By Zach
Kessel
Thursday,
August 31, 2023
The notion
that words have meanings, and that those meanings matter, was once intuitive
for the Right. One of conservatism’s foundational texts — published even before
the movement coalesced in the pages of National
Review during the 1950s — is Richard Weaver’s Ideas Have
Consequences, in which the Southern Agrarian argued, among other things,
that the West’s broad acceptance of philosophical nominalism had led society to
reject absolute truth. On a larger scale, Weaver contended, the improper and
cavalier use of language had degraded and corrupted civilization. The
importance of language, of truth, and of the idea that words mean what they
mean has since been a cornerstone of movement conservatism.
In our
political culture, words are now losing their meanings. Many in the electoral
arena have demonstrated this reality. But the most recent offender is
Republican presidential candidate and pharmaceutical executive Vivek Ramaswamy.
Repeatedly attacked on foreign policy during last week’s debate, Ramaswamy
posted a clip of an interview on X, formerly
known as Twitter, in which he claimed that he “was the only non-neocon on the
stage” and that “no difference” exists between President Joe Biden, former
representative Liz Cheney (R., Wyo.), and his primary opponents on issues of
international affairs. Ramaswamy is not the only figure to misuse the term
“neocon” lately. Last Thursday, the Heritage Foundation’s Rob Bluey used the
term in a piece taking issue with National Review writers’ position
on Ukraine aid and their criticism of Heritage’s own view.
In the
popular imagination, the word “neoconservative” and its diminutive form conjure
memories of War on Terror–era interventionism associated with former president
George W. Bush’s administration. Used during that time to describe a set
of idealists who
believed the United States should promote democracy abroad and assist fledgling
nations in the development of civic institutions — “nation-building,” as it is
often known — the term has become an insult applying to any right-of-center
individual who supports an assertive U.S. foreign policy. The Bush-era use of
the word as an insult began on the left, embedding itself into popular culture
to the extent that the Rolling Stones released a song titled “Sweet Neo Con” in 2005
as a protest against Bush.
That
conception of neoconservatism has persisted into the contemporary political era
on both sides of the aisle. Running for the Republican presidential nomination
in 2015, Senator Ted Cruz (R., Texas) said, “If you look at President Barack
Obama and Hillary Clinton, and for that matter some of the more aggressive
Washington neocons, they have consistently misperceived the threat of radical
Islamic terrorism and have advocated military adventurism that has had the
effect of benefiting radical Islamic terrorists.”
Leaving
aside legitimate debates over the efficacy of American military engagements in
the Middle East, Cruz’s characterization of Obama’s and Clinton’s foreign
policy as aligning with neoconservatives is a stretch. After all, the chief
distinction between the group of people more accurately (though, as we will
see, not faithfully to the term’s original meaning) called neocons in the Bush
administration and many mainstream political figures of that era is the
desire to export American-style democracy to the rest of the world. Most
members of the House and Senate voted for the authorization of the use of
military force that began the War in Iraq, even those who would later regret
that decision. But very few of them did so because they wanted to impose
American-style democracy on the Middle East. Rather, they wanted to depose a
dictator they saw as a threat to U.S. national security. Certainly, those like
Hillary Clinton are not neocons in that sense of the word. But the term has
become, like so many others in our political lexicon, a stand-in for “people
with whom I disagree.”
What
makes that interesting is that neoconservatism has no real foreign-policy
platform. As Irving Kristol, the “godfather of neoconservatism,” once wrote, “there is no set of
neoconservative beliefs concerning foreign policy, only a set of attitudes
derived from historical experience.” That history- and results-oriented outlook
is a core tenet of neoconservatism, which Kristol described as a “persuasion,”
rather than an ideology. The term began life as a derogatory utterance,
first appearing in a 1973 piece in Dissent magazine by
democratic socialist Michael Harrington. The people of whom Harrington wrote
were men and women, formerly of the Left, who had journeyed rightward during
the 1960s, and Harrington’s charge was that these men and women had become
fellow travelers of the Right.
Kristol
and the other thinkers and writers with whom he associated were members of a
group known as the “New York Intellectuals,” a tribe of anti-Stalinist Marxists
who largely converged around the City College of New York, with some hailing
from New York and Columbia universities. Other members of the cohort included
such figures as Midge Decter, Nat Glazer, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Norman
Podhoretz. The group’s writing could often be found in the pages of left-wing
journals like Partisan Review and the aforementioned Dissent,
as well as in the then-leftist Commentary magazine, which New York
Intellectual Elliot E. Cohen founded in 1945.
Many New
York Intellectuals found themselves pushed rightward by their burgeoning
anti-communist beliefs. But it was a critique of liberal domestic politics that
characterized the neoconservative movement, not hawkishness on defense.
Kristol, often referred to as the “godfather of neoconservatism,” used
the Public Interest journal — which he and Harvard University
sociologist Daniel Bell founded in 1965 before the latter’s departure and
replacement by Glazer in 1973 — to warn against the unintended
consequences of former President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society programs and
the rise of the New Left. The neoconservatives made their initial mark on the
broader movement through the Public Interest, imbuing conservatism
with a sociological depth and academic seriousness characteristic of the
intellectual class from which its members came. As Jonah Goldberg wrote of NR
founder William F. Buckley’s appraisal of Kristol, Podhoretz, and company, “the
neocons . . . brought the new language of sociology to an intellectual
tradition that had been grounded more in Aristotelian thinking.” The heart of
neoconservatism can be boiled down to a Kristol quote: “The legitimate question to ask
about any program is ‘will it work?’”
The
neoconservatives, unlike those on the right who came before them, did not
repudiate Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal. Kristol once said that “in our
urbanized, industrialized, highly mobile society, people need governmental
action of some kind . . . they need such assistance; they demand it; they will
get it.” Rather than seeking to deconstruct the welfare state entirely, those
within the neoconservative milieu argued for a conservative version of what was
already in place. The neoconservatives understood that the state could not
change human nature, but that an evidence- and outcome-based social policy
could be a force for good. “A conservative welfare state should,” Kristol
wrote, “discriminate in favor of satisfactory human results, not humane
intentions.”
This
outcome-based approach characterized the legitimate members of the loose
connection of individuals known as neoconservatives. In fact, insofar as any
central foreign-policy doctrine existed among the group, it would have to be
one stemming from Jeane Kirkpatrick’s “Dictatorships
& Double Standards,” published in the November 1979 issue of Commentary.
Kirkpatrick argued that, in certain countries, democracy was an untenable
political system. Traditional autocrats, Kirkpatrick wrote, “do not
disturb the habitual rhythms of work and leisure, habitual places of residence,
habitual patterns of family and personal relations,” while their Marxist
counterparts “claim jurisdiction over the whole life of the society and make
demands for change that so violate internalized values and habits that
inhabitants flee by the tens of thousands.”
The
Carter administration, Kirkpatrick charged, had pressured pro-U.S. autocratic
governments the world over to liberalize, which in practice meant ceding
control of their countries to anti-American, Marxist revolutionaries, yet had
not extended the same rhetoric toward communist states. Though the U.S. was
right to support notions of liberalization and democratization within
autocracies, the folly came in assuming rapid reforms would not immediately
lead to a power vacuum that America’s enemies would then fill. To avoid
pro-Soviet revolution, she believed, the U.S. was required to support regimes
in alignment with its broader Cold-War interests. This foreign-policy doctrine
brought the movement’s core observations — a belief in universal morality
and an understanding that human nature cannot be perfected from above — from
the domestic stage into the international arena.
The
Bush-era intellectuals commonly referred to as neoconservatives would be more
accurately described as hard Wilsonians, as Max Boot — who was often described
as a neocon before his recent move leftward — wrote in 2002. “Advocates of this view embrace
Woodrow Wilson’s championing of American ideals but reject his reliance on
international organizations and treaties to accomplish our objectives,” Boot
explained. In fact, as Matthew Continetti explained in his 2022 book The
Right: The Hundred Year War for American Conservatism, some original
neocons were skeptical of the nation-building mission in Iraq. Irving Kristol,
he writes, “argued for a foreign policy of unilateral nationalism that had an
expansive view of the national interest while avoiding any large-scale
diplomatic or military commitments,” while Kirkpatrick “thought that a modest
foreign policy was appropriate for the post-Cold War world” and did not believe
in “democracy promotion as the central task of diplomacy.” This conflict
between those initially given the name and those to whom it later came to apply
only highlights neoconservatism’s lack of a uniform agenda.
The
coterie of intellectuals who became known as neoconservatives in the 1970s have
little in common with many described with that term today other than a belief
in an engaged U.S. on the international stage. Republicans like Ramaswamy, who
would apply that description to many lawmakers and thinkers in both of the
country’s political parties, ought to understand what the word actually means.
Perhaps by looking back to the neoconservatives and focusing on a results-oriented
approach to our nation’s ills, the Right can become a community of ideas once
again.