Friday, June 22, 2012
There must be something in the water in Scandinavia:
Nobel laureates, from our president to Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz, all
agree that high levels of inequality are a serious problem, if not the problem,
facing our weak economy.
According to this liberal thesis, either the 2008
financial crisis and its attendant recession, or the sluggish recovery — and
maybe both — can be attributed in large part to the high level of economic
inequality in the United States. Further, in this view, inequality is an economic
malady on its own, even in times of prosperity. Liberal commentators, of
course, assert this as if it were a truism, but worse, economists of real
distinction trumpet it like scientific fact.
Joseph Stiglitz, who claims that “there is broad consensus
that one of the reasons for the weakness in the economy is the huge level of
inequality,” further contends that the plight of the 99 percent is of such dire
economic consequence that the 1 percent can’t afford to ignore the chasm.
Sounding even more empirically minded, President Obama asserts that “research
has shown that countries with less inequality tend to have stronger and
steadier economic growth over the long run.”
But if there is a broad consensus in economics and social
science on anything, it is certainly not this. For those who claim otherwise,
ideology has taken the place of empiricism.
There are two elements of the ubiquitous thesis:
Increased inequality generally slows economic growth, and it contributes to
financial crises such as our current one. But there’s never been much good
evidence to support either assertion. The best evidence for a causal link
between inequality and economic growth, alluded to in the president’s cryptic
claim above, is an IMF paper that suggests economic booms last longer and are
steadier in countries with less income inequality. But this link relies on
countries such as Cameroon and Colombia (two of the cases examined) —
dysfunctional nations with extreme inequality that often leads to pervasive
rent-seeking or political instability, causing uneven economic growth. For the
question of inequality in the U.S., the most relevant study on the topic, which
considers industrialized nations over the course of the 20th century, finds no
meaningful link between inequality and income growth.
There is also almost no evidence that economic inequality
causes financial crises. As a recent paper by Michael Bordo and Christopher
Meissner argues, there is no “general relationship” between inequality and
credit booms and crises — it isn’t hard to find a correlation between the two,
but these two dynamics are also correlated with a huge number of other economic
factors. Mark Thoma, a liberal professor of economics at the University of
Oregon, has admitted, “I am not saying that the evidence stacks up against the
idea that inequality contributed to the recession, it could very well be true .
. . [but] the evidence I’m aware of doesn’t tell us much one way or the other.”
Scott Winship, of the Brookings Institute, explains that
he finds it “amazing how willing some of the biggest names in economics are to
assert that the growth in inequality has had deleterious consequences,” when
“there’s little good evidence it has had important effects on opportunity,
growth, stability, or politics.”
Because these big names probably do know there is no good
statistical evidence for their thesis, they rely on a particular analytic
narrative: A large increase in inequality encourages more consumer debt,
leading to corporate cash gluts and asset bubbles, and, eventually, a financial
crisis, which leads to a stubborn depression.
When laid out on the editorial pages of the New York
Times, this may sound sensible, even obvious, but the case for causality rests
on many unproven assumptions and links. For instance, this theory assumes that,
when they face greater income inequality, middle-class households run up debt
in order to maintain their level of consumption relative to others. But it
turns out that inequality of consumption has closely tracked inequality of
income; that is, as the rich have gotten richer, the middle class has not been
increasing its debt for the sake of keeping up with the Joneses. The credit
boom and subsequent crisis probably happened for other reasons.
Further, the only two case studies in support of this
storyline are the Great Depression and our recent financial crisis. These
crises can be readily explained by traditional causes of credit booms, such as
low interest rates, economic expansion, and national current-account deficits.
As Bordo and Meissner’s paper explains, “the anecdotal evidence from several
historical credit booms finds little support for the inequality/crisis
hypothesis.”
Another key tenet of the inequality thesis is that
growing income inequality has given the super-rich the ability to dominate and
exploit our political system. But wealthy citizens’ outsized ability to
influence our political system isn’t sufficient proof of this; it must be shown
that the extreme wealth (and comparative poverty) created by America’s growing
inequality has allowed the super-rich to exploit politics in economically
problematic ways. It seems doubtful that, for instance, higher CEO pay has
given CEOs significantly greater political influence than the top decile or
percentile of American society has ever had before. In fact, greater levels of
wealth seem even less relevant when one considers the relative pittances spent
on politics: Liberals worry that the shadowy rich might spend $2 billion on
this year’s presidential election, or one-third of what Americans spent on
Porsches last year.
In addition, besides lower marginal tax rates (which many
wealthy Americans don’t want), it’s not entirely clear what an American
political system at the disposal of the wealthy would look like. There is no
one set of economic policies favoring ultra-wealthy corporations: Some
businesses benefit from more regulation or protectionism, others from less. The
causal argument linking growing inequality with policies that favor the elite
and hinder economic growth does sometimes bear out in developing nations, where
it is possible for the wealthy and the politically connected to capture
industry or natural resources.
This dynamic does not obtain in the United States;
America’s super-rich are nothing like the political-economic elites who run the
developing world. This is not least because America retains fairly healthy
middle-to-upper-class mobility. Most of the top 1 percent of income earners
drop out of that category after a few years, representing nothing like a
calcified super-rich overclass of individuals protecting their interests over
the course of decades.
Further, the evidence, discussed above, that high levels
of inequality might make growth unsteady relies on a different, and
contradictory, dynamic — that is, the idea that politicians in more unequal
societies are more likely to resort to inefficient redistributionist policies
(such as punishingly high tax rates on the rich, or the nationalization of an
industry). Thus, even if we live in a society where income inequality has begun
to burden the economy, the evidence suggests that the worst thing we could do
might be to ask the federal government to address it.
Some liberal economists point to the lack of monetary stimulus
as evidence of an economic system tilted toward the wealthy: The Federal
Reserve has chosen to protect the investor class from inflation, rather than
moving to address unemployment. Those interests may or may not thus aligned,
but there’s no evidence that the Fed has chosen its policies to protect the
interests of the upper class at the expense of everyone else.Polls indicate
that most Americans want the Federal Reserve to be audited or otherwise reined
in, rather than allowed to address unemployment via monetary policies that
would either risk inflation or actively encourage it. Have the super-rich
brainwashed the public?
Indeed, Krugman and Robin Wells came close to admitting
as much by laying out an even more tenuous explanation in an April Salon article:
Inequality causes political polarization; polarization causes policy paralysis;
policy paralysis causes economic stagnation. In other words, inequality may be
bad for the economy, if you buy a series of connections that have no solid
basis in evidence.
If income inequality doesn’t pose a problem for our
economy, does it contribute to social maladies that might merit a public-policy
response, or that might eventually have a bearing on our economic growth?
Again, empirical studies find little reason to think so: Works such as the 2009
book The Spirit Level find some cross-national link between inequality and
various social ills, but more rigorous research suggests that these simple
correlations don’t really tell us much — countries might have more or less
equality and have better social outcomes because of another lurking variable.
When one examines the effects of increased inequality on measures of well-being
— as Christopher Jencks of Harvard’s Kennedy School did in a 2002 paper — one
finds little evidence of such a connection.
Further, when inequality grows, it does so more at
certain levels than at others, and the poor are not the ones left behind.
Instead, gaps widen between the wealthy and the middle class; the rich get
richer in real terms, while the median income and lower-percentile incomes are
unaffected. This is not to say that inequality does not cause any social ills,
but there remains little substantial evidence of what they might be.
In view of the evidence, one may still argue that inequality
is intrinsically a problem; conservatives as well as liberals might find
spectacular levels of inequality to be unseemly or morally problematic. But
since there is little evidence that greater inequality per se presents a
problem for our economy, economists, politicians, and pundits should not baldly
assert that it is a public-policy problem, and certainly not our nation’s most
pressing one.
Indeed, the ubiquity of liberals’ inequality thesis, and
the confidence with which they assert it, betrays something important about the
Left.
Egalitarian liberals worship equality and find inequality
so disturbing that they blindly assume there must be evidence that it causes
social ills. If they did not also idolize empiricism, they might be more
willing to admit that their concern is ideological, not pragmatic.
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