By Rupert Darwall
Monday, December 14, 2015
What’s in a name?
that which we call a rose
By any other name
would smell as sweet.
— Juliet, Romeo and Juliet, William Shakespeare
The agreement adopted in Paris at 7:28 p.m. local time
Saturday doesn’t call itself a treaty, but in every other respect it is one.
Four years ago at the Durban climate conference, climate negotiators decided to
launch a process “to develop a protocol, another legal instrument, or an agreed
outcome with legal force.” If the Paris Agreement is to meet the requirements
of the Durban Platform, legal scholar and Clinton-era climate-change
coordinator at the State Department Daniel Bodansky states that “the Paris
Agreement must constitute a treaty within the definition of the Vienna
Convention.”
Article Two (a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties defines a treaty as an “international agreement concluded between
states in written form and governed by international law.” Under the principle
of pacta sunt servanda (“agreements
must be kept”), treaties are binding on the parties and must be performed by
them in good faith, Bodansky observes in a recent book. Article 14 of the Paris
Agreement establishes a compliance mechanism, and Article 20 duly sets out the
process for the depositing of “instruments of ratification, acceptance,
approval, or accession.”
Article Two of the Constitution of the United States
circumscribes the power of the executive to make treaties by stating that the
president “shall have the power, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.”
The question then arises whether the Paris Agreement imposes new legally
binding obligations on the United States. American negotiators were mindful of
this when Secretary of State John Kerry reportedly threatened that the U.S.
would walk out unless negotiators removed from the draft treaty the
specification that developed countries would begin providing $100 billion a
year in climate funding, by 2020. The Business
Standard of India reported that Kerry said: “I would love to have a legally
binding agreement. But the situation in the U.S. is such that legally binding
with respect to finance is a killer for the agreement.”
Here, one needs to be careful not to be taken in by the
hoopla surrounding the treaty agreement. “For the first time, we have a truly
universal agreement on climate change,” U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said
in an interview after the agreement was adopted. Article Four (2) of the Paris
Agreement might appear to signal universal accord — it requires all parties to
pursue “domestic mitigation measures,” that is to say, policies that slow down
or reverse the growth of their greenhouse-gas emissions.
This provision, however, is no more than a reformulation
of what the United States and all other parties are already obligated to do
under the 1992 U.N. framework convention on climate change, which the Senate
approved in a 95-0 vote. All parties to the convention shall “formulate,
implement, publish, and regularly update national programs to mitigate climate
change,” Article Four (1) (b) of the 1992 convention states. Despite what the
U.N. secretary general claims, the global scope of the Paris Agreement is not
what makes the Paris Agreement legally important or novel, as it merely
reiterates what was enacted 23 years ago.
Kerry had compelling political reasons to take the $100
billion a year of climate money out of the text of the treaty. Though not in
the treaty, the $100 billion a year — now pushed back to 2025 — survives as a
formal decision of the Paris conference (paragraph 54 of the decision
document). That massive fund would have been not only a killer for the deal, it
would also have been a killer for Hillary Clinton’s presidential candidacy. As
secretary of state, Clinton made the $100 billion pledge at the Copenhagen
climate conference to keep those talks from cratering.
Nonetheless, the Paris Agreement does impose a new,
expansive, and enormously consequential legally binding obligation on the
United States. “The efforts of all Parties will represent a progression over
time,” Article Three states. Thus the treaty creates a ratchet mechanism where
none previously existed. The new obligation is repeated in the next article:
“Each Party’s successive nationally determined contribution will represent a
progression beyond the Party’s then current nationally determined contribution
and reflect its highest possible ambition.” This is the strongest language of
the whole document.
The spin coming out of Paris and the Obama administration
is that the new treaty bridges the divide between developed and developing
nation parties. As President Obama put it in his statement welcoming agreement
on the treaty, “We showed it was possible to bridge the old divides between
developed and developing nations that had stymied global progress for so long.”
In fact, the divide between developed and developing countries remains, the
same divide that led the Senate (including then-senator Kerry) to pass the 1992
Byrd-Hagel resolution by 95 to 0 that then torpedoed U.S. ratification of the
Kyoto Protocol.
Article Four of the Paris Agreement states that
developing countries should be provided with support for implementing the
agreement, and this provision in turn is tied to Article Nine on the obligation
of developed country parties to provide financial contributions to developing
countries. India’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution makes this
conditionality explicit by tying its mitigation efforts “to the availability
and level of international financing and
technology transfer” (emphasis is mine). By contrast, developed countries
are on the hook and obligated to ratchet up their emissions cuts over time —
whatever developing countries do or don’t do — in perpetuity.
Furthermore, “highest possible ambition” precludes the
devising of the escape hatches that Clinton-administration officials viewed as
critical. “We agreed there needed to be goals, even aggressive goals,” a senior
economic adviser to Bill Clinton told the New
York Times in 1997. “But there also needed to be escape hatches, in case
the economic effects turned out to be a lot more damaging than we thought.”
In comparison with the Clinton administration and the
Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement is reckless and irresponsible. The new
treaty replicates the structural flaw of Kyoto in not having reciprocal actions
and obligations between developed and developing countries, and it adds a
deeply problematic procedural one. This is a vehicle with the gas pedal forever
being pushed down and no brakes or steering wheel.
U.S. ratification of the Paris Agreement without
congressional approval would raise profound constitutional questions. Attempts
to push through a quasi-carbon tax (in the form of Al Gore’s BTU tax) and
cap-and-trade measures repeatedly failed, and the Senate made clear that it
would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, which in key respects was a less bad
treaty than the Paris Agreement. The legal effect of the Paris ratchet would be
to constrain the discretion of future administrations. The EPA’s Clean Power
Plan is the most costly component of the Obama administration’s plan to cut
emissions by 26 to 28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025.
No one, least of all the EPA, knows how much the Clean
Power Plan will eventually cost. In 2013, the German environment minister
declared that its renewable program could cost one trillion euros ($1.1
trillion). The U.S. generates nearly seven times as much electricity as Germany
does, which gives some idea of the scale of its cost. When the Clean Power Plan
turns out to be a disaster, under international law, the U.S. could not simply
ditch it, but would have to replace it with something else (a carbon tax or the
cap-and-trade plan, for example, that Congress already rejected) otherwise it
would be in breach of the Paris Agreement.
President Obama has developed a new presidential doctrine
to bind his successors by aiming to make them accountable to the court of
international opinion. “Everybody else is taking climate change really seriously,”
the president said at a press conference shortly before he left Paris. “They
think it’s a really big problem. . . . So whoever is the next president of the
United States . . . is going to need to think this is really important.” If the
president decides to ratify the Paris Agreement without obtaining congressional
approval from two-thirds of the Senate, not only will he ensure that the only
way of reversing the agreement will be to put a Republican in the White House,
but he also will be subverting Article Two of the U.S. Constitution. For
America, the Paris Agreement is a very big deal.
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