By Thomas J. Duesterberg
Tuesday, September 17, 2019
After President Trump’s nearly three years in the White
House, we can begin to decipher the general outlines of a trade strategy. While
moving in the right direction, making up for years of inattention and
complacency with regard to the abuse of global rules by China and others, the
inconsistent and heavy-handed approach employed by the president threatens to undermine
the open-trade-based global economic order and the robust growth of the
American economy that has resulted from his more consistent tax, regulatory,
and energy policies.
Indeed, the vacillation and unpredictability of Trump’s
trade policy have raised economic uncertainty to its highest levels since the
2008 recession, which in turn has weakened investment, employment gains, and
market confidence. Even though critics from Europe, former U.S. government
officials, and card-carrying free-market purists pine for a return to some
aspirational “liberal, rules-based order,” what is really needed is a much more
determined and consistent critique of those countries most responsible for
undermining the order that actually does reign, and a clearer concept of the
importance of trade strategy to strengthening national security, including
long-term economic security.
The most important Trump trade initiative is certainly
taking on the long-neglected task of challenging China’s systematic disregard
of international rules and the basics of fair, reciprocal trade. The
confrontation with the world’s rising superpower is fully justified on economic
and national-security grounds, especially because the overlap between
commercial and security-specific technologies in the contemporary economy
continues to grow. Unilateral action on China was necessary because the rules
and enforcement history of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are insufficient
to address Beijing’s egregious trade and industrial policies.
The Trump administration also has made a good-faith
effort to work with allies in Europe and Japan to remedy the shortcomings of
the WTO, although this is a slow and tedious process, and Europeans (among
others) are recalcitrant in their opposition to major reforms. For example,
Europe is again considering
broader subsidies for industry, and its privacy and
data-transfer laws impede the development of open digital-commerce rules.
The Trump team has also employed a bilateral, sometimes
regional, approach to developing new rules and updating existing ones for the
21st-century economy. It has completed trade deals with South Korea and its
North American partners and likely soon will complete a deal with Japan and
open talks with the United Kingdom. Parallel talks with the European Union (EU)
probably won’t succeed for a variety of historical reasons, the EU’s different
conception of economic self-interest in sectors such as agriculture and
technology, and its pronounced animosity to Trump himself. The other new pacts
have good provisions to address emerging problems in digital commerce, data
flows, intellectual-property rights, and state-subsidy policies. Many of these
are taken from language in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a larger regional
agreement negotiated by the Obama administration and unwisely scrapped by
Trump.
The ultimate success of these positive initiatives,
however, is jeopardized by two important shortcomings: the wildly inconsistent
application of basic principles and the careless alienation of allies, whose
support is key to overcoming trade distortions from China and achieving
meaningful reform of the WTO.
The unfolding drama over Chinese technology leader Huawei
demonstrates the inconsistent application of basic principles. In 2018, the
other major Chinese telecommunications leader, ZTE, was given a reprieve from
crippling U.S. sanctions in return for promises related to agricultural
purchases and Chinese antitrust action against American technology giant
Qualcomm. China reneged on these promises after the U.S. side relented on ZTE.
There is now every indication that Trump is willing to consider reducing or
eliminating restrictions on Huawei in return for a deal anchored by
agricultural purchases, which obviously has implications for the 2020 election
cycle. ZTE had been caught selling products to Iran and bugging surveillance
equipment used around U.S. military bases. Huawei is credibly accused of serial
violations of foreign companies’ intellectual-property rights, has violated
sanctions on Iran and North Korea, and cannot ensure that its equipment is safe
from bugging. Its products could well displace Western-supplied
telecommunications networks in the U.S. and allied nations, posing a grave
threat to military communications and personal privacy.
The Trump administration has expended considerable effort
and political capital in trying to persuade allies not to deploy Huawei
products. Cutting a deal to lift the American sanctions on the company,
especially if more agricultural sales were all we got in return, would further
undermine U.S. credibility with those allies, who are already suspicious of
Trump’s broad use of national-security justifications for tariff actions.
Compromise on Huawei would also confuse and undermine the legitimate use of
national security as a justification for other trade actions, such as steps
taken to protect
sensitive jet-engine technology during the Reagan and George H. W. Bush
administrations. A more consistent set of guidelines for what technologies
require protection is badly needed. Another example of confusing purely
commercial transactions with national security was the president’s decision not
to employ tariffs or quotas on uranium imports, which are increasingly
dominated by Russia and its allies. In recent years, American miners have
produced less than 10 percent of the annual U.S. demand for uranium due to
competition and outright dumping from Russian-controlled companies.
Many traditional allies have been dissuaded from
cooperating with Trump’s trade policy due to the use of tariffs for both
economic and purely political purposes. In addition to the examples cited
above, one could cite the continued threats of imposing tariffs on European and
Japanese auto imports, and on Mexico because of dissatisfaction with its
efforts to secure our shared border. In order to make significant progress on
the hard tasks of changing Chinese behavior, reforming the WTO, and even
revisiting historic advantages granted to allies such as the EU, the U.S. will
have to work more effectively with like-minded countries.
In recent months it has become clear that the U.S.
economy is decelerating and that further escalation of trade tensions, with
either China or Europe, could result in recession. The Chinese economy is also
slowing and contributing to the threat of a global recession. This presents
both a threat and an opportunity for pragmatic compromise, as there is growing
evidence of dissent in China against President Xi’s hard-line positions. In a
sign of a search for compromise, both sides are making concessions before
negotiations next month.
How should Trump and his team balance their trade policy
with the need to avoid recession heading into the 2020 election cycle? First,
despite the importance of the agricultural economy, the president should accept
a deal with China only if it includes progress on the structural issues raised
in the past three years: the protection of intellectual-property rights, limits
on subsidies given to technology companies, and better protection for
industries and technologies key to national security. Above all, concessions on
Huawei or on theft of technologies crucial to future economic dynamism should
be at the core of any deal with China. Second, the administration should
redouble efforts to complete market-opening pacts with NAFTA, Japan, and the
U.K. Third, Trump should refrain from invoking national security as a
justification for new tariffs — as he has already done with steel tariffs, and
threatened to do with automobile tariffs — unless the cases involve significant
technologies or sectors identified as vital to national defense and the
preservation of personal liberties. Refraining from imposing auto tariffs would
be a clear opening to Japan and the EU and would hopefully motivate them to
work more cooperatively on the challenges posed by China and WTO reform.
All of these steps would relieve momentum for a global
recession and free up the U.S. economy to grow unimpeded, spurred on by the
administration’s tax, regulatory, and energy policies. At the end of the day,
our continued economic dynamism is the most important tool in winning the
global competition with China.
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