By Charles C. W. Cooke
Thursday, September 13, 2018
One of the more irritating misconceptions about the
American Bill of Rights is that it is the product of a debate over ephemeral
policy and not over constitutional structure. In the midst of modern arguments
relating to free speech, religious liberty, or the private ownership of
firearms, it is common to hear critics of the status quo say something along
the lines of “We are dealing here with amendments that were passed two
centuries ago, which shows us both that the document isn’t perfect and that it
can be changed.” Rendered a little more stupidly, this critique takes another
form: “Who cares what a bunch of dead people thought about politics?”
In a strict sense, it is of course true that the Bill of
Rights contains alterations to the original constitutional text, and true, too,
that those alterations are antique. But the charge’s underlying implication —
that a few years after the Constitution was written, the Framers had a big
debate over guns and religion and speech and quartering troops, and then put
the results into their national charter — is not true at all. As James Madison
made clear when introducing his proposed amendments, the remedy he was offering
up was architectural in nature, not
substantive, and the rights in question were not the product of a passing fad
but the essential building blocks on which all free government must rely. The
purpose of the Bill of Rights, Madison confirmed, was to “expressly declare the
great rights of mankind secured under this constitution.” And those rights, far
from being controversial or contingent, were those “against which I believe no
serious objection has been made by any class of our constituents.” By
enumerating certain protections within the Constitution’s text, the Framers
were merely adding another means by which to ensure the preservation of
liberties that all agreed must be preserved.
The idea for an American Bill of Rights had arisen as a
result of the Constitution’s historically unique presumptions, which were
radical for the time and remain radical to this day. As designed, the
Constitution carefully listed the powers that the federal government enjoyed,
and left everything else to the people and the states — a conscious inversion
of the usual order of things. Typically, governments were presumed to enjoy all
powers that they had not been explicitly denied; in America, the opposite was
the case. On paper, this arrangement served as a solid guarantor of freedom,
for if its terms were to be faithfully observed, its signatories could rest
assured that only the authority they had consciously signed over would be
wielded against them. Indeed, on paper,
the arrangement obviated the need for any serious “parchment barriers” that
might be raised against government overreach. Defending the unamended
Constitution, Alexander Hamilton proposed that the addition of a Bill of Rights
was self-evidently unnecessary and might even be dangerous. “Bills of Rights,”
Hamilton wrote in Federalist 84, “are
in their origin, stipulations between Kings and their subjects, abridgments of
prerogative in favor of privilege, reservations of rights not surrendered to
the prince.” What use for one could the American republic possibly have?
This, of course, was an excellent question. And yet so
was the answer, which came incessantly and vigorously from the Constitution’s
many critics: that history teaches us how quickly government can metastasize,
and confirms that a list of enumerated rights can serve as a useful rallying
tool in the hands of those seeking redress against caprice. To assuage the
cavilers, a compromise was struck: The Constitution would be ratified as
written, and a Bill of Rights would subsequently be added, along with an
explanatory note in the form of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. Thus would all
involved be satisfied, and would the added protections be reconciled with the
ostensibly incompatible enumerated-powers doctrine.
And thank goodness
that such a compromise was achieved, for, on this point at least, the
anti-Federalists who demanded the additions have been proven prescient. Since
the late 18th century, government has indeed expanded; the enumerated-powers
doctrine has indeed been undermined, if not gutted; and we have been left with
a constitutional order in which the Bill of Rights is indeed necessary as a
means by which to reserve to the people that which has not been surrendered to
the prince. Moreover, the amendments have proven fairly effective as a barrier
against usurpation.
One of America’s greatest roles is that of an — no, of the — incubator of classical liberalism
in the world. It is, of course, a shame that it is required at all, but the
Bill of Rights has played a considerable role in that incubation, serving as it
has as a bulwark against transient majorities, ideological whimsy, and
political overreaction. Antonin Scalia was absolutely correct to describe the
“structure of government” both as the sine qua non of the American order and as
the key prophylactic against tyranny. But he was perhaps too dismissive of the
salutary effects of the Bill of Rights, which in the American context does not
exist in a vacuum but has come to inform the nature and the instincts of
another fundamental player within the system: the People. Writing to Thomas
Jefferson in 1788, James Madison predicted that truths set into constitutional
aspic “acquire by degrees the character of fundamental maxims of free
Government, and as they become incorporated with the national sentiment,
counteract the impulses of interest and passion.” This process has been uneven,
certainly. And, by definition, it has been imperfect: If the people
demonstrated perfect respect for the Bill of Rights, it would not be necessary.
Nevertheless, the mere mention of the “Bill of Rights” can be enough to
“counteract the impulses of interest and passion,” and that is a positive thing
indeed.
As for the common charge that the contents of the Bill of
Rights are “outdated” or “tainted” or applicable only to a time or place, to me
it seems quite ridiculous. I have met a good number of people who think that
the Third Amendment’s restriction of the peacetime quartering of troops seems
“antiquated.” But I have met few who, when asked in earnest, suggest that it
should be removed in consequence. Other provisions within the series are more
hotly disputed at present, but, as someone who is familiar with recent human
history, I am at a loss to explain why. We are often told that “the Founding
Fathers couldn’t have imagined the modern world,” which, if true, would seem to
militate in favor of preserving their
robustly individualist Constitution, rather than against. Who can seriously
look at the horrors of the 20th century — at the Soviet Union, at Mao’s China,
at Nazi Germany — and conclude that the countries that escaped that fate would
benefit from having fewer explicit rights chiseled into their national stone?
Who can propose with a straight face that the ills attendant to untrammeled
free speech, guaranteed trial by jury, and a broad right to bear arms outweigh
the benefits that are provided by Madison’s “free Government”? Who hopes to
remove the prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment” or to allow the state
to establish a religion or to leave the presumption of innocence to
congressional vagary?
Not I. Indeed, I would sooner consent to have these
sureties tattooed in red upon my forehead, as an example and an injunction.
Properly understood, America’s Bill of Rights represents a set of prerequisite
instructions, without which a free political system simply cannot function over
the long term. Just as the programmer of a robot must include a line forbidding
his creation to remove its own battery, so the Founders entrenched the basics
into their contract, that it might endure well into posterity. It has worked —
and worked well. It would be quite the vandal who sought to pull out the
wiring.
No comments:
Post a Comment