By Kevin D. Williamson
Monday, December 30, 2014
For people who dislike and misunderstand capitalism (or
free markets, or laissez-faire, or economic liberalism, or whatever you want to
call it), the governing principle of market competition is the “Walmart
effect.” According to this model of how the economy works — a model with very
little basis in reality, but never mind that — big companies such as Walmart
muscle into a market or a territory, use advantages of scale and predatory
pricing (“predatory” here meaning “saving consumers money at the expense of
relatively well-off business owners”) to drive out so-called mom-and-pop operations,
lower workers’ wages, and then make like Scrooge McDuck doing his Greg Louganis
impersonation into a mile-high stack of hundred-dollar bills. Big businesses
vs. small businesses, employers vs. employees, factory owners vs. consumers:
Every relationship in the marketplace is in this view distorted by power
imbalances that almost always work in favor of entrenched business interests
that use their relative power to further heighten the advantages they enjoy.
The opposite of the “Walmart effect” understanding of how
the economy operates, a view more prevalent among people who like or simply
understand capitalism, is the “Bill Gates’s nightmare effect.” Back in 1998,
when Microsoft was at the height of its power — it had just become the world’s
most valuable company — and Gates was at the height of his prestige, he told
Charlie Rose that what worried him wasn’t competition from IBM or Apple or
Netscape: “I worry about someone in a garage inventing something that I haven’t
thought of.” That was in March of 1998; in September, two guys in a garage in
Menlo Park incorporated Google. Gates was correct and incorrect at the same
time: Microsoft was surprised by Google and also lost ground to Apple, a
company that many technology watchers at the end of the 1990s believed was at
the end of its days. Microsoft had market power far in excess of what Walmart
enjoys, but it got its flabby corporate butt kicked by a couple of kids.
The archetypal big, monolithic, faceless corporation is
McDonald’s, though anybody who thinks about it for two seconds understands that
McDonald’s is the case study of which competitive markets are good for
consumers. McDonald’s has very little power in the marketplace: It would dearly
love to raise its prices or to lower its labor costs (a less straightforward
proposition than you might think), but it has a hard time doing either. I
experienced firsthand just how utterly beholden McDonald’s is to consumer
preference some years ago when I covered the opening of its first restaurant in
New Delhi in the 1990s: Despite operating a 100 percent beef-free restaurant
(beef politics in India are a complicated matter of religious, regional, and
communal rivalry) the local McDonald’s offered burgers that were
indistinguishable from the conventional American model. The restaurant also
operated a second, entirely vegetarian kitchen out of deference to local
sensibilities. Where there is competition, the consumer is king.
Not that the consumer’s preferences always make sense.
There are very few things in this life for which I am willing to stand in line
for more than two minutes, and a hamburger is not one of them. And, at the risk
of casting myself in the role of Tupac Shakur in that other bitter East–West
rivalry, I cannot imagine standing in line even for 120 seconds for a hamburger
from Shake Shack, a perfectly acceptable New York City sandwich that is
nonetheless inferior in every way to its unpretentious West Coast rival,
In-N-Out. But my tastes do not prevail: Walk around Manhattan and you’ll see
inexplicable lines of people at Madison Square Park and Battery Park City eager
to pay too much for an unremarkable hamburger. In 2000, Shake Shack was a food
cart. Ten years ago, it was one kiosk in a park. In 2015, it’s going to have an
initial public stock offering.
Bear in mind that Shake Shack has gone from cart to
corporation over a period of time during which the iconic hamburger juggernaut,
McDonald’s, has found it increasingly difficult to maintain sales and profits.
McDonald’s scope and reach has been as much a hindrance to its success as an
advantage: The company knows that it has problems with quality and customer
service, but the enterprise is so large and so complex that corporate managers
have no way of even really knowing what is going on at any particular location;
imagine the variables that go into a corporate turnaround involving 35,000
restaurants in 119 countries. But, as with Microsoft and Google, it isn’t Burger
King (my sentimental favorite) or Wendy’s that is outclassing McDonald’s, but a
formerly obscure New York City food cart, i.e. a business no doubt operated, at
least in part, out of a garage.
The aggregate effect of competitive capitalism is indistinguishable
from magic, but we are so used to its bounty that we never stop to notice that
no king of old ever enjoyed quarters so comfortable as those found in a Holiday
Inn Express, that Andrew Carnegie never had a car as good as a Honda Civic,
that Akhenaten never enjoyed such wealth as is found in a Walmart Supercenter.
The irony is that capitalism has achieved through choice and cooperation what
the old reds thought they were going to do with bayonets and gulags: It has
recruited the most powerful and significant parts of the world’s capital
structure into the service of ordinary people. And it would do so to an even
greater degree if self-interested politicians in places such as India and China
(and New York and California and D.C.) would get out of the way.
The difference between market and state — between the
world of choice and the world of command — is that whether you’re an In-N-Out
aficionado or a Shake Shack man, nobody is going to put a gun to your head and
tell you that you can’t have it your way. To paraphrase that great national
embarrassment: If you like your burger, you can keep your burger.
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