By Art Keller
Monday, January 20, 2020
The death of Iranian Quds Force commander General Quassem
Soleimani has produced some truly bizarre media coverage. Some Western media
outlets are framing Soleimani’s death as the loss of a deeply beloved hero,
such in this January 7th episode of the New
York Times The Daily podcast. The podcast spends more than 20 minutes
describing how Soleimani was a beloved totem, a living security blanket that
Iranians believe protected Iran from instability (by fostering instability in
Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, apparently). The closest thing in the podcast
to an acknowledgement that Soleimani led a group of armed thugs that viciously
suppressed dissent in Iran, including turning their guns on Iranian protestors
less than two months ago, was a single sentence in the podcast: “To be clear,
there are plenty of Iranians who did not love or respect Soleimani.”
“Plenty” seems an inadequate way to characterize the
majority of Iranians. Seventy-nine
percent of Iranians would vote the Islamic Republic out of existence if
given a chance, according to one poll. Yet somehow that torrent of anti-regime,
anti-Soleimani sentiment was not deemed fit to discuss when describing how
Soleimani’s death was received in Iran.
Even more oddly pro-regime were stories blaming U.S.
President Donald Trump for the shooting down of the civilian airliner. The
downing has since led to ongoing anti-regime demonstrations all over Iran, in
which protestors are ripping down posters of the allegedly beloved Supreme
Leader and Soleimani, while pointedly walking around U.S. and Israeli flags
that the regime has painted on the ground to encourage people to tread on them.
Iranians have limited ways to challenge pro-regime propaganda, but deliberately
not disrespecting the U.S. flag is
one.
Preference falsification
Far too many of those covering the Iranian reaction to
Soleimani’s death never ask whether the crowds walking the streets in Tehran as
part of Soleimani’s funeral cortege had reasons for being there that had
nothing to do with mourning.
As the Iran analyst at the non-partisan Foundation for
the Defense of Democracies, Alireza Nader, told me, “The regime is good at
coercing crowds through threats and intimidation.” Which means media outlets
using crowd size as a metric to gauge support for the regime should try to
learn how many people are there of their own free will, and how many are, for
example, Iranian government employees given the day off from work and ordered
to show up. That’s a tactic the regime routinely uses to whip up anti-American
demonstrations. Duke professor Timur Kuran describes this mechanism in his
book, Private Truths and Public Lies,
which he calls “preference falsification, i.e. the act of misrepresenting our
wants under perceived social pressure.”
People will falsify their preferences about what they
really believe for a variety of reasons ranging from a simple desire to be
polite, all the way up to a wish not to get shot. Or to paraphrase Alireza
Nader from Twitter, “All the Iranians celebrating the death of Soleimani had to
do it at home.”
Many clerics loathe the
Supreme Leader
With pro-regime, pro-Soleimani parades being followed by
anti-regime protests and riots, it is easy for outside observers to be confused
about the true level of support for the regime, and how long it’s likely to
persist. The answer, as with most everything to do with Iran, is complex and
confusing, even for people who have been following Iran for years, as I have.
If, for example, you assume that because Iran is a
theocracy, the majority of the other Ayatollahs support the Supreme Leader,
Ayatollah Khamenei, you’d be wrong. He is quite unpopular among the Shia
clergy. (I explained why in greater detail in this piece for Foreign
Policy.) But the reason his clerical support is weak is that the whole
ruling system he’s at the center of, which translates as “the Rule of the
Islamic Jurist,” is considered a scam by most Shia clerics. Until Khomeini
seized power in 1979, most Shia clerics believed—and many still do, including
Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani in Iraq—it is not a religious leader’s place to
wield temporal power, but to provide wisdom in the form of clerical rulings,
and to be a marja, a spiritual guide
who lives life in a manner worthy of emulation. Other Ayatollahs have spoken
out against the excesses of the “Rule of the Islamic Jurist” including Grand
Ayatollah Montazeri, who was once Khomeini’s designated successor, but who was
placed under house arrest and died there.
Which brings us to the other reason why most Ayatollahs
don’t like the Supreme Leader. When Khamenei was selected as the successor for
Khomeini he was a mid-ranking cleric. Think a monsignor in the Catholic church,
slightly above a parish priest, but not by much. Then there’s the fact that
Khamenei’s claim to be a bona fide Ayatollah is a bit dubious. The clerical
rank of Ayatollah is granted by your peers after they have examined your
collected clerical rulings. Khamenei tried to pass that test with a collection
of uninspired rulings circulated among the Shia community in Pakistan that
hadn’t even been published in Iran. Imagine how popular you’d be in the
Catholic church if you promoted yourself from priest to Pope.
Khamenei retains the grudging support of much of the Shia
clergy, which largely amounts to agreeing to stay quiet and not interfere, by
the simple expedient of paying them off to the tune of hundreds of millions of
dollars a year. This made the news when an Iranian budget document was released
in late 2017 and immediately set off demonstrations because spending on items
like infrastructure was being cut while clerical subsidies increased.
An opposition without
leaders
Opposition to the regime is not just to be found in the
clergy. It is wide and deep but also unfocused. That is no accident. If there
is one thing police states are great at, it is making sure there are no
credible opposition leaders to rally around.
The last two major “opposition leaders” currently alive
in Iran are Mehdi Karroubi and Hussain Mousavi. Both have been under house
arrest for a decade after trying to lead anti-regime protests in 2009. As
opposition leaders, they have major flaws, including advanced age, but more
importantly, they are tainted by association with the regime. Both served in
the government of Ayatollah Khomeini just after the 1979 Revolution. During
this time, thousands of Iranians were designated as “enemies,” including
Marxists, intellectuals, and supporters of the deposed Prime Minister Mohammed
Mosaddeq. These secular allies, who had helped Khomeini overthrow the Shah,
were immediately stabbed in the back once the Shah was gone as part of
Khomeini’s consolidation of power.
Outside of Iran, opposition to the regime has two homes.
The first is Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, living in exile
in the United States. Several sources I spoke to suggested that Pahlavi has a
deep well of support to draw on. But Pahlavi is currently sitting on the
sidelines and not trying to rally opposition to the regime. This lack of
activity may be one reason Pahlavi is still breathing. Iran hasn’t been shy
about using assassins to take out opposition figures, including a wave of
killings in Europe in the 1980s, and at least one in the U.S.
The other is the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq, or MEK, a militant
political organization with roots in Marxism dedicated to overthrowing the
regime. The MEK has an effective propaganda machine, plenty of money, and ties
to the American government. Several years ago, it not only managed to get
itself off of the State Department’s terrorism watch list, a place it had
earned by planning attacks against Americans in the U.S., but got Republican
luminaries Rudy Giuliani and John Bolton to speak at MEK-sponsored rallies.
The main problem with the MEK is that everyone not on the
MEK payroll considers the group to be a cult.
That stems, in part, from having taken money from Saddam
Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war, and then fighting on Saddam’s side. Now that
Saddam has gone, the MEK is reported to be taking stacks of cash and gold from
the Saudis, whom many Iranians hate even more than they hated the Iraqis during
the Saddam era.
It’s not about oil. It’s
about water.
One man I spoke to believes he knows what will ultimately
fire up the opposition to the regime: water. Iran is running out, fast. Nothing
to do with climate change, and everything to do with the sort of epic state
mismanagement reminiscent of China’s “Great Leap Forward.”
I learnt this from Nikahang Kowsar. Dedicated Iran
watchers know Kowsar as an outsized critic of the regime, a voice amplified by
his skill as a political cartoonist. If you’ve ever seen a cartoon about Iran
imbued with a brilliant, brutal sarcasm, odds are Kowsar drew it. His work has
appeared in prominent outlets around the world, but before he ever picked up
his cartoonist’s pen he was a geologist. He was ultimately forced to leave Iran
after being imprisoned and interrogated for his cartoons mocking the regime.
But before that happened, he told the so-called “moderate” president of Iran,
Mohammed Khatami, that Iran’s water management practices were going to
eventually push the regime off a cliff. Kowsar believes his warning, delivered
almost 20 years ago, is about to become a reality. Iran is headed for a drought
of biblical proportions, according to him, one that is already underway if you
look at rural migration patterns. And continuing regime mismanagement is making
it worse:
I believe that Iran is going to
face a dire situation in the next few years and it’s not going to be
sustainable. Based on the numbers that the government just published last year,
by 2013, when Rohani became the president, we had 12 million people living in
city margins. In 2018, the number rose to 19.5 million. That means
seven-and-a-half million in just five years.
Kowsar asserts the people moving to the
cities—shantytowns and slums, for the most part—are rural people who can no
longer work their land as they’re running out of water. He estimates that Iran
has an annual water deficit of close to 20 billion cubic meters of and is
making up the shortfall by drawing down the aquifers at a terrifying pace:
Iran has lost more than 85 percent
of its groundwater resources the last 40 years. The population has gone from 35
million to 84 million. So, you have more consumers, less water and that means less
food, less opportunity. So, nothing is sustainable.
Kowsar went on to explain how the regime created the
looming water crisis. One of the first things that happened when the Shah fell
is the regime threw out his sustainable water management programs, but it did
not stop there. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) that Soleimani
helped run is not merely a paramilitary organization; it’s also a commercial
conglomerate that owns, among other things, the giant construction company,
Khatam-al Anbiya, which makes a lot of money from building dams. The problem
is, building a lot of dams can be stupid water management if you are living in
a hot, dry environment where keeping water above ground leads to massive losses
from evaporation, instead of letting it stay underground in the cool aquifers,
where it does not. The other thing the dams do is prevent rivers and other
bodies of water from recharging the same aquifers Iran is drawing down.
All the regime’s guns won’t matter when nobody has any
water, and the Iranian masses recognize that it is the regime’s fault. Iran’s
Minister for the Environment, Issa Kalanatari, has admitted that the country’s
water woes are self-inflicted.
Kowsar says he is a friend of Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi,
noting he has gone with the Prince to brief U.S. lawmakers like Senators Ted
Cruz and John McCain in the past. According to Kowsar, the Crown Prince is
surrounded by a coterie of advisors, with younger advisors begging the Prince
to take more aggressive action to rally opposition to the regime, and older
advisors counseling inaction and caution. To date, the older advisors seem to
be winning, per Kowsar.
The Crown Prince broke a years’-long silence in a speech
about Iran at the conservative Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C. on January
15th, 2020. It was live-streamed on YouTube and watched by about 1,300 people.
Pahlavi listed the regime’s historical sins and cast it as absolutely
unredeemable, not worth negotiating with. He called on foreign governments to
stop supporting the status quo merely because they fear chaos in the region,
and for a policy of maximum pressure to continue. He suggested Iranians start
forming political parties and preparing for the succession.
But when asked about how the regime will go about
relinquishing power when it shows all the signs of wanting to keep it, he
sidestepped the question. He said there had to be planning for what comes next,
not just hope for regime collapse. But he didn’t say who should be doing this
planning. Those hoping Pahlavi’s speech would result in specific policy
proposals and/or calls to action were disappointed.
Will blood run in the
streets?
Even if the regime manages to stave off the looming water
crisis, Kowsar is worried about blood running in the streets. “The people I’m
talking to in Iran, especially the nationalists, they want just one thing:
revenge on the regime,” he says.
Kowsar was not the only Iranian I spoke to worried about
what Iran may look like if average Iranians, sick of 40 years of regime
exploitation, finally indulge the urge for retaliatory violence. I spoke with
former Iranian diplomat Dr. Mehrdad Khonsari, who used to run a small
London-based dissident group, The Green Wave, and now heads a think tank based
in France called the Iranian Centre for Policy Studies. Like Kowsar, Khonsari
talks to many people in Iran, including current members of the regime. Khonsari
is concerned that as the regime moves closer to collapse, which seems inevitable,
Iran could quickly descend into a bloodbath unless something like a South
Africa-style Truth and Reconciliation Commission is established to manage the
transition.
Khonsari may well be right, but the trick, of course, is
how to persuade angry Iranians to negotiate with the regime that has been
repressing them. Nobody I spoke to had a good answer. Khonsari’s view is that
if there is no safe exit path for senior regime figures they’ll have no choice
but to cling to power until the bitter end. Khonsari believes the best hope of
a peaceful transition is if some members of the regime negotiate a withdrawal,
in which they’re allowed to escape punishment, and keep at least some of the
fruits of their corruption. Otherwise, why voluntarily relinquish power?
Khonsari also believes one should not dismiss figures
like Mehdi Karroubi and Hussain Mousavi. While the two men under house arrest
do have a troubling past, for the last 10 years their identity has been that of
men who tried to stand up to the regime during the contested 2009 presidential
elections. Khonsari believes the Iranian youth who never experienced the
excesses of the regime in the 1980s and so don’t have grudges to bear will
value that defiance.
When the lying stops
Assessing the opposition to the regime is difficult
because it’s hard to know how much preference falsification is going on. It
seems fitting to give Professor Kuran the last word—as a professor of
economics, political science, and
Islamic studies, he has a Venn diagram of expertise that makes him well
qualified to comment on the potential for regime change in Iran. He sent me the
following comment via email:
A regime sustained by preference
falsification cannot survive indefinitely. In Iran, everyone now understands
that the theocracy is widely hated. But few Iranians oppose it openly, because
this exposes them to brutal retaliation. They
will do so only if something sparks a critical mass of open dissenters. At
that point, a cascade will make the growth of opposition self-enforcing. In a
short time period, millions can come out of the closet, making it impossible
for the theocracy to continue governing. There are plenty of potential
flashpoints. The economy is in shambles. Sooner or later, people with little to
lose will say ‘enough is enough.’
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