By Victor Davis Hanson
Tuesday, January 17, 2017
For eight years, the Obama administration misjudged
Vladimir Putin’s Russia, as it misjudged most of the Middle East, China, and
the rest of the world as well. Obama got wise to Russia only when Putin
imperiled not just U.S. strategic interests and government records but also
supposedly went so far as to tamper with sacrosanct Democratic-party secrets,
thereby endangering the legacy of Barack Obama.
Putin was probably bewildered by Obama’s media-driven and
belated concern, given that the Russians, like the Chinese, had in the past
hacked U.S. government documents that were far more sensitive than the
information it may have mined and leaked in 2016 — and they received nothing
but an occasional Obama “cut it out” whine. Neurotic passive-aggression doesn’t
merely bother the Russians; it apparently incites and emboldens them.
Obama’s strange approach to Putin since 2009 apparently
has run something like the following. Putin surely was understandably angry
with the U.S. under the cowboy imperialist George W. Bush, according to the
logic of the “reset.” After all, Obama by 2009 was criticizing Bush more than
he was Putin for the supposed ills of the world. But Barack Obama was not quite
an American nationalist who sought to advance U.S. interests.
Instead, he posed as a new sort of soft-power moralistic
politician — not seen since Jimmy Carter — far more interested in rectifying
the supposed damage rather than the continuing good that his country has done.
If Putin by 2008 was angry at Bush for his belated pushback over Georgia, at
least he was not as miffed at Bush as Obama himself was.
Reset-button policy then started with the implicit
agreement that Russia and the Obama administration both had legitimate
grievances against a prior U.S. president — a bizarre experience for even an
old hand like Putin. (Putin probably thought that the occupation and
reconstruction of Iraq were a disaster not on ethical or even strategic grounds
but because the U.S. had purportedly let the country devolve into something
like what Chechnya was before Putin’s iron grip.)
In theory, Obama would captivate Putin with his
nontraditional background and soaring rhetoric, the same way he had charmed
urban progressive elites at home and Western European socialists abroad. One or
two more Cairo speeches would assure Putin that a new America was more
interested in confessing its past sins to the Islamic world than confronting
its terrorism. And Obama would continue to show his bona fides by cancelling
out Bush initiatives such as missile defense in Eastern Europe, muting
criticism of Russian territorial expansionism, and tabling the updating and expansion
of the American nuclear arsenal. All the while, Obama would serve occasional
verbal cocktails for Putin’s delight — such as the hot-mic promise to be even
“more flexible” after his 2012 reelection, the invitation of Russia into the
Middle East to get the Obama administration off the hook from enforcing red
lines over Syrian WMD use, and the theatrical scorn for Mitt Romney’s
supposedly ossified Cold War–era worries about Russian aggression.
As Putin was charmed, appeased, and supposedly brought on
board, Obama increasingly felt free to enlighten him (as he does almost
everyone) about how his new America envisioned a Westernized politically
correct world. Russians naturally would not object to U.S. influence if it was
reformist and cultural rather than nationalist, economic, and political — and
if it sought to advance universal progressive ideals rather than strictly
American agendas. Then, in its own self-interest, a grateful Russia would begin
to enact at home something akin to Obama’s helpful initiatives: open up its
society, with reforms modeled after those of the liberal Western states in
Europe.
Putin quickly sized up this naïf. His cynicism and
cunning told him that Obama was superficially magnanimous mostly out of a
desire to avoid confrontations. And as a Russian, he was revolted by the
otherworldly and unsolicited advice from a pampered former American academic.
Putin continued to crack down at home and soon dressed up his oppression with a
propagandistic anti-American worldview: America’s liberal culture reflected not
freedom but license; its global capitalism promoted cultural decadence and
should not serve as anyone’s blueprint.
As the West would pursue atheism, indulgence, and
globalism, Putin would return Russia to Orthodoxy, toughness, and fervent
nationalism — a czarist appeal that would resonate with other autocracies
abroad and mask his own oppressions, crony profiteering, and economic
mismanagement at home. Note that despite crashing oil prices and Russian
economic crises, Putin believed (much as Mussolini did) that at least for a
time, a strong leader in a weak country can exercise more global clout than a
weak leader in a strong country — and that Russians could for a while longer
put up with poverty and lack of freedom if they were at least feared or
respected abroad. He also guessed that just as the world was finally nauseated
by Woodrow Wilson’s six months of moralistic preening at Versailles, so too it
would tire of the smug homilies of Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and John Kerry.
Putin grew even more surprised at Obama’s periodic red
lines, deadlines, and step-over lines, whose easy violations might unite global
aggressors in the shared belief that America was hopelessly adrift, easy to
manipulate, obnoxious in its platitudinous sermonizing, and certainly not the
sort of strong-horse power that any aggressors should fear.
Perhaps initially Putin assumed that Obama’s
lead-from-behind redistributionist foreign policy (the bookend to his “you
didn’t build that” domestic recalibration) was some sort of clever plot to
suggest that a weak United States could be taken advantage of — and then Obama
would strike hard when Putin fell for the bait and overreached. But once Putin
realized that Obama was serious in his fantasies, he lost all respect for his
benefactor, especially as an increasingly petulant and politically enfeebled
Obama compensated by teasing Putin as a macho class cut-up — just as he had
often caricatured domestic critics who failed to appreciate his godhead.
Putin offered America’s enemies and fence-sitting
opportunists a worldview that was antithetical to Obama’s. Lead-from-behind
foreign policy was just provocative enough to discombobulate a few things
overseas but never strong or confident enough to stay on to fix them. When
China, Iran, North Korea, ISIS, or other provocateurs challenged the U.S.,
Putin was at best either indifferent and at worst supportive of our enemies, on
the general theory that anything the U.S. sought to achieve, Russia would be
wise to oppose.
Putin soon seemed to argue that the former Soviet
Republics had approximately the same relation to Russia as the Caribbean,
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have to the United States. Russia was
simply defining and protecting its legitimate sphere of influence, as the
post-colonial U.S. had done (albeit without the historic costs in blood and
treasure).
Russia had once lost a million civilians at the siege of
Leningrad when Hitler’s Army Group North raced through the Baltic States
(picking up volunteers as it went) and met up with the Finns. At Sevastopol,
General Erich von Manstein’s Eleventh Army may well have inflicted 100,000
Russian Crimean casualties in a successful but nihilistic effort to take and
nearly destroy the fortress. The Kiev Pocket and destruction of the
Southwestern Front of the Red Army in the Ukraine in September 1941 (700,000
Russians killed, captured, or missing) may have been the largest encirclement
and mass destruction of an army in military history.
For Putin, these are not ancient events but rather proof
of why former Soviet bloodlands were as much Russian as Puerto Rico was considered
American. We find such reasoning tortured, given Ukrainian and Crimean desires
to be free; Putin insists that Russian ghosts still flitter over such hallowed
ground.
Reconstruction of Putin’s mindset is not justification
for his domestic thuggery or foreign expansionism at the expense of free
peoples. But it does remind us that he is particularly ill-suited to listen to
pat lectures from American sermonizers whose unwillingness to rely on force to
back up their sanctimony is as extreme as their military assets are
overwhelming. Putin would probably be less provoked by a warning from someone
deemed strong than he would be by obsequious outreach from someone considered
weak.
There were areas where Obama might have sought out Putin
in ways advantageous to the U.S., such as wooing him away from Iran or playing
him off against China or lining him up against North Korea. But ironically,
Obama was probably more interested in inflating the Persian and Shiite regional
profile than was Putin himself.
If Obama wished to invite Putin into the Middle East,
then at least he might have made an effort to align him with Israel, the Gulf
States, Egypt, and Jordan, in pursuit of their shared goal of wiping out
radical Islamic terrorism. In the process, these powers might have grown
increasingly hostile to Syria, Hezbollah, and Iran. But Obama was probably more
anti-Israeli than Putin, and he also disliked the moderate Sunni autocracies
more than Putin himself did. As far as China, Putin was delighted that Obama
treated Chinese aggression in the Spratly Islands as Obama had treated his own
in Ukraine: creased-brow angst about bad behavior followed by indifference.
The irony of the failed reset was that in comparative
terms the U.S. — given its newfound fossil-fuel wealth and energy independence,
the rapid implosion of the European Union, and its continuing technological
superiority — should have been in an unusually strong position as the leader of
the West. Unhinged nuclear proliferation, such as in Pakistan and North Korea
and soon in Iran, is always more of a long-term threat to a proximate Russia
than to a distant America. And Russia’s unassimilated and much larger Muslim
population is always a far more existential threat to Moscow than even radical
Islamic terrorism is at home to the U.S.
In other words, there were realist avenues for
cooperation that hinged on a strong and nationalist U.S. clearly delineating
areas where cooperation benefitted both countries (and the world). Other
spheres in which there could be no American–Russian consensus could by default
have been left to sort themselves out in a may-the-best-man-win fashion,
hopefully peaceably.
Such détente would have worked only if Obama had forgone
all the arc-of-history speechifying and the adolescent putdowns, meant to
project strength in the absence of quiet toughness.
Let us hope that Donald Trump, Rex Tillerson, and Jim
Mattis know this and thus keep mostly silent, remind Putin privately (without
trashing a former president) that the aberrant age of Obama is over, carry huge
sticks, work with Putin where and when it is in our interest, acknowledge his
help, seek to thwart common enemies — and quietly find ways to utilize
overwhelming American military and economic strength to discourage him from
doing something unwise for both countries.
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