By Michael Brendan Dougherty
Monday, November 09, 2020
Out in the streets, young people in several cities have
returned to the streets to become part of the viral social-media moment
celebrating Donald Trump’s defeat in the election. For them the result was
simple.
For almost every faction in Washington, however, it is
not so simple. Donald Trump will eventually concede. His defeat is
heart-rending for his most passionate supporters, and it will result in real
reversals for conservatives. But Republicans almost pulled even in the House. Liberals
and progressives, contemplating a new Democratic administration that could be
severely restrained by Republicans in the Senate, are now engaging in
fratricide. Traditional Republicans and Trumpers are already jockeying for the
future of a party that needs them both, but with no clear message from the
electoral result about who should be in the driver’s seat.
Every talking point emerging from the election is a
half-truth. Every faction finds itself idled. This was a reality check.
Die-hard Trumpers: Trump’s rise was so psychologically
and politically invigorating to a certain segment of the electorate, it’s not a
surprise that they find his defeat hard to swallow or even to accept. Trump’s
brief and fascinating political career proved his doubters wrong, and his
critics correct. He could rise beyond their expectations, but he was
overmatched by the institutions of Washington, D.C., including his own party. A
charismatic personality can run against these institutions, but one person
cannot sustain full-on war with them. Trumpian revolution would require
institutionalization.
Republicans anti-Trumpers left disappointed: Donald Trump
did not drag the party down to the ultimate humiliation they wanted. There is
no “burning it down” the Republican Party to save it. And Trump’s “enablers”
from Susan Collins to Lindsey Graham probably found their re-electoral prospects
slightly enhanced by having him at the top of the ticket. Some of the
Republican anti-Trumpers will just drift into the Democratic coalition,
insisting that the Trump family owns the party forever, and finding any signs
of “Trumpiness” in the GOP too much to bear. Others, having decided to break
with the GOP in disgust over Trump, now proceed to break up with an American
electorate who almost rehired him; they will leave politics. Of them it might
be said, “They came to hate their party and this president. They have finished
by hating their country.”
The Revenge of the Establishment is deferred
indefinitely: There was an urge to purge Trump gathering itself in politics. It
wasn’t quite announced, but its spirit lay behind every single piece fantasizing
about a toppling of the Trump “regime” and restoring the pristine “liberal
world order” that Barack Obama left behind. It still exists, behind those
warning darkly about the “next authoritarian.” Some of them are even proceeding
by
making “lists” of Trump supporters, as if they were about to proceed with
de-Baathification after the fall of Saddam Hussein, or lustration after the end
of the Soviet Union. But those dreaming of full “de-Trumpification” cannot
plausibly argue that the electoral results give a mandate for cleaning the
Augean stables. They will have to satisfy themselves by lobbying Facebook and
Twitter to do the work that can’t be done with tools of law, or social
sanction.
The anti-racist Left and the racist Right made similar
errors: Those arguing that Trump’s embrace of the white working class would
result only in the GOP becoming a giant Southernized party of white resentment
must be chastened by results showing a surge of non-white votes among
Republicans, and the defection of white voters to the party criticizing white
supremacy. Similarly, those arguing that immigrants would not adopt Americanism
as a political creed are rebuked by Trump’s expanded support in Hispanic
communities. The anti-racist Left has a definition of anti-racism that is not
intuitive to most people and appeals primarily to affluent whites. And the
racist Right’s theory that American nationalism cannot appeal to non-whites is
demonstrated to be wrong.
The multi-racial working-class party is only half-alive:
Some commentators saw the increased turnout among Hispanic voters and black men
as an opportunity to declare the GOP a “multi-racial working-class party.” This
may be premature. Democrats did dramatically increase their vote share with
college-educated whites, particularly in the affluent suburbs around major
metro areas. We see hints of the shift in the ever-declining Republican vote in
wealthy suburban redoubts such as the lily-white Darien, Conn., and increases
in the Republican share of depressed, multi-racial Waterbury. But Republicans
are still winning among households with six-figure incomes. There are also
reasons to suspect that Republican Hispanics have more educational attainment
and income than their Democratic counterparts.
Populist nationalists: Was Trumpism tried at all? Trump
did not accomplish major reform of the immigration system. Trump only slightly
augmented the trading arrangements that he found upon taking office. And yet,
Trump’s cultural and political populism seemed to attract non-white voters, and
hold others. We got an ambiguous answer on what exactly the GOP needs to be and
do to hold its coalition together. Can its new voters survive on rhetoric
alone? Or does the party need to find a way, through law and policy, to
redistribute economic opportunities to them?
The 2020 election gave everyone unsatisfying answers. The
future is still wide open.
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