By Matthew Continetti
Saturday, November 16, 2019
The latest entry in the post-Trump conservatism
sweepstakes was Marco Rubio’s speech at the Catholic University of America in
early November. The Florida senator made the case for a “common-good
capitalism” that looks on markets in the light of Catholic social thought. “We
must remember that our nation does not exist to serve the interests of the
market,” he said. “The market exists to serve our nation.”
Senator Josh Hawley of Missouri shares many of the same
attitudes. He told the inaugural “National Conservatism” conference in July
that the “cosmopolitan consensus” dominating our politics “abandons the idea of
the republic altogether” and leaves us “with the curse of faction.” To “rebuild
our sense of shared purpose and belonging,” he went on, Republicans “must
protect our communities of faith,” while “encouraging capital investment in the
great American middle,” “investing in research and innovation in the heartland
of this country,” and “challenging the economic concentration that stifles
small producers and family enterprises.”
Rubio and Hawley are the standard-bearers of a shift
against markets among some quarters of the right. They want to integrate the
lessons of 2016 into a policy agenda for the years after President Trump leaves
office. They point to a possible direction for American conservatism. But they
should have no illusions. The agenda they propose for the future bears little
relation to the Republican party of the present.
I worry that conservatives will commit themselves to a
misreading of the political terrain. There always has been danger in
over-interpreting the results of Trump’s plurality victory in the primaries and
a razor-thin Electoral College victory in the general. Nor do social media
encourage detached analysis. Abstract theories paraded on the Internet are
easily mistaken for concrete realities. Republicans will be in trouble if they
replicate the dilemmas of a Democratic party imprisoned within its woke Twitter
shell.
Rubio and Hawley speak for — and hope to appeal to — the
segment of the electorate that the 2017 Pew Research Center political typology
identified as “Market Skeptic Republicans.” The senators’ political logic:
Market Skeptic Republicans are the fulcrum on which Trump’s fate, and that of
the GOP, depends.
Maybe.
On the other hand, Market Skeptic Republicans, who
support increased taxes on corporations and say the system is rigged in favor
of the rich, are just 12 percent of registered voters and 10 percent of the
politically engaged (defined as registered voters who follow politics closely
and participate in elections regularly).
Three other groups make up the GOP. “Core Conservatives”
are traditional Republicans. “Country First Conservatives” are older than other
GOP-leaning groups, have fewer bachelor’s degrees, and oppose immigration and
involvement overseas. “New Era Enterprisers” are younger, more diverse,
pro-immigration, and pro-business.
Together, Core Conservatives and New Era Enterprisers
comprise 26 percent of registered voters and 29 percent of the politically
engaged. They provide the dominant Republican discourse. The Country First
Conservatives and Market Skeptic Republicans supply the critique. As
interesting and novel as this critique may be — and perhaps because it is so
interesting and novel — it is easy to commit the fallacy of composition and
mistake the market-skeptical part for the whole.
It might be argued that, because Core Conservatives and
New Era Enterprisers are more reliable GOP constituencies, Market Skeptics are
the ones Republicans have to court. But recent elections amply demonstrate that
the party does not have a solid lock on college-degree-holding, suburban-dwelling
Core Conservatives after all. On the contrary: It is the flight of these voters
from the GOP that is responsible for Democratic victories in 2018 and 2019. A
thriving party includes all four types.
Public opinion data reveal a Republican party that, while
highly supportive of President Trump, is wary of his behavior, ambivalent over
his legacy, and consistent in its beliefs.
A March 2019 poll conducted by Heritage Action found that
52 percent of Republicans agreed with the statement: “I am bothered by some of
President Trump’s policies and character, but I support him because I agree
with many of the things he stands for, and because I don’t want the media and
the Democrats to defeat him.” Sixty-two percent of Republicans identified as
either a member of the traditional GOP or a member of the conservative
movement. Thirty-two percent identified as part of the Trump movement.
This vocal minority coexists uneasily with more numerous
party regulars. An October Morning Consult survey asked 1,218 registered
Republicans to name their favorite Republican. Forty-one percent said Ronald
Reagan. Thirty-three percent said Donald Trump. “Reagan Republicans are
wealthier than Trump Republicans, more highly educated and are more likely to
identify as Christian,” write Eli Yokley and Joanna Piacenza.
They’re also more likely to name the economy as their top
voting issue, while Trump Republicans prioritize security issues such as border
security, terrorism, and foreign policy. And while a majority of Reagan
Republicans live in the suburbs, Trump Republicans are almost evenly divided
between suburbs and rural areas, with 1 in 5 living in a city.
Trump is popular with both groups. Most Republicans told
the Morning Consult pollsters that he has changed the party, and for the
better. But they were split on whether this transformation is temporary or
permanent. Forty-seven percent said it’s a passing phase.
GOP issue positions remain the same. In a 2018 Gallup
survey, 71 percent of Republicans had a positive view of capitalism.
Supermajorities of both Reagan and Trump Republicans in the Morning Consult
poll said it was important to support smaller government, religious freedom,
and a wall on the southern border. The top three issues for Republicans in the
2018 Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) American Values Survey were the
economy (44 percent), national security (40 percent), and immigration (36
percent). Indeed, PRRI found a slight majority of all adults in favor of
reducing legal migration to the United States, a position that enjoyed the
support of 78 percent of Republicans and most independents.
If you were to draw a picture, based on the data, of a
Republican politician who could unify the party and be competitive at large, he
would combine the spirit and demeanor of Reagan with Trumpian inflections on
trade and, especially, immigration. He would be more populist than his
predecessors in the pre-Trump GOP, but not radically different in economic,
social, or national security policy. To go too far in one direction, to favor
one part of the coalition over another, would rupture unity and guarantee
failure.
Why, then, are Republican and conservative circles
involved in heated theoretical debates over such tangential matters as
nationalism, industrial policy, trust busting, economic development, and
post-fusionism? One culprit is congressional weakness. Deprived of
opportunities to pass legislation, our most promising congressmen instead
deliver speeches, write books and op-eds, and appear on television.
Media also play a role. Not only are proposals for new
taxes, spending, and regulation far less controversial to the press than
immigration restriction, opposition to abortion, and defense of the Second
Amendment. Conservatives have their own information cocoon.
The conversation surrounding the slow-rolling realignment
of the GOP into a party that includes more voters without college degrees has
come to resemble progressive discussions about the so-called rising American
electorate. Prophets glimpse dazzling images of the future. An online bandwagon
promotes the most heterodox voices. Iconoclasm is so bold and exciting that
hardly anyone checks if revisionist ideas have worked out in the past, and if
not, why not. Feelings of camaraderie and élan accompany the sense of being
part of a rising ideological tide. Policies are proposed that might not have
any relation or appeal to intended beneficiaries.
Many Democrats convinced themselves that their party is
made up of voters eager to confiscate guns, open the border, and strip churches
of nonprofit status. Now they are puzzled to find a septuagenarian moderate
white male leading polls nationwide and in South Carolina and Nevada, and tied
in New Hampshire.
A similar fate awaits Republican candidates who run in
2024 on the assumption that the GOP electorate resembles the one they read
about online.
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