By Andrew Stuttaford
Thursday, March 28, 2019
Loosening the ties that bound the U.K. into the EU was
always going to be complicated. Dropping out of Brussels’ relentless trudge
towards political integration is not in itself too great a challenge, but doing
so in a way that minimizes the damage to Britain’s economic access to its
European markets is an entirely different matter. To Brussels, economic and
political integration are inextricably intertwined. Preserving as much of the
benefit of the former while escaping the latter needs patience, diplomatic
savvy, a realistic understanding of the EU’s workings, and the ability to weigh
the strength (or otherwise) of the U.K.’s negotiating position. Since the
Brexit vote on June 23, 2016, Britain’s Conservative government has displayed
no sign of any of these qualities.
None. Not one.
This was an operation calling for a scalpel. Theresa May
chose to try her luck with a blunt, rusty saw. The result has been a
predictably bloody mess. After dithering and then overplaying her hand, May
came up with a scheme — the Chequers Plan — that was received with disdain in
the U.K. and which the EU threw back in her face.
May ploughed on. London and Brussels have now structured
a two-part deal. The first part, the Withdrawal Agreement, which would be
legally binding, governs the terms of the U.K.’s departure from the EU. Its
provisions include a transition period ending on December 31, 2020. The second,
the non-binding Political Declaration, sketches out Britain’s longer-term
relationship with the bloc. It envisages an “ambitious, broad, deep and
flexible partnership”. Sounds good, but before reaching that happy state, Brits
can expect a brutal trade negotiation in which the skeptic isle will be trying
to cut the best deal it can with a greedy, aggrieved and much larger counterparty.
As it does so, London will also have to keep a sharp eye on the clock. This new
“partnership” must be in place by the conclusion of the transition period
(which can be extended by one to two years).
All this assumes that the U.K. has entered the Withdrawal
Agreement. If its terms have not been accepted by Parliament before April 12,
the U.K. can request a much longer extension (the original date for Brexit Day,
incidentally, was March 29). Alternatively, Britain can either give up on
Brexit (it is able do this unilaterally) or abandon any attempt to enter into
the agreement, in which case it will face a “no deal” Brexit from April 12, a
grim prospect, euphemistically known by more Panglossian Euroskeptics as the
WTO option. If, on the other hand, the U.K. signs up for the agreement and — a
detail not to be forgotten — the agreement is ratified by the European
Parliament and approved by the EU’s other member states, it will leave the EU
on May 22 and the transition period will begin.
As things currently stand, it is (to put it mildly)
uncertain that the Withdrawal Agreement can get through Parliament. A flawed
prime minister acting on flawed premises has, not unsurprisingly, negotiated a
flawed deal. Some of its drawbacks were inevitable, but that does not ease
their sting. During the transition period, the U.K. will effectively be a
voteless member of the EU, a rule-taker with no say: It will be the “vassal
state” of Euroskeptic rhetoric, a condition made yet more aggravating by the
fact that the U.K. will be paying a large divorce bill (roughly £39 billion).
What has caused the most trouble, however, is the so-called Irish backstop.
Whatever the rights, wrongs, and necessity of the
backstop, the intention behind it (at least nominally: there are other darker
theories) is to avoid a potentially destabilizing “hard” border between
Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. It provides that, prior to reaching a
permanent agreement satisfactory to all sides (how long will that take?) that
defuses the border problem, the U.K. will enter into a “single customs
territory” with the EU, a state of affairs that theoretically could endure for
years. Among other problems, this would mean putting a brake on Britain’s plans
to cut its own trade deals independent of Brussels, a major reason (to some)
for Brexit. In an additional twist of the knife, for as long as the backstop is
in force, Northern Ireland will be obliged to remain in closer regulatory
alignment with the EU than will the rest of the U.K.. This would insert a
degree of separation between Britain and the province, an extraordinarily
sensitive issue for Ulster’s Protestant majority and more than a touch
embarrassing for the Tories, a party formally known as the Conservative and
Unionist Party. Wait, there’s more: Since May threw away her parliamentary
majority in 2017’s election campaign, her government has been dependent on the
support of Northern Ireland’s (Protestant) Democratic Unionist Party. The
D.U.P. really, really, doesn’t like the backstop.
The Withdrawal Agreement’s debut in the 650-member House
of Commons in January was not a success. It was defeated by a majority of 230,
the biggest loss by any British government in modern (and perhaps not just
modern) history. Accompanied, after talks with Brussels, by what lawyers,
rarely reassuringly, call a comfort letter, the agreement returned to Westminster’s
Orient Express on March 13, only to be murdered again. This time it was felled
by a majority of 149, merely the fourth-largest such loss on record: progress
of a sort, but alarming with less than three weeks to go before that original
March 29 deadline (the extension was only agreed to on March 21).
With Brussels insisting the Withdrawal Agreement was not
up for renegotiation, May’s strategy appeared to be to keep repeating the same
question, and bet that a glimpse of the approaching abyss would scare MPs into
submission. On March 14, the House of Commons passed a motion against leaving
the EU without a deal — a nice gesture, but “no deal” remains the default
position. If nothing is agreed, Britain crashes out of the EU. The abyss,
however, has not proved as terrifying as the prime minister might (quite
reasonably) have hoped. Based on very little evidence, some Tories,
particularly those associated with the European Research Group — a group noted
for the depth of its Euroskepticism and the shallowness of its research —
contended that the abyss was little more than a ditch. Other Conservatives seem
to be relying on the EU’s tradition of cutting last-minute deals, apparently
oblivious to the distinction between going the extra mile for someone staying
in the club and for someone on the way out. Meanwhile there are many in the
opposition Labour party who are well aware that a chaotic Brexit will do their
election chances no harm.
May’s plan to keep asking MPs the same question has since
run into an unanticipated obstacle. On March 18, John Bercow, the Speaker of
the House of Commons (a somewhat Napoleonic figure, minus hat and
achievements), ruled, citing a principle dating back to 1604, that the
agreement could not be put to the vote again without “substantial changes.”
Changes, in other words, of a type that Brussels had already said it would not
consider.
In another sign that power is sliding away from May’s
spavined government and towards the legislature, MPs then decided to hold a
series of “indicative” votes on (broadly) the type of Brexit they would like to
see. It was an innovative response to the current impasse. The EU is unwilling
to give any more time to allow for discussion of a deal that Parliament has no
intention of passing, but if a form of Brexit could be found that had the
support of the Commons, well, who knows? There has, after all, been some talk
of longer extensions.
That said, Parliament’s effort to find some sort of
resolution did not start well. Eight “next steps” were presented to MPs on
Wednesday, and eight “next steps” were rejected. The madness of “no deal” was
heavily defeated, but by less of a margin than the fantasy of “managed” no
deal. Both, naturally, outperformed the eminently sensible “Norway option,” as
did both Labour’s ludicrously unrealistic “plan” and “Common Market 2.0,” a
less attractive variant of Norway. A suggestion that Article 50 should be
revoked in the event of an imminent no deal was rejected a little more
decisively than I might have expected. The two proposals that came closest to
passing were a call for a second referendum to confirm Brexit and a suggestion
that the U.K. should enter into a customs union with the EU but avoid the
Single Market. The Institute of Economic Affairs’ Kristian Niemietz has previously
described the latter combination (which would, by the way, do nothing to
resolve the backstop conundrum) as “throwing away the burger and eating the
napkin.”
So what now? Courtesy of some procedural sleight of hand,
there will be a third vote on the Withdrawal Agreement on Friday, supposedly
made more enticing by May’s offer to step down if its passing leads to Brexit.
At the time of writing, it did not seem as if that long-overdue promise would
be enough to do the trick. The DUP remain opposed as, it seems, do many of
those Euroskeptic “researchers.” The Withdrawal Agreement might not be the only
revenant. There’s already talk of another round of indicative votes next week,
and backers of a number of the options are promising that next time, things will
be different. Maybe.
Best guess? Brexit will still take place: The how and the
when remain a mystery.
Tick, tock.
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