By Tom Struble
Thursday, September 06, 2018
Antitrust law — or, as the rest of the world calls it,
competition law — is designed to police unfair business practices that stifle
competition and harm consumers. However, if done incorrectly, antitrust law can
itself stifle competition and harm consumers by punishing conduct that looks
unfair — especially through the eyes of a competitor — but actually produces
benefits that far outweigh any associated harms.
Unfortunately, the Europeans seem to be getting it
dreadfully wrong these days. Eager to protect small businesses (usually
domestic) from their stronger competitors (usually foreign), the European
Commission repeatedly intervenes in the market in ways that stifle competition,
reduce innovation, and hurt consumers. Consider, for example, its recent case
against Google.
In July, the European Commission fined Google over $5
billion for the way it licenses the Android mobile operating system to device
manufacturers. The full text of the decision still hasn’t been released, but the
press release identifies three allegedly harmful practices: Tying Google’s
Search and Chrome apps to the Play Store in a software bundle; sharing Google’s
Search-app revenues with manufacturers who exclusively pre-install the app; and
preventing manufacturers from offering both Android devices and devices that
run on variations, or “forks,” of the open-source Android operating system
(such as Amazon’s Fire OS, for example).
It’s easy to see how these restrictions harm certain
competitors in the mobile ecosystem, but it’s also easy to see how they all
benefit consumers. First, consider Google’s tying practices.
Google ties the Play Store to its Search and Chrome apps
in a bundle, so manufacturers who want the Play Store pre-installed on their
Android devices must also pre-install the Chrome and Search apps. Manufacturers
can also pre-install competing apps (such as Bing and Firefox), but Google’s
bundle ensures that any Android device with the Play Store also has at least
one browser app and one search app pre-installed, allowing consumers to start
using their new devices right out of the box without having to search for and
download new apps. That’s a clear benefit to consumers, but the European
Commission has nonetheless sought to outlaw this type of bundling, in a clear
break from how American officials handled the similar antitrust case against
Microsoft in the late 1990s.
When Microsoft was convicted of tying Internet Explorer
to the Windows operating system in ways that stifled competition from alternative
browser apps (such as Netscape Navigator), the remedy wasn’t to prohibit the
tying — Windows still comes bundled with Internet Explorer — but simply to
prohibit Microsoft from using licensing or software restrictions that make it
difficult or even impossible for users to switch to alternatives.
Google was one of the primary beneficiaries of that case
— Chrome has now displaced Internet Explorer as the most popular web browser —
and it intentionally designed Android to avoid antitrust liability by making it
the most
open, flexible, and differentiated platform in the world. That’s why it’s
triflingly easy for Android users to uninstall or disable existing apps and
switch to alternatives. Breaking apart Google’s software bundle won’t give
consumers any added choices or make switching between competing apps any
easier, but it could make Android devices more expensive (if a drop in ad
revenues from its Chrome and Search apps forced Google to start charging
licensing fees for Android in order to cover its software-development costs)
and more difficult to set up and use (if manufacturers either pre-installed no
browser or search apps or pre-installed apps that were inferior to Google’s).
That seems like a net loss for consumers.
The commission’s complaint over exclusive
pre-installation and revenue sharing is similarly misguided. Manufacturers are
already allowed to pre-install applications that compete with Google’s apps and
to pursue revenue-sharing deals with those competing application providers in
exchange for pre-installation. However, Google offered manufacturers a share of
the revenue generated via the Google apps on their devices if they agreed not
to pre-install competing apps alongside Google’s. The commission found that
practice illegal because it harms competition among application developers, but
consider the effects this will have on the rest of the market. Prohibiting
revenue-sharing deals between Google and Android manufacturers may benefit
competing application developers, but at the expense of both manufacturers (as
access to that source of revenue is cut off) and, more important, consumers (as
manufacturers raise device prices to make up for that lost revenue). That also
seems like a net harm to consumer welfare, but this is what passes for
competition law in the EU.
And finally, consider the commission’s complaint over
forking. Giving manufacturers complete freedom to both use and fork Android as
they wish may help them differentiate their products and services, which could
boost competition among device manufacturers. However, such fragmentation would
come at an immense cost to consumers (who may be confused about subtle
differences between devices running Android and Android forks) and to app
developers (who would have to do extra work in order to ensure compatibility of
their apps across additional operating systems). Historical evidence with Unix,
Symbian, and Linux clearly shows how fragmentation can harm open-source
software, but the commission rejected this argument by merely asserting that
Google could prevent harmful fragmentation in other ways. There is no mention,
however, of just how effective these alternative anti-fragmentation strategies
may be, or of how costly they would be to implement.
In failing to account for these costs, the commission has
lost the plot and elevated competitors’ welfare over that of consumers.
Unsurprisingly, many are now questioning Europeans’ motives — and not for the
first time either. Claims that European competition law is just thinly veiled
protectionism stretch back at least to the early 2000s, when the commission
unilaterally blocked General Electric’s acquisition of Honeywell — a
combination that would have threatened domestic firms such as Airbus and
Siemens. However, these claims have grown louder in recent years as the number
of enforcements and severity of penalties brought against foreign firms have
both increased. Even President Trump has taken notice.
Whether European competition law and the recently
implemented General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) truly are mercantilist
policies designed to fleece foreign businesses and protect domestic firms is up
for debate, but they do fit the pattern of an undeclared trade war. The
commission’s recent move to block Apple’s takeover of Shazam does, too, since
the primary beneficiary seems to be Stockholm-based Spotify. And this could all
be just the beginning. Whatever their intentions, it will ultimately be
consumers who wind up paying the price.
A recent study from Thibault Schrepel explained this
point, showing how European competition law dramatically slows the pace of
innovation by curtailing sanctioned firms’ investments in research and
development. Again, hobbling bigger and stronger rivals will benefit firms that
are less efficient and less profitable, but it hurts consumers by discouraging
fair competition, raising prices, and slowing the pace of innovation. And that,
ultimately, is what’s wrong with European competition policy. As Senator Mike
Lee observed, “appropriate competition policy should serve the interests of
consumers and not be used as a vehicle by competitors to punish their
successful rivals.” Hopefully someday soon our European friends will realize
that fundamental truth, because their current version of competition policy is
hurting consumers.
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