By Noah Rothman
Tuesday, January 28, 2020
The Trump administration misled the public about the
aftermath of Iran’s missile attacks on U.S. positions in Iraq—at least that
was how many media outlets characterized the revelation that 34 U.S. troops had
been treated for concussive injuries during Iran’s response to the strike that
killed Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps commander Qasem Soleimani. The
president has said, “we suffered no casualties.” While most of those troops
returned to duty shortly after the attack, some of those injuries were serious
enough that they were treated out of theater.
Accuracy is important, and the upward revision of U.S.
casualty statistics is newsworthy. And yet the tone that accompanied reports on
these revisions exposed a naked political agenda. The “credibility gap has been
a major problem as the Trump administration has tried to convince the American
people it’s doing the right thing in Iran,” declared Vanity Fair’s Bess
Levin in a typical response. To judge from the polling that was available when
Levin wrote those words, though, her assertion was more a veiled hope than
objective analysis.
Within the first week of the Soleimani strike, three
public opinion surveys demonstrated a consistent pattern of public support for
the administration’s actions. In each, pluralities favored the strike even if
the American public was trepidatious about what might come next. Nearly one
month later and with the benefit of hindsight, the American public is even more
comfortable. This week, a Washington Post/ABC News poll found that a
majority—53 percent—approved of the Soleimani strike with 41 percent opposed. A
general sense of anxiety about what Iran will do next remains pervasive‚—and
yet the public’s initial concerns about the prospect of a broader conflict with
Iran have abated substantially, as they should. Reducing the likelihood of that
kind of conflict is precisely what the Soleimani strike was designed to
achieve.
The possibility that Trump’s approach to containing and
destabilizing Iran is yielding dividends is one the president’s critics seem
incapable of entertaining. In the eyes of the Obama administration in exile and
their allies in the press, almost every act of Iranian aggression is Trump’s
fault.
“If you want to pin the blame on Iran, you’re going to
have to do extra due diligence and have some kind of international
investigation,” warned Obama’s former deputy national security advisor Ben
Rhodes in June 2019 following the sabotage of a series of vessels in the Strait
of Hormuz (an omission of the fact that the targeted nations had done precisely
that). If Iran was responsible for these attacks, Rhodes added, it would be an
expected response to Trump’s abrogation of the Iran nuclear accords. Rhodes’s
perspective was not shaken when Iran was starving Syrian civilians, killing
U.S.-backed anti-Assad rebels, threatening to choke off the Gulf of Aden via
proxy forces, orseizing American Navy vessels and holding U.S. sailors hostage
while the Iran deal was in force, so it’s unsurprising that it would persist.
“The United States is also completely isolated as we find
ourselves now on the brink of a much, much more serious conflict with Iran,”
Rhodes averred in the wake of the Soleimani strike. If the failure of these
dire predictions to materialize is a source of relief, Rhodes has done his best
to disguise his enthusiasm. “Reminder that Trump said he’d get us out of wars
in the Middle East but has sent 20,000 more troops there because of his
self-created crisis with Iran,” he recently remarked. The lack of any
appreciable “war” to speak of was no obstacle to this verdict.
Rhodes’s myopia isn’t unique to him. According to Obama’s
national security advisor Susan Rice, Trump’s last-minute decision to abort a
retaliatory strike against Iran for downing a U.S drone in June 2019 was a
welcome one. Meeting aggression with aggression would have “marked the beginning
of a costly war” because Iran would not have simply “swallowed” such an affront
to its sovereignty. The only prudent response to Iranian hostility, in her
view, was to unilaterally “pause” the build-up of deterrent forces in the
Middle East and hope for the best. And when Trump did finally respond in kind
to Iranian attacks, Rice predicted that Trump would inaugurate broader conflict
no matter how he responded to Iran’s inevitable reply. “It’s hard to envision
how this ends short of war,” she wrote. Confessing to a lack of vision might be
an admission against interest, but it’s a welcome first step on the path toward
introspection.
For months, Tehran demonstrated a willingness to court
risk, and a direct conflict with Iran appeared imminent. As Secretary of State
Mike Pompeo confessed last October, it was incumbent on the U.S. to “restore
deterrence.” That was a serious warning. When a revisionist adversary is
undeterred, it will test its freedom of action until it encounters an
unacceptable level of resistance. Neither Iran nor the U.S wants a war. But by
failing to calibrate its attacks, Iran could have easily miscalculated its way
into one. It was incumbent on the administration to impose costs on Iran that
would deter reckless acts of aggression against vital U.S. interests. Its
decision to neutralize a terrorist commander soaked
in American blood appears to have had the desired effect.
That is not to say that Iran’s provocations have abated.
Sporadic rocket and mortar attacks from inside Iraq on U.S. positions,
including Baghdad’s Green Zone, continue. But they are of the more sporadic
than the assaults U.S. forces regularly endured last November and December.
Foreign policy observers are correct to note that Iran is still likely to
respond in unpredictable ways to the killing of Soleimani, which could take the
form of asymmetric terrorist attacks on civilian targets far beyond the Middle
East. That’s a worrisome prospect, but we have to remember that Iran has
executed asymmetric attacks on soft targets since the Islamic Republic came
into existence. If that is the form Iranian retaliation takes, it is a return
to the status quo ante, and an indication that the Trump administration has
made the regime more cautious.
Which leads us back to the American political media’s
response to the news that Iran had, in fact, injured U.S. forces in its
calibrated and telegraphed ballistic missile attack. Trump was accused not only
of deceiving the public but also of callously downplaying the extent of the
injuries U.S troops suffered. But what reaction would the nation’s tastemakers
have preferred to see from the president? Histrionics? An ultimatum demanding
satisfaction from Iran? A kinetic response against Iranian military and
government targets? What strategic purpose would that have served other than to
upend the president’s successful effort to deescalate the conflict?
For so many of the last administration’s devotees, the
Trump administration’s approach to containing Iranian aggression is beyond
comprehension. They do not seem to have ever considered that this is less an
indictment of the president than a confession of their own insularity and
strategic blindness. The worst-case scenarios these and other Trump critics
imagined have thus far failed to materialize. That’s a relief to most
Americans, but it’s a double-edged sword for the president’s most committed
critics. The unavoidable implication that Trump and the hawks with whom he is
surrounded were right about Iran is too much for them to stomach.
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