By Charles C. W. Cooke
Friday, May 25, 2018
In the New York
Times, Carl Bogus attempts to taint the Second Amendment by linking it to
America’s greatest historical evil, slavery. I say “attempt” because Bogus
doesn’t make an argument so much as he insinuates, gestures, and implies
perfidy with a wink. Where there should be glue, there is handwaving instead.
Where one would expect a joint, there is an ellipsis, a “may be,” or a
hard-turned “I believe it likely.” As is typical of the genre, the result is as
transparent as it is shoddy.
Bogus’s central claim is that the Second Amendment’s
“genesis was, at least in part, a concern with preserving a form of
governmental tyranny?” You’ll note the cop-out question mark in that sentence —
a trick that is also used in the title, “Was Slavery a Factor in the Second
Amendment?” To get to this explosive conclusion, Bogus selectively recounts the
“background” against which the Bill of Rights was passed, and then, in a
remarkable jump, proposes that the context he provides must serve as the best
explanation for why at least one
state, Virginia, ratified the Bill of Rights, and with it the Second Amendment.
Such as it is, Bogus’s case runs like this:
1) That Virginia was a slave state; and
2) That Virginians were scared of slave rebellions; and
3) That some Virginians were worried that the new
Constitution would prevent them from using their militias to address those
slave rebellions; and
4) That James Madison, who wrote the Bill of Rights, was
a Virginian, and
5) That, like any politician, Madison wanted to please
those whom he was asking to elect him; so
6) That in an attempt to please Virginians, who were
worried about slave rebellions, Madison included the Second Amendment in the
federal Bill of Rights; and
7) That Virginia voted for that Bill of Rights because it
wanted the Second Amendment; therefore
8) The Second Amendment is stained by slavery.
There are a number of fatal problems with this argument.
For a start, there is no evidence that Madison believed his Second Amendment to
be primarily, or even in part, a
means by which the Southern states might prevent slave rebellions, which is why
Bogus is reduced to connecting the two sections of his essay with the words “I
believe it likely that Madison sought to correct the problem Henry and Mason
had railed against in Richmond” rather than with quotations from the
ratification debates, from the many contemporary observers who wrote about the
provision, or from Madison’s other writings on the question of an armed
citizenry. Introducing his draft Bill of Rights to Congress in 1789, Madison
explained that he had included only those “rights against which I believe no
serious objection has been made by any class of our constituents.” And indeed
he had, for although there continued a fierce debate as to the wisdom of
muddying the enumerated-powers doctrine — some insisted that a Bill of Rights
was unnecessary because the federal government possessed no authority to
violate the people’s rights in the first instance — nobody rose to complain
about the individual rights contained within his proposal, nor to cast the
Second Amendment (originally the fourth) as a scheme contrived by pernicious
Virginians. Well-versed as they were in the natural rights of Englishmen, his
peers understood what he was doing, and they considered it substantively
uncontroversial.
And why wouldn’t they, when the right had such a long and
broad pedigree? The 1689 English Bill of Rights — to which so many colonists
had appealed warmly when appealing to the Crown — contained a right to bear
arms that had precisely nothing to do
with human bondage, and that had never been linked to it in either the British
or colonial imaginations. Moreover, nothing in Blackstone’s widely read discussion
of that right so much as touched on
the issue (nor, for that matter, was it addressed by the great jurists who
succeeded him). To those familiar with the antecedents of the federal right, it
should come as no surprise that, before 1791, three of the four jurisdictions
that boasted Second Amendment–style provisions within their constitutions were
in the North (they were Pennsylvania,
Vermont, and Massachusetts; North Carolina was the only Southern state that had
codified such a right). If, magically, the idea of the private ownership of
arms had become linked to bondage at the moment it hit North America, one would
expect to see a connection between its adoption and the spread of slavery. In
fact, one sees the opposite.
In 1777, Vermont protected the right to keep and bear
arms in the very same document that it
used to ban slavery. Interestingly, the drafters of that charter simply
copied and pasted the provision that Pennsylvania had adopted the previous year
(Pennsylvania abolished slavery in 1780):
That the people have a right to
bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state; and as standing armies
in the time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up;
And that the military should be kept under strict subordination, to, and
governed by, the civil power.
Presumably, if Pennsylvania had encoded this protection
in order to shield its citizens from slave uprisings, Vermonters would have
known that, and would have considered the provision unnecessary in a document
that decreed that all men were to be free. That they included it anyway speaks
volumes as to how they saw the right. In Massachusetts, too, there was an
overlap between the protection of the right to bear arms and the abolition of
slavery. Massachusetts added its right to bear arms in 1780, in the same
constitutional document as it declared that:
All men are born free and equal,
and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be
reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and
obtaining their safety and happiness.
One year later, a judge ruled in Brom and Bett v. Ashley that this provision mandated the
emancipation of a pair of slaves who had sued for their freedom. Two years
after that, the state’s supreme court applied the ruling to everyone.
Naturally, one constitutional provision did not cause the other — not even
close. But insofar as the two ideas coincided, it was with abolitionism, not
slavery, that protection of the right to bear arms most commonly overlapped.
Its historical weakness aside, Bogus’s essay exhibits
another fatal problem: to wit, that even if we were to accept his insinuations
as facts, his conclusion would remain wholly meaningless. For the sake of
argument, let’s stipulate that Virginia’s motives for wanting the Second
Amendment were, indeed, impure. What, exactly, would that tell us? The most
charitable reading of Bogus’s view is 1) that for a host of different reasons,
the original states feared that Congress would disarm their militias; 2) that
those states wanted what became the Second Amendment to ensure that that
disarmament didn’t happen; and 3) that while many states were sincere in their
appeals to ancient liberty, Virginia’s
reason for supporting the addition — the desire to quell slave uprisings — was
an ugly one. But that an institution has sometimes been abused is not, ipso
facto, a mark against its validity. In the antebellum republic, the Slave Power
in the South was happy to use any
tool at hand in order to get its own way. If slaveowners had the numbers on
their side, they made lofty appeals to democracy. If they didn’t, they appealed
passionately to localism. The men who saw fit to corrupt the Declaration were
nothing if not protean.
To reiterate: I do not for a moment buy Bogus’s case
about Madison’s intent; that the right to bear arms came from England and was
so widely protected in the North illustrates how widespread the idea had become
in America. But even if he were
right, the most that one could
conclude would be that one of the original states had bad motives — a
conclusion that is neither shocking nor especially interesting. That neo-Nazis
are protected by the First Amendment does not indict the First Amendment, just
as that criminals are protected by the Fifth does not call that bulwark into
general question. Bogus asks whether we’d “think differently about the” Second
if we took his claims at face value. The answer, I’d hope, would be no.
Happily, though, we don’t have to.
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