By Andrew Stuttaford
Saturday, May 26, 2018
“Revenge,” it is said, “is a dish best served cold”. The
creation of the euro, it is said, was the triumph of politics over economics.
The eurozone crisis a decade or so later, it is said, was the revenge of
economics.
Well, economics has returned for another helping.
Accepting Italy as one of the eurozone’s founding members
was a decision only made possible by ignoring common sense, by twisting
statistics, and by making a mockery of the rules. But it was a Pyrrhic victory:
Italy was allowed to trick its way onto a voyage that damned it. The euro
simply did not fit the realities of Italy’s economy or its politics. By
dramatically cutting the country’s financing costs (borrowing lire would have
carried a significantly higher nominal cost) adopting the single currency
allowed Rome to avoid tackling the country’s high debt load, a debt load that
was made all the more dangerous now that it was all denominated in a ‘foreign’
currency. Italy could no longer print lire to pay off its creditors.
When the eurozone crisis hit, Italy was one of the
victims, and so, in some respects was its democracy. In something that came
uncomfortably close to a coup, the eurozone leadership essentially used Italy’s
financial fragility as a lever to secure the replacement in 2011 of Prime Minister Berlusconi by a
Brussels man, Mario Monti, a pliable, unelected proconsul. Next time you hear
Brussels lecturing Eastern Europeans on democracy remember that.
Italy weathered the crisis in a ‘just a flesh wound’ sort
of way. Its problems became chronic,
rather than acute, if that’s the correct adjective to describe the consequences
of staying stuck in the euro’s deflationary trap: High rates of unemployment and anemic
economic growth.
The Independent:
Per capita GDP in Italy is still
more than 8 per cent lower than it was when Lehman Brothers went bust in 2008.
Quite incredibly, it is even lower than it was when the country joined the
eurozone back at the turn of the millennium. Unemployment stands at 11 per
cent, down from a peak of 13.1 per cent in 2014, but still double the 5.8 per
cent low seen in 2007.
The figures for the young are still worse. For the
under-25s unemployment stood at 31.5 percent in January.
Growing rates of illegal immigration, accelerated by
Angela Merkel’s decision to throw open Germany’s doors in 2015, only fueled
popular discontent with Rome—and Brussels— still further.
Italy’s March elections generated a result that was
confusing except in one clear respect: Italians had had enough. A potentially chaotic coalition government has
been formed between populist (that word will have to do) parties of the right
and (sort of – it’s complicated) left, united mainly by euroskepticism and
frustration with the status quo. The tensions inherent within such a pairing,
not to speak of an economic program that currently seems set—over Brussels’
protests— to send Italy’s government debt (already some 130 percent of GDP)
soaring, could well mean that this government proves short-lived. That (and the
‘interesting’ question of what would come next) is a topic for another time, as
is (given Italy’s size, the amount of its debt and who holds it) the potential
threat to the eurozone (not existential, I reckon, but it could be a very rough
ride).
For now, the more interesting question is how free
Italians really are to choose and keep their own government. Italian sovereign
yields remain far below their crisis levels, but the bond vigilantes are
gathering, Moody’s has threatened to downgrade the country’s debt, there are
mutterings in Brussels and Rome’s europhile establishment is pushing back.
A couple of weeks back, Italy’s eurofundamentalist
President Mattarella stated (Politico
reports) that “irreversible unity” at the European level is “urgent.” He has,
it seems, learnt nothing from the mistakes of the past. It’s worth adding that “irreversible” is not
a very democratic term, and the insistence on urgency is an old, old demagogic
trick, as was Mattarella’s (ludicrous) claim that the “wind of war is blowing”:
The Verdun card, played again.
Comments
Mattarella has balked (so far) at the coalition’s pick
for finance minister, Paolo Savona, a veteran economist who has made the
mistake of being right (despite some stupidly anti-German rhetoric) about the
euro for decades. That, it seems, will not do.
Readers with long memories will recall that the euro was
going to bring stability. Central planners with short memories even believed
it. I’m not convinced it’s working out.
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