By Kevin D. Williamson
Tuesday, December 21, 2021
The Left loves “the masses” — at least, in theory. As a
matter of historical fact, leftist regimes around the world spent most of the
20th century putting “the masses” into camps or intentionally starving them to
death or, from time to time, eating them (“The incidents reported from Guangxi were apparently the most
extensive episodes of cannibalism in the world in the last century or more”)
to make a political point, and they have not done a hell of a lot better in the
21st century.
(“Te Occidere Possunt Sed Te Edere Non Possunt
Nefas Est.” Nobody told the Red Guards.)
But there are no “masses.”
Not in the United States, anyway. The American people are
not an undifferentiated blob of interchangeable individuals or interchangeable
communities. Time, mass media, and mobility have ensured that the states are
not as different today as they were when the Constitution was drafted, but life
in rural West Virginia really is quite different from life on the Upper West
Side or life in Echo Park or life in Bountiful, Utah. I am not sure that there
are “masses” in Mexico, India, or China, either, however much politicians of a
certain demagogic sort may like to appeal to the masses and their grievances.
There is genuine diversity in American life, and the
splendid array of American communities and their particular interests matter,
irrespective of whether 50 percent plus 1 of the total American voting
population says otherwise. Everybody understands this when it is his own
interest on the line, and everybody pretends not to understand this when it is
some rivalrous interest in question. “Black Lives Matter” is a meaningful
statement because black Americans have particular interests, particular
experiences, and particular histories all their own; whatever the misdeeds of
the organization calling itself Black Lives Matter, the sentiment itself is no
more exclusionary than the idea that we should maintain such organizations as
the League of Women Voters, the Texas Asian Republican Club, the Fellowship of
Christian Athletes, or Jews for the Preservation of Firearms Ownership.
Our law recognizes these particularities in many
different ways, some prudent and some less so. We have civil-rights laws that
were intended mainly to help African Americans secure their basic rights and
interests in practical ways that probably would have been impossible without
federal intervention; we maintain a contingency plan for conscripting men into
military service but not women; farmers receive tax exemptions not available to
other businesses; churches receive exemptions from certain employment laws; we
offer many different kinds of benefits and subsidies to small businesses that
are denied to large ones. We have both urban-development and rural-development
programs in government because these communities do not have identical
interests or identical needs.
Protection for this diversity is written into our
Constitution, and it informs the fundamental shape and organization of the
federal government. No majority, no matter how large, gets to tell you what to
teach in your church or what to publish in your newspaper. No majority gets to
use the law to single you out because you are black or an immigrant. Our system
is by no means perfect: Well-intentioned civil-rights practices are why we now
have men competing in women’s college sports, for example, and equally well-intentioned
accommodations such as bilingual-education mandates have blunted valuable spurs
to immigrant assimilation. (Diversity is not the only value.) Passing
civil-rights laws has not as a practical matter solved the problems those laws
were meant to address. God knows we have problems. But the American approach
has proved extraordinarily resilient, strong and flexible at the same time.
The United States and Switzerland — the world’s oldest
democracy and the world’s second-oldest democracy, respectively — have very
different governments and very different political cultures, but they have one
important thing in common: federalism. Switzerland’s “double majority” system
requires that big social changes move forward only when there is substantial
consensus, as indicated by winning the votes of a majority of the people as a
whole and a majority of the votes in a majority of the cantons. The U.S.
Electoral College works on the same principle: To be elected president, a
candidate needs to win not simply a majority of the entire voting population
but a majority of the votes in a certain number of states, weighted by
population. This means not only that a handful of big states cannot simply
sweep aside the votes of the smaller states but also that a candidate who does
not appeal to a sufficient diversity of constituencies in the various states
will not win in some circumstances even when he secures a majority of the total
vote. American federalism and Swiss federalism even produce many of the same
complaints, e.g., that the system amplifies the power of people in less densely
populated rural areas, who tend to be conservative, at the expense of people in
the big cities, who tend to be more progressive.
(Similar procedures and institutions exist on a more
limited scale in a few other countries, such as Germany and Australia.)
Which brings us to Joe Manchin and the grievously
misnamed Build Back Better bill.
As my friend Charles C. W. Cooke points out, Senator
Bernie Sanders’s constant whining that “one senator” or two should not be able
to put a halt to the president’s legislative agenda is pure illiteracy,
beginning with the fact that it is not one senator blocking Build Back Better —
it is 51 senators, at least. Cooke writes:
In a 50/50 Senate, the “problem”
that “one senator is able to hold up what the president wants!” can only be
“fixed” by (a) passing bills with a minority of senators, (b) allowing only
majority party to vote, (c) forcing senators to vote with their party — all of
which are crazy.
As I am sure Charlie and I will have a chance to discuss
on our Mad Dogs & Englishmen podcast, what Senator Sanders
is up to here is not really constitutional analysis — it is base demagoguery.
(And a bit of “mood affiliation,” which I will get to in a minute.) But Senator
Sanders does have a point, albeit a point he does not quite understand: The
Senate is, in an important way, not only undemocratic but antidemocratic. That
is how it is meant to be — and we would be better off, both as a country and as
a people trying to practice an intelligent form of liberal democracy, if the
Senate were even more undemocratic and antidemocratic than it is.
Build Back Better would be a bad piece of legislation in
the best of times. But these are not the best of times: We are a country that
is facing a genuine inflation crisis — not of Argentine or Zimbabwean
proportions, at least not yet, but a crisis nonetheless — and a country that is
dancing on the precipice of a sovereign-debt crisis, as well. This isn’t
Chicken Little stuff, and I don’t want you to think that the country is going
to look like The Walking Dead the day after tomorrow. But here
are the facts: Inflation is at a 40-year high, and interest payments on the
debt already take up 15 percent of all federal tax revenues. Interest rates are
very low by historic standards, and the main way you work to control inflation
is by raising them. And, ultimately, interest rates are not under government
control — they are under the control of investors in the debt market, who
decide what rates they will lend at and what rates they won’t. Interest rates
could easily be three to four times what they are today in a few years, meaning
that interest payments could consume somewhere between half and two-thirds of
all federal tax revenue, necessitating a radical and immediate restructuring of
the federal government and its finances — that is the risk we are faced with.
A gigantic spending binge such as Build Back Better would
tend to make both inflation and the debt situation worse. It would raise
inflation by flooding the economy with more money (mostly put indirectly into
the pockets of well-connected political constituencies), and it would worsen
the debt because much of that money would be borrowed. The rosy projection is
that BBB would add hundreds of billions of dollars to the debt, and the more
realistic projections have it in the trillions.
Senator Manchin has been inundated with claims, many of
them suspect, that BBB is overwhelmingly popular with the American people. It
may be. But even if it were, it would still be a terrible piece of legislation
— and, sometimes, political leaders are called upon to lead rather than act as
their voters’ factota. And however BBB stands with the public in general, it is
not especially popular with the people of West Virginia, and it is to them —
not “the masses” — that Senator Manchin is ultimately accountable.
One way of thinking about the apparent failure of BBB is
that it could not pass the double-majority test. The proposal had substantial
general support but also inspired many pockets of urgent and persistent
opposition from communities who were not willing to have this imposed on them
by a group of senators who are, as Charlie notes, a minority, even if they are
a majority of the majority party. There simply is not the wide and deep
consensus that should be present when advancing wide-ranging legislation of
this kind. The president, of course, has very little role in the crafting of
legislation and no vote in Congress — but he does have the ability, and at
times the obligation, to work toward building the consensus necessary for major
reforms and important pieces of legislation. President Biden can criticize Fox
News and talk radio and implacable Republicans, and he wouldn’t be wrong about
any of that, but he would be admitting that he simply isn’t an effective enough
leader to show himself more than the equal of Tucker Carlson or Madison
Cawthorn. I am all for a smaller presidency, but a smaller president should
have smaller ambitions — he should make some effort to accommodate the reality
of his situation.
President Biden and other Democrats are always looking
wistfully for the second coming of Franklin Roosevelt. But what Democrats
really need is someone more along the lines of Lyndon Johnson, who was gross
and venal but who had a real gift for plumbing the outer limits of what was
politically possible and then getting Congress to meet him there. (That he
sometimes did this in the service of unwise legislation does not in any way
diminish the gift.) And President Johnson did bigger things than BBB. Much
bigger.
If your whole political agenda goes off the rails because
you cannot bring around one mulish senator from your own party, then perhaps
you need to rethink your political agenda. You might even think about how you
might win the support of six or seven senators from the other party. Don’t tell
me they can’t be had — Ted Cruz came around to champion the cause of a guy who
called his wife ugly and suggested that his father had been involved in
assassinating President Kennedy. Lindsey Graham is . . . Lindsey Graham. These
aren’t exactly Doric columns of unmovable moral commitment we’re talking about
here.
These are politicians, and the game is politics. If you
can’t politics your way into getting something done in this Senate, that’s on
you, Democrats — not the Constitution.
Words about Words
Ten years ago, the economist and polymath Tyler Cowen
described the “fallacy of mood affiliation.” Mood affiliation distorts our
reasoning by subordinating facts and logic to moods, sometimes vague, that
impose a kind of psychological meta-narrative on our understanding of events.
An example from Cowen: “People who see a lot of net environmental progress (air
and water are cleaner, for instance) and thus dismiss or downgrade
well-grounded accounts of particular environmental problems. There’s simply an
urgent feeling that any ‘pessimistic’ view needs to be countered.” Another,
more familiar example: “People who see raising or lowering the relative status
of Republicans (or some other group) as the main purpose of analysis, and thus
who judge the dispassionate analysis of others, or for that matter the partisan
analysis of others, by this standard. There’s simply an urgent feeling that any
positive or optimistic or deserving view of the Republicans needs to be
countered.” Etc. “In the blogosphere,” Cowen writes, “the fallacy of mood
affiliation is common.”
What has changed since Cowen first wrote this is that
writers for major publications and, increasingly, political figures now simply
lead with the mood. I think this is an example of the prose style, and the cognitive
style, of social media infiltrating print journalism, political rhetoric, and
the rest of discursive life.
An example: Charles M. Blow writes in the New
York Times: “I’m Furious at the Unvaccinated.” That’s the headline. In the
column, Blow recounts his failed effort to nag a friend of his into getting
vaccinated. “I am disappointed, and I am angry, not just with my friend but
with all the people who are choosing not to get vaccinated.”
What I take from this is that Charles Blow and the people
who write his headlines believe that Charles Blow is a very big deal, indeed,
such that his internal emotional situation is the stuff of New York
Times headlines. “Journalist Is Angry and Disappointed.” Well. I
suppose there are insurance agents and farmers and elderly men in rocking
chairs who are angry and disappointed about all sorts of things. But nobody
would think that makes for headlines.
Is there really no more to the horrible Omicron news than
how Charles Blow feels about it? I think there is. But journalists increasingly
act like they are running for office, asking their constituents to resonate
with their moods and prejudices. It is a ritual of hating together.
Hence the headline.
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