By Seth J. Frantzman
Saturday, January 04, 2020
The targeted killing of Iranian Quds Force general Qasem
Soleimani and a leading Iraqi militia leader has challenged the view that Iran
is an all-powerful country that can strike terror throughout the Middle East
region without repercussions to it and its leaders. President Donald Trump’s
decision has been condemned by a chorus of supporters of Barack Obama’s “Iran
deal” as “reckless.” But it also calls into question whether Iran’s ability to
build up an empire of influence in the region was based largely on fear of
reprisals, which kept the U.S. and other countries from actively opposing its slow
extension of influence, rather than reality on the ground.
For decades Iran thrived on its ability to slowly build
up powerful proxies across the Middle East, often with Soleimani playing a key
role in knitting together groups from Lebanon to Syria and Iraq. His death may
harm the symphony of Iranian power that he projected like a conductor. Still,
the general opinion is that Iran must respond. “The pressure on Tehran to
retaliate for the loss of such a towering figure will be immense,” argues a
writer for the Times of London.
Iran has lost other key allies to assassinations in the
past. Imad Mughniyeh, the second in command of Hezbollah and a key ally of
Soleimani, was killed in Syria in 2008. U.S. and Israeli intelligence
reportedly led to his killing. It is particularly interesting that Soleimani,
in a recent interview about his role in the 2006 war that Hezbollah launched
against Israel, spoke about how he and Mughniyeh and Hezbollah’s Hassan
Nasrallah had worked closely together. Now two of the three are dead. There was
supposed to be a massive Hezbollah retaliation for the death of Mughniyeh, but
it never materialized. Similarly, Israel’s Operation Black Belt in November
against the Iranian-backed Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza started with the targeted
killing of Baha Abu al-Ata. Islamic Jihad retaliated with rocket fire, which
Israel easily intercepted.
Iran is capable of spreading chaos across the Middle
East, but it must choose wisely what to do next. Its assets include Hezbollah,
Syrian-based militias that work for the Assad regime and Iran, and more than
100,000 members of pro-Iranian Shiite militias in Iraq. Iran has also
transferred advanced missiles and drones to the Houthi rebels in Yemen. In
addition, the Shiite militias in Iraq, called Popular Mobilization Units, have
received ballistic missiles from Iraq in August 2018 and in 2019. However,
missiles don’t win wars. Hezbollah has an arsenal of some 150,000 rockets and
missiles, but it lacks much of the precision guidance that would make them a
strategic threat to Israel. Iran has drones, like those used to attack Saudi
Arabia in September, and it has cruise missiles and swarms of small boats it
uses to harass shipping.
However, none of Iran’s technology, nor its Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps, is the threat that they have been made out to be, at
least to an adversary that actually wants to confront Iran. Iran’s threat is
more in its willingness to use force when its adversaries don’t want to be
attacked. That is why tactics such as the kidnapping of academics, or the
waylaying of a U.K.-flagged tanker, are its preferred methods. When it has used
its precision missiles, it was against ISIS and a Kurdish dissident group.
Soleimani masterminded several small attacks from Syria on Israel, including a
failed drone attack in August, three rocket attacks in 2019, and one rocket
salvo in 2018. In response, Israel hit 54 targets in Syria in 2019, according
to the Israel Defense Forces. Israel has launched more than 1,000 airstrikes on
Iranian targets in Syria.
If one adds up the balance of attacks, Iran is generally
the loser when it chooses to fight militarily. Soleimani’s genius was in
building Iran’s influence, mostly among Shiites. This meant arming militias,
usually with small arms and some up-armored vehicles. It meant laying the
groundwork for Iranian weapons trafficking, such as drones or even air defense
and ballistic missiles. But claims that Soleimani was like Nazi-era tank
commander Erwin Rommel would be true only if Rommel hadn’t used tanks and had
just had an armed militia trying to gain influence in North Africa.
The narrative behind the Iran deal was that if there was
no deal, there would be war. This is predicated on the notion that war is the
only way to stop Iran’s nuclear program. However, despite decades of work on
its nuclear program, Iran doesn’t have a nuclear weapon. It’s not clear it ever
wanted one. It wanted a deal that would give it cover for its larger agenda to
dominate Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. It thrives on threats. It judiciously
uses attacks to harass and intimidate. But Iran does not want war. Iran’s
regime knows that a major war will result in its collapse. Iran’s regime
murdered 1,500 protesters in November precisely because they fear the rising
anger of average people in Iran. Where was the spontaneous outpouring of anger
over Soleimani’s death? There were no million-man protests in Iraq, Syria,
Lebanon, and Iran, of people rushing to the streets. They waited for the regime
or their militia commanders to tell them how to protest. This is evidence that
Iran’s role may be weakening and that even though it will respond, it must
decide wisely how to do so.
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