehran’s growing
regional influence. Syria remains a threat to Israel; has continuing aspirations
to control Lebanon while serving as a conduit to supply and support the
terrorist group Hezbollah; provides a base of operations for Russian military
activity in the Middle East; and is quite possibly the site of ongoing, illicit
nuclear-weapons activity by Iran and North Korea, despite Israel’s destruction
of a Syrian nuclear reactor in September 2007.
Accordingly, regime change in Syria is prima facie in
America’s interest as well as the interests of Israel and our Arab friends in
the region, who see nothing but danger for themselves if Iran’s hegemonic
ambitions unfold successfully. Why Republicans and Democrats alike have coddled
Syria’s tyrants over the years is extraordinarily difficult to understand. Of
course, as with overthrowing Saddam Hussein and Moammar Qaddafi, there is the
question of what will replace a concededly distasteful regime. And today, that
uncertainty is a major factor constraining our options for dealing with Syria’s
conflict.
It would have been one thing to work with the Syrian
diaspora to remove Assad and the Baath party when we had a massive military
presence in Iraq, right on Syria’s border. In the days just after Saddam’s
ouster in 2003, conditions were optimal (if nonetheless imperfect) for
overthrowing Assad and replacing his regime with something compatible with
American interests. We would not have needed to use U.S. ground forces. Our
mere presence in Iraq could have precluded Iran — or, what we see today, an
Iraq under Iran’s influence — from trying to protect Assad.
That possibility is now much more remote, given the
widespread infiltration of the anti-Assad forces by al-Qaeda and other
terrorists. In truth, we do not know enough about the opposition’s political or
military leadership (which currently, at least, appears confused and divided)
to predict who would prevail in the immediate aftermath of Assad’s overthrow.
In such circumstances, the risk of a radical Islamist regime’s replacing Assad
is considerably higher than it would have been if we had moved to oust him
years ago. A relatively orderly exit by Assad is one thing. A disorderly,
indeed chaotic exit is quite another, especially given the risk that Syria’s
chemical- and biological-weapons assets, and possibly nuclear assets, might
fall into hands even worse than Assad’s.
There is one other important consideration. Assad and his
father routinely butchered their Sunni political opponents to protect their
political base in the Alawi sect, an offshoot of Shia Islam. If the civilians
whose bodies we have seen recently on television were the victims of Alawite
militias or Syrian government forces, it is, sadly, more of the same. There is
little doubt that the Sunni desire for revenge is strong. After years of
oppression and brutality, how could it not be? Accordingly, we are blinking at
reality if we do not recognize that, following Assad’s ouster, especially if
the violence grew, the bloodlust would be high and the risk of large-scale
massacres of Alawites all too real. How would we feel if U.S. weapons were used
in such massacres? Without a substantial on-the-ground troop presence, we could
no more prevent them than we can prevent the current killings of civilians.
Advocates of U.S. intervention argue that, if we are
unwilling to supply weapons to the opposition, we can at least declare a no-fly
zone along the Turkish border and continue to supply non-lethal assistance.
This less visible approach implicitly acknowledges that Arab states determined
to prevent Iran from consolidating its hold over Syria are now arming the
rebels and will continue to do so. Of course, they will arm factions they
believe are congenial to their interests, and not necessarily those congenial
to ours, a fact we can do little to change. Indeed, any level of U.S. support,
if it turns out to be effective, implies the same potential political and
humanitarian problems as does U.S. support that is truly robust. The more
effective our aid is, the more likely the opposition is to prevail. The issue
is whether we want that to happen when we have so little understanding of, let
alone influence over, what a successor regime would be like.
Assad remains in power because of Russia and Iran, with
China supporting him in the background. Russia has been providing arms,
economic and financial assistance, and full political backing to the Syrian
government. Iran has done the same and more. According to credible reports,
officers of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards are aiding Syrian-government
forces and even directing them in combat. While China has no significant direct
stake in Assad’s future, it does have a stake in staying close to Russia, in
hopes that Moscow will support Beijing on issues where China’s interests are
much stronger, such as North Korea and, potentially, China’s assertive
territorial claims in the South and East China Seas. On June 1, the U.N. Human
Rights Council voted to condemn the violence against Syria’s civilians, and
only three countries voted no: Russia, China, and Cuba.
Both Russia and Iran are prepared to shed a lot of Syrian
blood, civilian or otherwise, to keep Assad in power, because it is in their
interests, as they perceive them, to do so. And neither Moscow nor Tehran is
much swayed by emotional arguments or by that perennial bugaboo for Western
diplomats: “isolation” from the international community. Consider the expulsion
of Syrian diplomats from Western capitals at the end of May. Does anyone
seriously think Assad will change course because his diplomats now have to
return to Damascus? Do any of us doubt that the Europeans (and Obama) will
quietly welcome those Syrian diplomats back in due course if Assad prevails?
Significantly, U.S. intervention could not be confined to
Syria and would inevitably entail confronting Iran and possibly Russia. This
the Obama administration is unwilling to do, although it should.
In the case of Russia, such a confrontation would likely
break the famous “reset” button beyond repair. As a president waiting for
reelection so he can be more “flexible” toward Moscow, Obama is simply
incapable of contemplating this step.
In the case of Iran, U.S. military assistance to Syrian
rebels would almost certainly end any prospect of further negotiations over
Iran’s nuclear-weapons program. In fact, that would be no great loss, since
Iran was never going to negotiate away its longstanding nuclear-weapons
aspirations, a reality that Obama is congenitally unable to acknowledge. Syria
today is the focal point of the ancient Sunni–Shia conflict, which is well
beyond America’s power to resolve. Rather than encourage more fighting in
Syria, we should concentrate on eliminating Tehran’s nuclear-weapons program.
So doing would make our Arab friends less worried by, and more able on their
own to rebuff, Iran’s politico-military adventurism around the region.
Unsurprisingly, the United Nations has failed, is
failing, and will continue to fail to resolve the Syria conflict. The Security
Council is and will remain hopelessly divided, given Russian and Chinese
intransigence. Kofi Annan’s ill-fated ceasefire plan and his overall approach
prove beyond dispute that negotiations require a negotiator with something in
his back pocket other than a white handkerchief. So long as the various Syrian
factions believe they can prevail militarily, they have no incentive to
negotiate or compromise. Even the Obama administration now seems to recognize
that the U.N. is an empty vessel.
Obama is not up to the job in Syria. The gravest risk of
American involvement is that his administration and Iran might find common
ground in the Middle East chess game: Iran would allow Assad to fall, losing
its pawn, and in exchange Obama would agree to do even less than he is doing
now to stop Iran’s nuclear-weapons program, allowing Iran to protect its queen.
The prospect of such a nightmare scenario, which the Europeans could well
accept, is palpable.
The case of Libya provides no encouragement. Unlike
Assad, Qaddafi had zero outside support. In any event, post-Qaddafi Libya is
hardly something to boast about. Indeed, Libya’s prospects themselves
demonstrate that the chimerical “responsibility to protect” doctrine under
which Obama justified U.S. intervention is not tethered either to reality or to
American interests. To extend “responsibility to protect” to Syria without
contemplating the larger consequences for our interests worldwide would simply
be irresponsible. Advancing those interests sensibly might make it possible to
ameliorate the situation in Syria, but we must first set our logic and
priorities in order.
Thus, neither U.S. military assistance to the opposition
nor current administration policy, which has stumbled from failure to failure
over the past year, will advance legitimate American interests. If we assume,
however, that Obama wakes up to reality — or, more likely, that the conflict in
Syria drags on until Governor Romney’s January 20, 2013, inauguration — what
should we conclude the United States ought to do? Or must we simply watch the
killing continue?
First and foremost, we should cut Syria off from its
major supporters. The television images from Syria will not change permanently
until the underlying strategic terrain changes permanently. Russia should be
told in no uncertain terms that it can forget about sustained good relations
with the United States as long as it continues to back Assad. We should resume
full-scale, indeed accelerated, efforts to construct the limited
missile-defense system designed by George W. Bush to protect American territory
not against Russia but against rogue states such as Iran and North Korea. But
we should immediately make it clear to Moscow that we will begin to consider
broadening our missile-defense program to deal with Russian and Chinese
ballistic-missile capabilities. We should also announce our withdrawal from the
New START arms-control treaty, and our utter disinterest in negotiations to
prevent an “arms race” in space. Let Moscow and Beijing think about all that
for a while.
The magnitude of such a shift as a response to the
conflict in Syria may seem startling, but each of these proposals is meritorious
on its own terms. Wrapping several major policy redirections around the Syria
problem thus advances multiple objectives simultaneously. Both Russia and China
think Obama is weak, that America is declining, and that they can ignore our
views on Syria and many other issues with complete impunity. It is time for a
wake-up call to the Kremlin and Zhongnanhai.
Next, we should tell Iran that our patience with their decade-long ploy of using diplomacy to gain time to advance their nuclear-weapons program has ended. Tehran should face a stark choice, and we can leave to their imagination what will happen if they fail immediately to dismantle all aspects of their existing nuclear effort. We should also reverse the fantasy still trumpeted by Obama that, despite its repeated violations of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty over 20 years, Iran is somehow entitled to a “peaceful” nuclear program. Until there is a new, trustworthy regime in Tehran, there can be no claim to benefits or “rights” under a treaty Iran has grossly abused. We should introduce this new reality to our European friends as well, perhaps by simply being unambiguous with them.
Finally, in Syria itself, we should do now what we could
have begun to do ten years ago (and what the Obama White House at least says it
is doing now): find Syrian rebel leaders who are truly secular and who oppose
radical Islam; who will disavow al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and other terrorist
groups; and who will reject Russian and Iranian hegemony over their country. We
will need some reason to believe that this opposition can prevail against not
only the Assad regime but also the terrorists and fanatics who also oppose
Assad. This must be not a faith-based judgment but a clear-eyed assessment of
reality. Such is the kind of opposition that, assuming it exists, we should
support, aiming for regime change in Damascus when — and only when — it becomes
feasible on our terms. On this matter, too, we should tell our European allies
that we want their support for something other than semiotic diplomacy.
If we had pursued these kinds of policies after Saddam
Hussein’s overthrow in 2003, we might today be in a very different place in the
Middle East and have avoided much of the ongoing bloodshed. Better late than
never.
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