By Dalibor Rohac & Ivana Stradner
Wednesday, March 17, 2021
The EU’s vaccine shortage is not just a medical
emergency. With China and Russia making headway by marketing their vaccines in
Central and Eastern Europe, the EU faces a geopolitical problem entirely of its
own making.
As of March 15, the bloc had administered 11 doses per 100 people, compared
with 33 in the United States and 39 in the United Kingdom. With a million
vaccinations a day, in contrast to over 2 million in America and around 400,000
in Britain, the gap between the EU and its closest partners risks widening.
Europe’s political leadership deserves a large portion of
the blame for the shortfall, from the European Commission’s handling of vaccine
procurement to France’s President Emmanuel Macron and other European
politicians’ casting aspersions on AstraZeneca’s work. The result?
The limited supply of available vaccines, especially of AstraZeneca, often goes
unused because of the public’s distrust. Two weeks ago France sent 15,000 doses to Slovakia and 15,000 to the Czech Republic, expecting that they would not be used
at home. On Monday, Germany, France, and Italy suspended the use of
AstraZeneca’s vaccine due to concerns over the vaccine’s potential link with
blood clots — an association rejected by
the World Health Organization.
Enter China and Russia. With vaccines that have undergone
nothing like the scrutiny facing those made in the U.S., U.K., and EU, neither
Russia nor China should be Europe’s preferred medicinal vendor. Yet Russia sold
4 million doses of its Sputnik V, which has not yet been approved by the European
Medicines Agency (EMA), to Hungary and Slovakia, which will administer them
under national-emergency authorization measures. In Slovakia, the decision has
started a government crisis that might well bring down the center-right government of Igor
Matovič.
Meanwhile, Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orbán
has purchased 5 million doses of China’s Sinopharm
vaccine, which is also not yet approved. Under pressure from pro-Russian and pro-Chinese President
Miloš Zeman, the Czech government has also contemplated these options, but the
health ministry is pushing back. Meanwhile, Russia scored a win by signing a deal to produce its Sputnik
V vaccine in Italy.
EU governments may feel inspired by their close non-EU
neighbor Serbia, which has set a seemingly impressive example by leveraging its
close relationship with Russia and China. The Serbian government bet big on
Sputnik V and Sinopharm and is speeding ahead, having already administered 23 doses per 100 people.
But Serbia’s supposed successes, and China and Russia’s
vaccine diplomacy more broadly, are fraught with risks. First, there are
questions about safety and efficacy. True, encouraging results about Sputnik
V’s effectiveness have been published in The Lancet, a leading
medical journal, and its manufacturer has applied for rolling review by EMA,
which could lead to the vaccine’s approval in the EU. However, Russia’s track
record of misreporting, along with a general lack of transparency, urges
caution, as do the regime’s hacks into American and British biomedical
companies and the efforts of Russian intelligence to spread lies about
the Pfizer/BioNTech and Moderna vaccines.
The effectiveness of China’s Sinopharm appears less
impressive, with only a 50 percent efficacy rate in some trials. In fact,
although Serbia’s vaccination rate far outstrips that of the EU thanks to the
plentiful supply of Chinese and Russian vaccines, the caseload continues to
grow rapidly, forcing another lockdown.
Furthermore, can China and Russia actually deliver? Oddly enough, the two countries are even farther behind in
vaccinating their own populations than the EU (Russia is at five doses
per 100, China is at less than four doses). That may suggest that the
generous contractual commitments are detached from their actual production
capacities — not unlike the case of Western vaccine manufacturers.
Alternatively, it can mean that these two governments
prioritize their international influence over the health of their own
populations. Finally, and most disturbingly, Beijing and Moscow might be keen
to use other countries’ populations as guinea pigs in a test of vaccines that
are not trusted by their own populations.
But if (and, in fact, especially if) the
Russian and Chinese vaccines prove to be safe and effective, and thus
beneficial for countries that have purchased them, the EU will have a problem
on its hands. What will Russia and China ask in return for the goodwill
generated by an early end of the pandemic? Slovakia’s deal with Russia was kept
under wraps until the last possible moment. What else is being kept secret? And
as Serbia peddles vaccines to Republika Srpska, North Macedonia, Montenegro,
and beyond, it is likely also spreading soft power on behalf of Russia and
China.
Here is the bottom line for those who want the EU to be a
strong and autonomous player on the global stage: The only way to inoculate
Europeans from Russian and Chinese influence is to make them not depend on
favors extended by Moscow and Beijing. With their mishandling of vaccine
procurement, European institutions have failed that test spectacularly.
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