By Daniel Pipes
Thursday, June 20, 2013
Rebellion has shaken Turkey since May 31: Is it
comparable to the Arab upheavals that overthrew four rulers since 2011, to
Iran's Green Movement of 2009 that led to an apparent reformer being elected
president last week, or perhaps to Occupy Wall Street, which had negligible
consequences?
The unrest marks a deeply important development with
lasting implications. Turkey has become a more open and liberal country, one in
which leaders face democratic constraints as never before. But how much it
changes the role of Islam in Turkey depends primarily on the economy.
China-like material growth has been the main achievement
of Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan and his AKP party. Personal income has more
than doubled in the decade that he has been in power, changing the face of the
country. As a visitor to Turkey since 1972, I have seen the impact of this growth
in almost every area of life, from what people eat to their sense of Turkish
identity.
That impressive growth explains the AKP's increased share
of the national vote in its three elections, from 34 percent in 2002 to 46
percent in 2007 to a shade under 50 percent in 2011. It also explains how,
after 90 years of the military serving as the ultimate political player, the
party was able to subdue the armed forces.
At the same time, two vulnerabilities have become more
evident, especially since the June 2011 elections, jeopardizing Erdogan's
continued domination of the government.
Dependence on foreign credit. To sustain consumer
spending, Turkish banks have borrowed heavily abroad, especially from
supportive Sunni Muslim sources. The resulting account deficit creates such a
need for credit that the private sector alone needs to borrow $221 billion in
2013, nearly 30 percent of the country's $775 billion GDP. Should money stop
flowing into Turkey, the party (pun intended) is over, possibly leading the
stock market to collapse, the currency to plunge, and the economic miracle to
come to a screeching halt.
Erdogan's sultan-like understanding of his democratic
mandate. The prime minister sees his election -- especially the one in 2011,
when the AKP won half the popular vote -- as a carte blanche to do as pleases
until the next vote. He indulges his personal emotions (recall his 2009
confrontation with Shimon Peres), meddles in the tiniest matters (his mandate
on the use of a city park prompted the current turmoil), acts like a social
engineer (telling married couples to bear three or more children), involves
Turkey in an unpopular foreign adventure (Syria), and demonizes the half of the
electorate that did not vote for him (calling them beer-guzzlers who copulate in
a mosque). This attitude has won the fervent support of his once-downtrodden
constituency but has also brought the fury of growing numbers of Turks who
resent his authoritarianism as well as the criticism of Europe leaders. German
Chancellor Angela Merkel pronounced herself "appalled" by the recent
police crackdown.
These two weaknesses point to the economy for the future
of Erdogan, the AKP, and the country. Should Turkey's finances weather the
demonstrations, the Islamist program at the heart of the AKP's platform will
continue its advance, if more cautiously. Perhaps Erdogan himself will remain
leader, even as the country's president with newly enhanced powers next year,
or perhaps his party will tire of him and -- as happened to Margaret Thatcher
in 1990 -- push him aside in favor of someone who can carry out the same
program without provoking so much hostility.
But if "hot money" flees Turkey, if foreign
investors go elsewhere, and if Persian Gulf patrons cool on the AKP, then the
demonstrations could end AKP rule and rupture the drive toward Islamism and the
application of Islamic law. Infighting within the party, especially between
Erdogan and President Abdullah Gül, or within the Islamist movement, especially
between the AKP and Fethullah Gülen's powerful movement, could weaken the
Islamists. More profoundly, the many non-Islamist voters who voted for the
AKP's sound economic stewardship might abandon the party.
Payroll employment is down by 5 percent. Real consumer
spending in first quarter of 2013 fell by 2 percent from 2012. Since the
demonstrations started, the Istanbul stock market is down 10 percent, and
interest rates are up about 50 percent. To assess the future of Islamism in
Turkey, watch these and other economic indicators.
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