By Charles C. W. Cooke
Wednesday,
December 20, 2023
Since
the Colorado supreme court issued its bombshell ruling last night — a ruling that, if
upheld by the Supreme Court, would keep Donald Trump off the ballot in Colorado
in both the primary and the general election — I’ve seen a lot of people argue
that the core problem with the judgment is that it is “undemocratic.” This, no
doubt, is an attractive argument to make politically. But it is an incorrect
argument — or, at least, it’s an incomplete argument constitutionally. The
problem with the Colorado supreme court’s decision is that it’s incorrect. Everything else flows from
that.
This
isn’t nitpicking. By design, there are many provisions within our Constitution
that limit what the public is able to vote for, and sometimes even for whom.
Without amending the Constitution, a transient majority of Americans cannot
elect a president for a third term, hold midterm elections more than once every
two years, abolish elections completely, restrict the freedom of speech, deny
the accused their right to a trial, seat Article III judges without the
acquiescence of the U.S. Senate, impose taxes without congressional approval,
and so on. We have a process for doing things in the United States, and the
Constitution sits at the peak of that process. If the Constitution says
something, then that something obtains until the Constitution doesn’t say it
any more. If, as the Colorado supreme court seems to believe, Article 3 of the
14th Amendment to the Constitution really does bar Donald Trump from political
office, then Donald Trump must be barred from political office, and, unless
one’s goal is to reject the very idea of constitutional government, complaining
about that fact is fruitless.
It
is true, of course, that some of the provisions in our Constitution prevent the
democratic process from delivering exactly what voters want. But to describe
this as “undemocratic” is a little misleading, given that the
Constitution itself was ratified and amended by the people. This,
above all else, is why originalism is so crucial. America is a democratic
republic, in which the people get to vote for their politicians and their laws,
and if those politicians and laws can be thwarted at will by unelected judges,
then . . . well, America isn’t much of a democratic republic, is it? Unless —
and this unless is utterly imperative — those unelected judges
are invoking other laws that were democratically passed and
have not been democratically repealed. Then, you have democracy pitted against
democracy. From time to time, I am asked why I believe that Roe v. Wade was
unjustly “undemocratic” when I don’t believe that, say, Brandenburg v.
Ohio was. Surely, the implication runs, if I’m worried about the
courts thwarting the public’s will, I should be worried about it in every case?
But this does not follow. The reason that Roe was undemocratic
and Brandenburg was not is that Roe was a lie
and Brandenburg was not. Or, to put it another way: In Roe,
unelected judges inserted law into the Constitution, whereas
in Brandenburg, unelected judges upheld law that
had been placed there by a supermajority of the people.
The
same distinction must be observed here. If one believes that Section 3 of the
14th Amendment truly does disqualify Donald Trump from office, then one is not
not rejecting democracy or the rule of law, but demanding that it be sustained.
The 14th Amendment was ratified by a supermajority according to the process
laid out in Article V, and it is thus good law. When it applies, it must be
applied.
And
when it doesn’t apply? Then it shouldn’t be applied.
I’ll
reiterate that I’m really not trying to be pedantic here. I understand that, in
some sense, “undemocratic” is shorthand for “legally incorrect, with
undemocratic consequences.” But the logic of the argument I’m seeing — that
it’s outrageous in all circumstances for a court to take someone off the
ballot, and thereby deny the public the chance to vote for or against him —
extends much too far beyond the material inquiry. There are multiple provisions
within our system that exclude people from electoral consideration, either
temporarily or permanently. We have impeachment, by which supermajorities
within the elected federal legislature can use a provision ratified by a
majority to declare a given candidate outré. We have minimum-age and “natural
born Citizen” provisions that govern who is eligible to run. And, at the state
level, we have all manner of ballot rules with which aspirants must comply. If
unelected figures bend those regulations in ways that do not comport with what
the people originally passed, we have a problem. If they uphold them — and
thereby ensure the integrity of the democratic process and the rule of law — we
do not. On balance, I oppose what Colorado’s supreme court did because, while
I’d very much like to see Donald Trump go away, I agree with Dan McLaughlin that it got the law wrong.
Others I respect disagree with us. Irrespective of who is right, this is the
only question that matters in this case — and, as it moves ineluctably to the
Supreme Court, it is the only question that ought to be debated abroad the
land.
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