Do Dems finally understand the collateral effects of taxing the "rich"?
By Kimberley A. Strassel
Friday, August 3, 2007 12:01 a.m.
Back in the hot summer of 1990, Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell proudly engineered the infamous "luxury tax," a nasty little tithe on everything from furs to jewelry to yachts. Democrats were proud: Not only were they throwing new dollars at the Treasury, they'd done it by socking it to the rich. The wealthy, in the words of then-House Majority Leader Dick Gephardt, would finally pay "their fair share."
Within a year, Mr. Mitchell was back in the Senate passionately demanding an end to the same dreaded luxury tax. The levy had devastated his home state of Maine's boat-building business, throwing yard workers, managers and salesmen out of jobs. The luxury tax was repealed by 1993, though by the look of today's tax debate, its lessons haven't been forgotten. Top Democrats are working to implement a new class-warfare tax strategy, only this time they're getting pushback from those in their party who fear the economic consequences.
Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid, for their part, are steaming ahead with a plan ripped straight out of Mr. Mitchell's 1990 playbook. They're sitting atop years of pent-up spending demand that is now starting to bust free. Their liberal members want to give more money to gentleman farmers, take credit for expanding health insurance for "the children," and write checks to all those struggling renewable energy titans, like Archer Daniels Midland.
At the same time, the new majority is in a short-term box. They ran on fiscal responsibility, and now (bummer) are expected to live up to their paygo pledge to offset new spending with money from elsewhere. Where do they get that money? They aren't about to cut entitlements, and the so-called "tax gap"--that vast sum of uncollected IRS money that Democrats last year explained would cover all their expenses--is a fiction. The top ranks also recognize it would be political suicide to propose broad tax hikes--at least this early in their reign.
Their approach has instead been to follow Mr. Mitchell down that seductive luxury-tax path. Tax hikes are flying out of House and Senate committees, though what they all share in common is that each is laser-targeted on some rich or disreputable industry. The carried-interest tax would soak greedy hedge-fund managers. The "Blackstone tax" would hit wealthy private equity partnerships. A new farm-bill tax would siphon dollars from the U.S. subsidiaries of big foreign corporations. A repeal of a domestic deduction would suck money out of dirty oil companies. The tobacco tax needs no explanation.
As in 1990, many Democrats are feeling confident about this tax-the-rich plan. It builds nicely on the class-warfare themes they expounded in last year's election. It puts some Republicans--at least those who aren't keen to stand up for smokers--on the defensive. And, they hope and pray, it allows them to raise money while avoiding the tax-and-spend moniker. After all, they aren't giving America tax hikes, they're giving America "tax justice." If you see what they mean.
Their problem is that, at least for now, a substantial number of their own party doesn't see what they mean. And it's why, despite months of hearings and wrangling and arm-twisting, few of these tax proposals have seen the legislative light of day. For every liberal who fondly recalls Mr. Mitchell's initial demagoguery of the rich, it seems there's another Democrat who remembers Mr. Mitchell's tattered, lifeless boat industry. Many understand that taxes on the "rich" have a way of spreading their pain around to everyone, and they don't want their own district to be next.
Witness the pushback. Class warrior Sander Levin from Michigan introduced House legislation levying higher taxes on hedge fund and private equity managers' earnings back in June. It took until the end of July for Senate Democrats to start publicly trouncing the idea. Washington's Maria Cantwell worried the tax would hurt returns for her state's public pension fund, which makes a pretty penny off the back of private equity funds. Others fretted it would drive their private equity companies offshore. As for the almighty Chuck Schumer, patron senator of Wall Street, he declared his opposition to any tax that wasn't also levied on non-finance industries. And since Mr. Schumer is the one doling out money for next year's Senate re-election races, that may well be the end of that tax idea.
Over in the House, tobacco-state Democrats have already taken a scalpel to the Senate's proposed 61-cent federal tax on cigarettes, whittling it down to 45 cents. Even then, 10 Democrats--several hailing from the tobacco havens of North Carolina and Tennessee--voted against the child health-insurance legislation that included the tax. Their defection makes it that much harder for Ms. Pelosi to consider an override of a presidential veto.
Madame Speaker, meanwhile, spent what was by all accounts an unfriendly hour last week trying to coax Democrats from oil-patch states to sign on to her oil-company tax hike. As of yesterday, she hadn't had much luck; Texas's Gene Green and about two dozen other oil-state dissidents were holding firm against the $16 billion tax package leveled directly at their home-state economies. It was unclear whether Ms. Pelosi could even risk bringing her vaunted energy legislation for a vote before August recess. Chief tax writer Charlie Rangel has faced so much in-party blowback to his idea of heavily taxing "the rich" in order to finance an alternative minimum tax fix, he has yet to introduce legislation.
"What Charlie Rangel is encountering--and he has found this shocking--is that within his Democratic ranks he today has parochial interests with foresight," says Dick Armey, former House majority leader and current chairman of FreedomWorks. "These folks aren't going to come back a year later with a George Mitchell revelation. They're looking forward now, to what all this could do to their districts, and it's making it difficult for those proposing taxes."
This isn't to suggest some of these bad taxes won't go through; they will. But it's encouraging to know that, even amid this latest round of Democratic class-warfarism, the party harbors a minority who understands that taxes do have economic consequences. You can almost hear the ghost of the luxury tax past rasping away in the background.
Friday, August 3, 2007
Quit Complaining
By Linda Chavez
Friday, August 3, 2007
Ever wonder why women, on average, make less money than men? For years, feminists have argued that discrimination is to blame. But most careful studies show that once you take into account differences in the hours worked, years of experience, and the actual occupational or professional category in which women work, the gap narrows considerably.
If you add marital status to the mix (married men earn the highest salaries, married women the lowest), the differences virtually disappear among the youngest groups of working men and women.
Now, a group of economists has come up with a different explanation of the pay gap -- one that adds a surprising bit of nuance to the "discrimination" thesis. According to a study by economics professor Linda C. Babcock of Carnegie Mellon University, reported recently in the Washington Post, women may not actually ask for as much money as men. And their reticence costs them in both starting pay and in earning higher raises.
Babcock and her colleagues observed how men and women reacted when told they would be paid according to a sliding scale. Men were eight times more likely to ask for higher compensation than they were initially offered to participate in a simple experiment. Even when told that the payment was negotiable, only 58 percent of the women, but 83 percent of the men, asked for more money.
And other studies have examined whether this female acquiescence applied in the real world beyond a laboratory experiment. A survey of students who received job offers after earning master's degrees demonstrated that more than half the men, but only 12.5 percent of women, negotiated for higher salaries than they were initially offered.
Babcock and her co-authors argue that this behavior may not be entirely self-defeating, however, since women may be penalized subtly if they are too aggressive. Their studies show that both male and female supervisors react more negatively to women who try to negotiate higher pay. But male supervisors don't penalize men who do so, while female supervisors prefer both men and women who aren't pushy when it comes to salary, accepting whatever they are offered.
Apparently it took years of study and, no doubt, substantial research grants, to determine something most of us realized all along: Men and women behave differently. In the past, feminists maintained, against all evidence to the contrary, that there were no differences between the two sexes, and any that might seem to exist were just a matter of socialization.
The first efforts to narrow the pay gap aimed at encouraging women to go into previously all-male jobs. Women should be just as eager to become plumbers, lumberjacks and long-haul truck drivers as men, they argued. When women didn't flock to most male-dominated jobs, the feminists then urged that we raise the wages in female-dominated job categories to close the pay gap. Nurses should make more money than electricians; child-care workers should earn more than tree trimmers; and librarians should earn more than garbage collectors.
But there is no central wage-setting mechanism in this country that could enforce such arbitrary efforts to increase pay in female-dominated jobs, thankfully. So these efforts to eliminate the wage gap also failed. And if these recent studies are correct, even if starting wages for women were higher, many women's salaries would eventually fall behind their male co-workers' because they failed to demand raises. But discrimination isn't the cause.
Discrimination -- against women, minorities or white men, for that matter -- still occurs on an individual basis. Even with harsh penalties and aggressive enforcement of anti-discrimination laws, some employers will choose to hire or promote based on their own prejudices. But employers who make a habit of rewarding less qualified individuals over better qualified ones will pay dearly for those prejudices in lower productivity -- and lower profits -- over time. And those employers who reward merit and effort will benefit by being able to attract the best workers -- that is, unless the workers themselves give up.
Marketplace economics works to reward talented individuals, but only if those individuals are willing to take risks on their own behalf. Women need to learn to play the game -- or quit complaining that they're underpaid.
Friday, August 3, 2007
Ever wonder why women, on average, make less money than men? For years, feminists have argued that discrimination is to blame. But most careful studies show that once you take into account differences in the hours worked, years of experience, and the actual occupational or professional category in which women work, the gap narrows considerably.
If you add marital status to the mix (married men earn the highest salaries, married women the lowest), the differences virtually disappear among the youngest groups of working men and women.
Now, a group of economists has come up with a different explanation of the pay gap -- one that adds a surprising bit of nuance to the "discrimination" thesis. According to a study by economics professor Linda C. Babcock of Carnegie Mellon University, reported recently in the Washington Post, women may not actually ask for as much money as men. And their reticence costs them in both starting pay and in earning higher raises.
Babcock and her colleagues observed how men and women reacted when told they would be paid according to a sliding scale. Men were eight times more likely to ask for higher compensation than they were initially offered to participate in a simple experiment. Even when told that the payment was negotiable, only 58 percent of the women, but 83 percent of the men, asked for more money.
And other studies have examined whether this female acquiescence applied in the real world beyond a laboratory experiment. A survey of students who received job offers after earning master's degrees demonstrated that more than half the men, but only 12.5 percent of women, negotiated for higher salaries than they were initially offered.
Babcock and her co-authors argue that this behavior may not be entirely self-defeating, however, since women may be penalized subtly if they are too aggressive. Their studies show that both male and female supervisors react more negatively to women who try to negotiate higher pay. But male supervisors don't penalize men who do so, while female supervisors prefer both men and women who aren't pushy when it comes to salary, accepting whatever they are offered.
Apparently it took years of study and, no doubt, substantial research grants, to determine something most of us realized all along: Men and women behave differently. In the past, feminists maintained, against all evidence to the contrary, that there were no differences between the two sexes, and any that might seem to exist were just a matter of socialization.
The first efforts to narrow the pay gap aimed at encouraging women to go into previously all-male jobs. Women should be just as eager to become plumbers, lumberjacks and long-haul truck drivers as men, they argued. When women didn't flock to most male-dominated jobs, the feminists then urged that we raise the wages in female-dominated job categories to close the pay gap. Nurses should make more money than electricians; child-care workers should earn more than tree trimmers; and librarians should earn more than garbage collectors.
But there is no central wage-setting mechanism in this country that could enforce such arbitrary efforts to increase pay in female-dominated jobs, thankfully. So these efforts to eliminate the wage gap also failed. And if these recent studies are correct, even if starting wages for women were higher, many women's salaries would eventually fall behind their male co-workers' because they failed to demand raises. But discrimination isn't the cause.
Discrimination -- against women, minorities or white men, for that matter -- still occurs on an individual basis. Even with harsh penalties and aggressive enforcement of anti-discrimination laws, some employers will choose to hire or promote based on their own prejudices. But employers who make a habit of rewarding less qualified individuals over better qualified ones will pay dearly for those prejudices in lower productivity -- and lower profits -- over time. And those employers who reward merit and effort will benefit by being able to attract the best workers -- that is, unless the workers themselves give up.
Marketplace economics works to reward talented individuals, but only if those individuals are willing to take risks on their own behalf. Women need to learn to play the game -- or quit complaining that they're underpaid.
How the JFK assassination changed liberalism
By Rich Lowry
Thursday, August 2, 2007
From a distance of nearly 50 years, the liberalism of 1960 is hardly recognizable. It was comfortable with the use of American power abroad, unabashedly patriotic and forward-looking. But that was before The Fall.
In his eye-opening new book "Camelot and the Cultural Revolution," Jim Piereson argues The Fall was the assassination of President Kennedy. It represented more than the tragic death of a young president, but the descent of liberalism from an optimistic creed focused on pragmatic improvements in the American condition to a darker philosophy obsessed with America's sins. Echoes of the assassination -- and the meaning attributed to it by JFK's admirers -- can still be heard in the querulous tones of contemporary liberalism.
The real John F. Kennedy wasn't the paladin of liberal purity of myth. He was friends with Joseph McCarthy. In his 1952 campaign for Senate and his 1960 presidential campaign, he got to the right of his Republican opponents on key issues. "Kennedy did not want anyone to tag him as a liberal, which he regarded as the kiss of death in electoral politics," Piereson writes. As president, he was vigorously anti-communist, a tax-cutter and a cautious supporter of civil rights.
His kind of liberalism -- "tough and realistic," as Piereson puts it, in the tradition of FDR and Truman -- was carried away in the riptide of his death. In a crucial and counterintuitive interpretive act, the nation's opinion elite made JFK a martyr to civil rights instead of the Cold War. Kennedy had been killed by a communist, Lee Harvey Oswald, who a few years before had tried to defect to the Soviet Union. Liberals nonetheless blamed the assassination on, in the characteristic words of Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren, "the hatred and bitterness that has been injected into the life of our nation by bigots."
Thus, the assassination curdled into an indictment of American society: "Kennedy Victim of Violent Streak He Sought to Curb in Nation," read a New York Times headline. Until this point, 20th-century liberalism had tended to see history as a steady march of progress. Now, the march had been interrupted by the country's own pathologies. "Kennedy was mourned in a spirit of frustrated possibility and dashed hopes," Piereson argues, and that sense of loss came to define the new liberalism.
American history no longer appeared to be a benign process, but a twisted story of rapine and oppression. "With such a bill of indictment," Piereson writes, "the new liberals now held that Americans had no good reason to feel pride in their country's past or optimism about its future."
Their agenda took on a punitive edge, focused on compensating victim groups and expiating the country's guilt.
The left developed ambivalence about national power, in which the old liberal reformers had placed such faith. In the paranoid theories that sprang up in the wake of Kennedy's assassination -- many of them to avoid the simple, uncongenial fact that a lone communist had killed the president -- the seat of American government had been the locus of a secret plot to kill JFK. The conspiracy theories and anti-Americanism that had so appalled liberals about the far right in the 1950s had now gravitated to the left. Bizarrely, after a liberal hero was slain by a Marxist, communist icons and ideas became more fashionable on the left than ever before.
Other things were going on obviously, most importantly the Vietnam War. But the war was seen through the prism of American malignancy established by the Kennedy assassination. This downbeat and adversarial disposition is -- more than any specific policy weaknesses on, say, national security -- a drag on contemporary liberalism's long-term appeal. One day a Democratic politician will emerge who is compelling enough to vanquish the foul spirit of JFK's assassination from the left.
Until that happens, JFK has to be remembered, in Piereson's words, as "the last articulate spokesman for the now lost world of American liberalism."
Thursday, August 2, 2007
From a distance of nearly 50 years, the liberalism of 1960 is hardly recognizable. It was comfortable with the use of American power abroad, unabashedly patriotic and forward-looking. But that was before The Fall.
In his eye-opening new book "Camelot and the Cultural Revolution," Jim Piereson argues The Fall was the assassination of President Kennedy. It represented more than the tragic death of a young president, but the descent of liberalism from an optimistic creed focused on pragmatic improvements in the American condition to a darker philosophy obsessed with America's sins. Echoes of the assassination -- and the meaning attributed to it by JFK's admirers -- can still be heard in the querulous tones of contemporary liberalism.
The real John F. Kennedy wasn't the paladin of liberal purity of myth. He was friends with Joseph McCarthy. In his 1952 campaign for Senate and his 1960 presidential campaign, he got to the right of his Republican opponents on key issues. "Kennedy did not want anyone to tag him as a liberal, which he regarded as the kiss of death in electoral politics," Piereson writes. As president, he was vigorously anti-communist, a tax-cutter and a cautious supporter of civil rights.
His kind of liberalism -- "tough and realistic," as Piereson puts it, in the tradition of FDR and Truman -- was carried away in the riptide of his death. In a crucial and counterintuitive interpretive act, the nation's opinion elite made JFK a martyr to civil rights instead of the Cold War. Kennedy had been killed by a communist, Lee Harvey Oswald, who a few years before had tried to defect to the Soviet Union. Liberals nonetheless blamed the assassination on, in the characteristic words of Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren, "the hatred and bitterness that has been injected into the life of our nation by bigots."
Thus, the assassination curdled into an indictment of American society: "Kennedy Victim of Violent Streak He Sought to Curb in Nation," read a New York Times headline. Until this point, 20th-century liberalism had tended to see history as a steady march of progress. Now, the march had been interrupted by the country's own pathologies. "Kennedy was mourned in a spirit of frustrated possibility and dashed hopes," Piereson argues, and that sense of loss came to define the new liberalism.
American history no longer appeared to be a benign process, but a twisted story of rapine and oppression. "With such a bill of indictment," Piereson writes, "the new liberals now held that Americans had no good reason to feel pride in their country's past or optimism about its future."
Their agenda took on a punitive edge, focused on compensating victim groups and expiating the country's guilt.
The left developed ambivalence about national power, in which the old liberal reformers had placed such faith. In the paranoid theories that sprang up in the wake of Kennedy's assassination -- many of them to avoid the simple, uncongenial fact that a lone communist had killed the president -- the seat of American government had been the locus of a secret plot to kill JFK. The conspiracy theories and anti-Americanism that had so appalled liberals about the far right in the 1950s had now gravitated to the left. Bizarrely, after a liberal hero was slain by a Marxist, communist icons and ideas became more fashionable on the left than ever before.
Other things were going on obviously, most importantly the Vietnam War. But the war was seen through the prism of American malignancy established by the Kennedy assassination. This downbeat and adversarial disposition is -- more than any specific policy weaknesses on, say, national security -- a drag on contemporary liberalism's long-term appeal. One day a Democratic politician will emerge who is compelling enough to vanquish the foul spirit of JFK's assassination from the left.
Until that happens, JFK has to be remembered, in Piereson's words, as "the last articulate spokesman for the now lost world of American liberalism."
Thursday, August 2, 2007
Wrong Turn
Even as European leftists move right, American ones move further left.
By Jurgen Reinhoudt
Wednesday, August 1, 2007 12:01 a.m.
In Europe, reforms are in vogue. Though many special interests are fiercely resisting change, it is striking to see just how many European Social Democrats have come to recognize the need for structural reforms to welfare states.
Witness Gerhard Schröder, the center-left former chancellor of Germany: in 2003, he called for a "change of mentality" in his own party, the SPD, as well as in German society as a whole. "Much will have to be changed to keep our welfare and social security at least at its current level," he added, as he argued in favor of reforms that would trim entitlements, and cut taxes. The chairman of the SPD, Franz Müntefering, supported Mr. Schroeder by saying that "we believe that things must be rearranged and restarted in Germany in this decade." Not long thereafter, Mr., Schroeder took the lead in making German labor laws more flexible.
In France, Socialist former prime minister Lionel Jospin shocked the left several years ago: When asked on TV what he was going to do to help laid-off factory workers beyond the public assistance already on the books, he said that "the state cannot do everything." It was not so much the truth of the statement that came as a shock; it was that a leader of the French left would say it so candidly. Throughout his tenure, Mr. Jospin privatized numerous state-owned companies, including Air France, even as he criticized capitalism.
Labour former British prime minister Tony Blair became famous for his "Third Way" philosophy, which he said moved "beyond an old left preoccupied by state control, high taxation and producer interests."
And in Italy, on July 20, center-left prime minister Romano Prodi announced a deal raising the retirement age to 61 from 57. Though the deal was a somewhat watered-down version of the pension reform plan originally passed by his center-right predecessor, Silvio Berlusconi, it shows that the Italian left is aware that structural reforms are urgently needed.
In many countries the left has been willing to discard or, at the very least, publicly reconsider old big-government approaches in order to reinvigorate economic growth and general prosperity.
In the United States, by contrast, those most committed to the welfare state tend to talk about trimming entitlements the least. This is particularly true of politicians aspiring to the highest office of the land.
Yet the statistics--affirmed by center-left and center-right experts alike--are unequivocal. The United States is facing a tremendous fiscal shortfall in the decades ahead. In addition to Medicare, Social Security and Medicaid will have to be dealt with. The total entitlement shortfall is expected to surpass $50 trillion, and there are no politically easy solutions.
Under reasonable calculations of higher spending, according to the Congressional Budget Office, Federal spending as a percentage of gross domestic product will rise to 35% in 2050 from about 20% today to pay for the additional entitlement spending. But that is excluding state and local spending, which takes up about 11% of GDP.
Thus, under a reasonable scenario, by 2050, the federal, state and local governments in the U.S. will spend 46% of GDP, not that far from what France spends today (54%).
To avoid getting there, benefits for entitlement recipients may have to be trimmed, contributions of wealthy retirees to certain programs may have to rise, private Social Security accounts could be permitted, and benefits may have to be dependent on one's income or total assets. There are many possible pieces of a comprehensive solution, yet they are not being discussed in political circles.
Far from tackling the looming fiscal crisis, presidential candidates are busy marketing expensive new plans to voters. The health-care plan of John Edwards would "cost the federal government some $120 billion a year," $1.2 trillion over a 10-year period, for the foreseeable future. And that's not including $15 billion a year in proposed antipoverty measures. No word on how the existing entitlement shortfall will be dealt with.
Similarly, Sen. Barack Obama's health-care proposals would cost "$65 billion a year," roughly $650 billion over a 10-year period, "though other health experts think it would be higher." No credible word yet on how the existing entitlement shortfall can be managed.
There is another problem: Estimates of new entitlement programs inevitably understate the actual cost, either for political reasons (to ease passage) or out of innocent miscalculations, as happened with Medicare. In 1966, its first year of existence, Medicare cost $3 billion a year: the House Ways and Means Committee predicted it would cost $12 billion in 1990, taking inflation into account. But instead of costing $12 billion in 1990, Medicare cost $107 billion. And it is set to cost $488 billion in fiscal 2008.
Or consider the new prescription drug benefit for seniors, estimated to cost about roughly $1 trillion from 2007 to 2016: the costs of that program are set to rise significantly thereafter as more baby-boomers retire. Originally, the White House estimated the plan to cost $400 billion over a 10-year period; it ended up costing substantially more.
While proposals for new entitlements may be politically easy, they are fiscally reckless. Candidates who promise expansive new entitlement spending are effectively writing checks the American economy cannot cash. They will take us to the place where Europe is today: a place where existing entitlements are unaffordable. Yet what matters is not so much the specific measures being considered, but the broader mindset from which they originate. It is in this context that comparing the European political mindset to the American political mindset is useful.
In 2005, the liberal Washington Post columnist Sebastian Mallaby criticized the opposition of many Democrats to the possibility of investing in private Social Security accounts by saying that "a party that refuses to acknowledge the urgency of entitlement reform is a party of ostriches." He's right--and the label applies to many leaders in both parties.
Presidential candidates ought to learn from Europe's lessons. Even if it is politically painful, we should not race to the place that Europe is trying to get away from.
By Jurgen Reinhoudt
Wednesday, August 1, 2007 12:01 a.m.
In Europe, reforms are in vogue. Though many special interests are fiercely resisting change, it is striking to see just how many European Social Democrats have come to recognize the need for structural reforms to welfare states.
Witness Gerhard Schröder, the center-left former chancellor of Germany: in 2003, he called for a "change of mentality" in his own party, the SPD, as well as in German society as a whole. "Much will have to be changed to keep our welfare and social security at least at its current level," he added, as he argued in favor of reforms that would trim entitlements, and cut taxes. The chairman of the SPD, Franz Müntefering, supported Mr. Schroeder by saying that "we believe that things must be rearranged and restarted in Germany in this decade." Not long thereafter, Mr., Schroeder took the lead in making German labor laws more flexible.
In France, Socialist former prime minister Lionel Jospin shocked the left several years ago: When asked on TV what he was going to do to help laid-off factory workers beyond the public assistance already on the books, he said that "the state cannot do everything." It was not so much the truth of the statement that came as a shock; it was that a leader of the French left would say it so candidly. Throughout his tenure, Mr. Jospin privatized numerous state-owned companies, including Air France, even as he criticized capitalism.
Labour former British prime minister Tony Blair became famous for his "Third Way" philosophy, which he said moved "beyond an old left preoccupied by state control, high taxation and producer interests."
And in Italy, on July 20, center-left prime minister Romano Prodi announced a deal raising the retirement age to 61 from 57. Though the deal was a somewhat watered-down version of the pension reform plan originally passed by his center-right predecessor, Silvio Berlusconi, it shows that the Italian left is aware that structural reforms are urgently needed.
In many countries the left has been willing to discard or, at the very least, publicly reconsider old big-government approaches in order to reinvigorate economic growth and general prosperity.
In the United States, by contrast, those most committed to the welfare state tend to talk about trimming entitlements the least. This is particularly true of politicians aspiring to the highest office of the land.
Yet the statistics--affirmed by center-left and center-right experts alike--are unequivocal. The United States is facing a tremendous fiscal shortfall in the decades ahead. In addition to Medicare, Social Security and Medicaid will have to be dealt with. The total entitlement shortfall is expected to surpass $50 trillion, and there are no politically easy solutions.
Under reasonable calculations of higher spending, according to the Congressional Budget Office, Federal spending as a percentage of gross domestic product will rise to 35% in 2050 from about 20% today to pay for the additional entitlement spending. But that is excluding state and local spending, which takes up about 11% of GDP.
Thus, under a reasonable scenario, by 2050, the federal, state and local governments in the U.S. will spend 46% of GDP, not that far from what France spends today (54%).
To avoid getting there, benefits for entitlement recipients may have to be trimmed, contributions of wealthy retirees to certain programs may have to rise, private Social Security accounts could be permitted, and benefits may have to be dependent on one's income or total assets. There are many possible pieces of a comprehensive solution, yet they are not being discussed in political circles.
Far from tackling the looming fiscal crisis, presidential candidates are busy marketing expensive new plans to voters. The health-care plan of John Edwards would "cost the federal government some $120 billion a year," $1.2 trillion over a 10-year period, for the foreseeable future. And that's not including $15 billion a year in proposed antipoverty measures. No word on how the existing entitlement shortfall will be dealt with.
Similarly, Sen. Barack Obama's health-care proposals would cost "$65 billion a year," roughly $650 billion over a 10-year period, "though other health experts think it would be higher." No credible word yet on how the existing entitlement shortfall can be managed.
There is another problem: Estimates of new entitlement programs inevitably understate the actual cost, either for political reasons (to ease passage) or out of innocent miscalculations, as happened with Medicare. In 1966, its first year of existence, Medicare cost $3 billion a year: the House Ways and Means Committee predicted it would cost $12 billion in 1990, taking inflation into account. But instead of costing $12 billion in 1990, Medicare cost $107 billion. And it is set to cost $488 billion in fiscal 2008.
Or consider the new prescription drug benefit for seniors, estimated to cost about roughly $1 trillion from 2007 to 2016: the costs of that program are set to rise significantly thereafter as more baby-boomers retire. Originally, the White House estimated the plan to cost $400 billion over a 10-year period; it ended up costing substantially more.
While proposals for new entitlements may be politically easy, they are fiscally reckless. Candidates who promise expansive new entitlement spending are effectively writing checks the American economy cannot cash. They will take us to the place where Europe is today: a place where existing entitlements are unaffordable. Yet what matters is not so much the specific measures being considered, but the broader mindset from which they originate. It is in this context that comparing the European political mindset to the American political mindset is useful.
In 2005, the liberal Washington Post columnist Sebastian Mallaby criticized the opposition of many Democrats to the possibility of investing in private Social Security accounts by saying that "a party that refuses to acknowledge the urgency of entitlement reform is a party of ostriches." He's right--and the label applies to many leaders in both parties.
Presidential candidates ought to learn from Europe's lessons. Even if it is politically painful, we should not race to the place that Europe is trying to get away from.
The Hidden Basis for Hostility to Israel and America
By Michael Medved
Wednesday, August 1, 2007
On Saturday in Jerusalem, I participated in a moving religious service to honor one of Israel’s most celebrated heroes from last summer’s war against the Hezbollah terrorists.
Lieutenant Eli Kahn, 23, led a unit of elite Paratrooper Commandos advancing against heavily defended Hezbollah positions in the Southern Lebanon town of Maroun al-Ras in the early days of the fighting. The Israelis, hoping to knock out Katyusha rockets that had already taken a bloody toll on civilian targets, drew unexpectedly intense fire from the enemy and sustained heavy casualties.
While tending to one of his wounded paratroopers, Lt. Kahn saw a terrorist run toward them and throw a grenade that landed at their feet. Rather than jumping out of the way and abandoning his comrade to certain death, Lt. Kahn immediately picked up the grenade and threw it directly back at the Hezbollah fighter --- killing the terrorist and turning the tide of battle. For his leadership and quick thinking, he received the Medal of Valor – Israel’s equivalent of America’s Medal of Honor. The young hero’s father, Howie Kahn, remembered that his boy played Little League before the family immigrated to Israel from the United States and suggested that his skills as a slick-fielding shortstop paid off with that one fateful and well-aimed toss on the field of battle.
Hearing the story of Eli Kahn, most Americans would feel gratified and inspired but the service I attended at the lieutenant’s Orthodox synagogue nonetheless serves to highlight the deeper, unspoken reasons that Israel provokes such visceral hostility from the international left.
The Middle East’s only democracy has recently enjoyed spectacular economic progress and unprecedented success in blocking and deterring terror attacks from its many Islamo-Nazi adversaries. Why, then, the increasingly shrill demands from politically correct activists throughout Western Europe and from college campuses in the United States for boycotts, UN condemnation, sanctions and diplomatic isolation aimed at punishing the Jewish state?
Why does the death of a few dozen Palestinians (mostly gunmen or racketeers from Hamas and Islamic Jihad) provoke more international indignation than the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of innocents in Darfur, or the butchery of additional thousands by Muslim terrorists in Pakistan, Indonesia, India, Algeria, Yemen, the Philippines and even Thailand?
The common explanations for singling out Israel for international denunciation make no sense when placed in any reasonably well-informed historical context.
For instance, leftist critics like to suggest that Israel deserves the world’s hostility because of its long-term “occupation” of lands captured in defensive wars. But the Jewish state has already withdrawn from the overwhelming majority of the disputed territory it ever controlled, hoping to demonstrate its eagerness to trade land for peace—abandoning the vast area of the Sinai Peninsula in 1978, its South Lebanon “Security Zone” in 2000, and all the Gaza Strip in 2005. Moreover, in the remaining zone of “occupation” in the West Bank, the results of Israeli rule can hardly count as brutal: according to UN figures, by all measures of economic prosperity, public health, and standards of living before the Second Intifada broke out in the Fall of 2000, West Bankers did better than their fellow Arabs in neighboring countries like Syria, Egypt and Jordan.
The historical record makes clear that Arab fury against Jews in the Middle East bears no connection to any occupation policy or to the plight of refugees, since this murderous rage claimed countless victims long before Israel occupied a single square inch or territory and before a single Palestinian had fled his home.
A brief history of the early conflict (published by the indispensable Israel Pocket Library) offers a necessary reminder of Palestinian terrorism as long ago as 1929. In that year, the bitterly anti-Semitic Grand Mufti of Jerusalem (who later traveled to Berlin and spent most of the war years at Hitler’s side) claimed that the largely unarmed and loosely organized Jewish community harbored secret “designs” on Muslim holy places, and launched bloody attacks on the Jews of Jerusalem. As the grim story unfolded, “The violence spread to other parts of the country. On Sabbath, August 24, the Arabs of Hebron fell upon the small, defenseless Jewish community in the town and slaughtered some 70 men and women. Old people and infants were butchered; the survivors, numbering several hundred, being evacuated to Jerusalem.
Attacks on Tel Aviv and the Jewish quarter in Haifa were repulsed, but on the fifth day of the riots an Arab mob killed 18 Jews and wounded many more before the Jews could take refuge in the police headquarters while the mob ransacked and burned the historic Jewish quarter. In Be’er Toviyah all the settlers held out in a cowshed while the mob plundered and destroyed the village. Huldah, too, was destroyed after the Jewish defenders held out for many hours against thousands of Arabs and were evacuated by a British army patrol.”
A mere eight years later, in 1937, unprovoked Palestinian violence broke out once again with even bloodier results: “415 Jews were killed by the terrorists in the period 1937-39, over half of them between July and October 1938.”
The most striking revelation in these all-but-forgotten chapters of Middle East history involves the brutal, determined, vicious nature of Palestinian terrorism before Israel occupied any territory whatever, or caused the departure of any refugees (the Palestinian population went up sharply – never declining for even a single year – as Jewish return to the ancient homeland intensified). As a matter of fact, the devastating riots of 1929 and 1937-39 (not to mention other deadly attacks in 1921, 1926 and 1936) occurred long before the state of Israel even existed—making clear that Palestinian violence against their Jewish neighbors arose from fanatical Jew-hatred, not any objection to the specific policies of a non-existent state.
Clearly, the same deep-seated anti-Semitic instincts help to explain some of the hostility to the Jewish state today, especially among purportedly enlightened Europeans.
There’s also the undeniable factor of worldwide anti-Americanism – Israel earns contempt as one of the closest, most reliable allies of the Superpower labeled by many leftists (including Michael Moore in his previous America-bashing film, “The Big One”) as “the real Evil Empire.” But other nations (like Britain, Canada and Australia, most obviously) align themselves equally closely with the United States and even more enthusiastically embrace America’s reviled culture, without provoking the animus that faces Israel in many corners of the globe.
One of the secrets of the world-wide suspicion and resentment toward the Jewish state involves the unmistakably prominent, even dominant, Israeli role for two institutions loathed by leftists everywhere: religion and the military.
While two-thirds of Israelis describe themselves as secular, the increasing popularity and influence of Orthodox religiosity remains an undeniable factor in Israeli society. Meanwhile, even the state’s famously agnostic and atheist founders made regular reference to Bible in urging their compatriots to return to Zion. The fact that Israel counts as the “Holy Land” to the world’s more than two billion Christians also provides a religious flavor and perspective to the nation’s existence that makes secular purists distinctly uncomfortable.
Meanwhile, the military continues to play a huge and necessary part in the life of the perpetually embattled nation. Some 75% of young people still do three full years of military service after their high school graduation, and continue with yearly reserve duty for 25 years after that. Even the leader of Israel’s leading party on the left (former Prime Minister Ehud Barak) is a one-time war hero and the most decorated soldier in the country’s history.
In other words, for trendy liberals who feel profound, instinctive distaste for the influence of armies and organized faith in human life, it’s only natural to feel somewhat uncomfortable with Israel.
The same attitudes, by the way, help to explain some of the fashionable anti-Americanism that’s taken hold among European and other international elites. Religion remains a vastly more potent force in the US than in any other Western nation, and our military remains far larger, more potent and more revered than the armies of other major nations. Those who love to denounce the impact of militarism and organized faith will inevitably find much to dislike about America – and about our close ally in the Middle East.
This US and Israeli devotion to both armed forces and religious institutions brings me back to the synagogue celebration I witnessed for Lt. Eli Kahn. Called to the Torah before a clapping, singing, admiring congregation, the young war hero chanted the weekly “Haftorah” (a passage from Isaiah) and received a good-natured pelting of candy tossed at him from all directions by his friends and neighbors. This treatment had little to do with his battlefield exploits of exactly one year earlier, but actually reflected his status as the community’s next bridegroom: in Jewish tradition, all young men receive similar honor on the Sabbath before their weddings. (Lt. Kahn stands under the wedding canopy with his bride tomorrow night, Thursday).
In Israeli eyes, there’s no contradiction between love of God and admiration of the military – between celebrating the beginning of a loving new family along with the courage and dedication of a battle-hardened soldier. Both religious and military institutions exist to promote life, not death; to facilitate peaceful communities and growing families, not bloodshed and martyrdom.
Americans and Israelis understand the connection between our soldiers and our survival, between faith in a compassionate God and the maintenance of military strength that allows decency and kindness to flourish. And of course, much of the rest of the world that believes that they’ve already moved on beyond such outmoded relics as organized religion and mighty armies, hates us for our decidedly different perspective.
Wednesday, August 1, 2007
On Saturday in Jerusalem, I participated in a moving religious service to honor one of Israel’s most celebrated heroes from last summer’s war against the Hezbollah terrorists.
Lieutenant Eli Kahn, 23, led a unit of elite Paratrooper Commandos advancing against heavily defended Hezbollah positions in the Southern Lebanon town of Maroun al-Ras in the early days of the fighting. The Israelis, hoping to knock out Katyusha rockets that had already taken a bloody toll on civilian targets, drew unexpectedly intense fire from the enemy and sustained heavy casualties.
While tending to one of his wounded paratroopers, Lt. Kahn saw a terrorist run toward them and throw a grenade that landed at their feet. Rather than jumping out of the way and abandoning his comrade to certain death, Lt. Kahn immediately picked up the grenade and threw it directly back at the Hezbollah fighter --- killing the terrorist and turning the tide of battle. For his leadership and quick thinking, he received the Medal of Valor – Israel’s equivalent of America’s Medal of Honor. The young hero’s father, Howie Kahn, remembered that his boy played Little League before the family immigrated to Israel from the United States and suggested that his skills as a slick-fielding shortstop paid off with that one fateful and well-aimed toss on the field of battle.
Hearing the story of Eli Kahn, most Americans would feel gratified and inspired but the service I attended at the lieutenant’s Orthodox synagogue nonetheless serves to highlight the deeper, unspoken reasons that Israel provokes such visceral hostility from the international left.
The Middle East’s only democracy has recently enjoyed spectacular economic progress and unprecedented success in blocking and deterring terror attacks from its many Islamo-Nazi adversaries. Why, then, the increasingly shrill demands from politically correct activists throughout Western Europe and from college campuses in the United States for boycotts, UN condemnation, sanctions and diplomatic isolation aimed at punishing the Jewish state?
Why does the death of a few dozen Palestinians (mostly gunmen or racketeers from Hamas and Islamic Jihad) provoke more international indignation than the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of innocents in Darfur, or the butchery of additional thousands by Muslim terrorists in Pakistan, Indonesia, India, Algeria, Yemen, the Philippines and even Thailand?
The common explanations for singling out Israel for international denunciation make no sense when placed in any reasonably well-informed historical context.
For instance, leftist critics like to suggest that Israel deserves the world’s hostility because of its long-term “occupation” of lands captured in defensive wars. But the Jewish state has already withdrawn from the overwhelming majority of the disputed territory it ever controlled, hoping to demonstrate its eagerness to trade land for peace—abandoning the vast area of the Sinai Peninsula in 1978, its South Lebanon “Security Zone” in 2000, and all the Gaza Strip in 2005. Moreover, in the remaining zone of “occupation” in the West Bank, the results of Israeli rule can hardly count as brutal: according to UN figures, by all measures of economic prosperity, public health, and standards of living before the Second Intifada broke out in the Fall of 2000, West Bankers did better than their fellow Arabs in neighboring countries like Syria, Egypt and Jordan.
The historical record makes clear that Arab fury against Jews in the Middle East bears no connection to any occupation policy or to the plight of refugees, since this murderous rage claimed countless victims long before Israel occupied a single square inch or territory and before a single Palestinian had fled his home.
A brief history of the early conflict (published by the indispensable Israel Pocket Library) offers a necessary reminder of Palestinian terrorism as long ago as 1929. In that year, the bitterly anti-Semitic Grand Mufti of Jerusalem (who later traveled to Berlin and spent most of the war years at Hitler’s side) claimed that the largely unarmed and loosely organized Jewish community harbored secret “designs” on Muslim holy places, and launched bloody attacks on the Jews of Jerusalem. As the grim story unfolded, “The violence spread to other parts of the country. On Sabbath, August 24, the Arabs of Hebron fell upon the small, defenseless Jewish community in the town and slaughtered some 70 men and women. Old people and infants were butchered; the survivors, numbering several hundred, being evacuated to Jerusalem.
Attacks on Tel Aviv and the Jewish quarter in Haifa were repulsed, but on the fifth day of the riots an Arab mob killed 18 Jews and wounded many more before the Jews could take refuge in the police headquarters while the mob ransacked and burned the historic Jewish quarter. In Be’er Toviyah all the settlers held out in a cowshed while the mob plundered and destroyed the village. Huldah, too, was destroyed after the Jewish defenders held out for many hours against thousands of Arabs and were evacuated by a British army patrol.”
A mere eight years later, in 1937, unprovoked Palestinian violence broke out once again with even bloodier results: “415 Jews were killed by the terrorists in the period 1937-39, over half of them between July and October 1938.”
The most striking revelation in these all-but-forgotten chapters of Middle East history involves the brutal, determined, vicious nature of Palestinian terrorism before Israel occupied any territory whatever, or caused the departure of any refugees (the Palestinian population went up sharply – never declining for even a single year – as Jewish return to the ancient homeland intensified). As a matter of fact, the devastating riots of 1929 and 1937-39 (not to mention other deadly attacks in 1921, 1926 and 1936) occurred long before the state of Israel even existed—making clear that Palestinian violence against their Jewish neighbors arose from fanatical Jew-hatred, not any objection to the specific policies of a non-existent state.
Clearly, the same deep-seated anti-Semitic instincts help to explain some of the hostility to the Jewish state today, especially among purportedly enlightened Europeans.
There’s also the undeniable factor of worldwide anti-Americanism – Israel earns contempt as one of the closest, most reliable allies of the Superpower labeled by many leftists (including Michael Moore in his previous America-bashing film, “The Big One”) as “the real Evil Empire.” But other nations (like Britain, Canada and Australia, most obviously) align themselves equally closely with the United States and even more enthusiastically embrace America’s reviled culture, without provoking the animus that faces Israel in many corners of the globe.
One of the secrets of the world-wide suspicion and resentment toward the Jewish state involves the unmistakably prominent, even dominant, Israeli role for two institutions loathed by leftists everywhere: religion and the military.
While two-thirds of Israelis describe themselves as secular, the increasing popularity and influence of Orthodox religiosity remains an undeniable factor in Israeli society. Meanwhile, even the state’s famously agnostic and atheist founders made regular reference to Bible in urging their compatriots to return to Zion. The fact that Israel counts as the “Holy Land” to the world’s more than two billion Christians also provides a religious flavor and perspective to the nation’s existence that makes secular purists distinctly uncomfortable.
Meanwhile, the military continues to play a huge and necessary part in the life of the perpetually embattled nation. Some 75% of young people still do three full years of military service after their high school graduation, and continue with yearly reserve duty for 25 years after that. Even the leader of Israel’s leading party on the left (former Prime Minister Ehud Barak) is a one-time war hero and the most decorated soldier in the country’s history.
In other words, for trendy liberals who feel profound, instinctive distaste for the influence of armies and organized faith in human life, it’s only natural to feel somewhat uncomfortable with Israel.
The same attitudes, by the way, help to explain some of the fashionable anti-Americanism that’s taken hold among European and other international elites. Religion remains a vastly more potent force in the US than in any other Western nation, and our military remains far larger, more potent and more revered than the armies of other major nations. Those who love to denounce the impact of militarism and organized faith will inevitably find much to dislike about America – and about our close ally in the Middle East.
This US and Israeli devotion to both armed forces and religious institutions brings me back to the synagogue celebration I witnessed for Lt. Eli Kahn. Called to the Torah before a clapping, singing, admiring congregation, the young war hero chanted the weekly “Haftorah” (a passage from Isaiah) and received a good-natured pelting of candy tossed at him from all directions by his friends and neighbors. This treatment had little to do with his battlefield exploits of exactly one year earlier, but actually reflected his status as the community’s next bridegroom: in Jewish tradition, all young men receive similar honor on the Sabbath before their weddings. (Lt. Kahn stands under the wedding canopy with his bride tomorrow night, Thursday).
In Israeli eyes, there’s no contradiction between love of God and admiration of the military – between celebrating the beginning of a loving new family along with the courage and dedication of a battle-hardened soldier. Both religious and military institutions exist to promote life, not death; to facilitate peaceful communities and growing families, not bloodshed and martyrdom.
Americans and Israelis understand the connection between our soldiers and our survival, between faith in a compassionate God and the maintenance of military strength that allows decency and kindness to flourish. And of course, much of the rest of the world that believes that they’ve already moved on beyond such outmoded relics as organized religion and mighty armies, hates us for our decidedly different perspective.
This War Is Lost?
By Emmett Tyrrell
Thursday, August 2, 2007
Washington, D.C. -- James Taranto, the very clever Wall Street Journal writer and editor of OpinionJournal.com, has a thesis regarding our political culture. He believes the liberals are victims of their own cultural hegemony. They say things that are quite inaccurate. Their inaccuracies are repeated by their intellectual look-alikes throughout the culture. They reread their inaccuracies and are roundly confirmed in their ignorance. Conservatives think the liberal opposition is composed of liars or suave deceivers. Actually, our liberals are sincere in their ignorant beliefs. Grant them at least this much.
If our liberals were not so ubiquitously dominant in our political culture, they might be confronted occasionally by disagreement. It would smarten them up. It might even cheer them up, for they have a very gloomy view of the world. Today they are profoundly convinced, as one of their very brightest has put it, that the war in Iraq is "lost." The very bright fellow is that rumpled, loveable old curmudgeon from Nevada, Sen. Harry Reid. He is not the only one. As far as I can tell, almost all the Democratic presidential candidates think the war is lost. Congress abounds with solons who are calling for retreat. Just the other day, I watched Rep. John Conyers intoning this defeatist line to Wolf Blitzer, and Blitzer, too, seemed to agree this war is lost.
Rather heroically, Bill Kristol, the editor of The Weekly Standard, submitted a Washington Post piece two weeks ago arguing victory is still attainable in Iraq and history would view President George W. Bush benignly. The hoots and the ha-has from the liberals are still to be heard. Of course, he had a point. The new strategy of Gen. David Petraeus seems to be working. Casualties among civilians in Iraq are perceptibly lower. Sheiks in once hostile provinces such as Anbar and Diyala are joining forces with us against the savages of al Qaeda, the Iraqi military is gaining strength, and wider areas of the country are assuming a semblance of law and order.
Now, two critics of the Bush administration's policies in Iraq have returned from an eight-day visit there and published a piece in The New York Times that sounds very much as if the writers have come to Kristol's point of view. What will happen to our liberal friends if they read it? Perhaps Rep. Conyers will perceive it as satire. It is hard to imagine anything shaking his conviction that Iraq is a lost cause.
The critics writing in the Times are analysts from the liberal Brookings Institution, Michael E. O'Hanlon and Kenneth M. Pollack. They chide the defeatist critics of the administration who they say "seem unaware of the significant changes taking place" in Iraq. "As two analysts who have harshly criticized the Bush administration's miserable handling of Iraq, we were surprised by the gains we saw and the potential to produce not necessarily 'victory' but sustainable stability that both we and the Iraqis could live with." They conclude by saying, "There is enough good happening on the battlefields of Iraq today that Congress should plan on sustaining the effort at least into 2008."
That would take us into an election year with the Democrats saying the war is lost. What will they say if we are, as these analysts seem to think, winning? My guess is that they will continue to say we are losing. Return to Taranto's insight. The political culture is almost totally befogged by liberal misconceptions and bugaboos. It is, as we say at The American Spectator, a Kultursmog. It pollutes the liberals' minds and renders them oblivious of any evidence contrary to their gloomy views.
Thus, they will continue to say we are losing. They may pipe down somewhat, but they are not likely to admit to being wrong. How would they know? If their calls for retreat gain no support from the electorate, perhaps they will change the subject to another of their favorite misconceptions, to wit, the economy is going to hell. Actually, the economy is chugging along in a healthy and protracted period of growth. For the past five years, per capita gross domestic product has grown at 11 percent. We are living through a vast global economic boom, and the Democrats seem completely unawares. In 2008, their presidential candidate will be moaning that we have lost a war and are economically in a hell of a mess. The Republican candidate only will have to point to a healthy economy and the success of Gen. Petraeus' splendid Army to win. Then, the Democrats will whine that the Republicans stole the election from them. That is my prediction, and I base it on the evidence.
Thursday, August 2, 2007
Washington, D.C. -- James Taranto, the very clever Wall Street Journal writer and editor of OpinionJournal.com, has a thesis regarding our political culture. He believes the liberals are victims of their own cultural hegemony. They say things that are quite inaccurate. Their inaccuracies are repeated by their intellectual look-alikes throughout the culture. They reread their inaccuracies and are roundly confirmed in their ignorance. Conservatives think the liberal opposition is composed of liars or suave deceivers. Actually, our liberals are sincere in their ignorant beliefs. Grant them at least this much.
If our liberals were not so ubiquitously dominant in our political culture, they might be confronted occasionally by disagreement. It would smarten them up. It might even cheer them up, for they have a very gloomy view of the world. Today they are profoundly convinced, as one of their very brightest has put it, that the war in Iraq is "lost." The very bright fellow is that rumpled, loveable old curmudgeon from Nevada, Sen. Harry Reid. He is not the only one. As far as I can tell, almost all the Democratic presidential candidates think the war is lost. Congress abounds with solons who are calling for retreat. Just the other day, I watched Rep. John Conyers intoning this defeatist line to Wolf Blitzer, and Blitzer, too, seemed to agree this war is lost.
Rather heroically, Bill Kristol, the editor of The Weekly Standard, submitted a Washington Post piece two weeks ago arguing victory is still attainable in Iraq and history would view President George W. Bush benignly. The hoots and the ha-has from the liberals are still to be heard. Of course, he had a point. The new strategy of Gen. David Petraeus seems to be working. Casualties among civilians in Iraq are perceptibly lower. Sheiks in once hostile provinces such as Anbar and Diyala are joining forces with us against the savages of al Qaeda, the Iraqi military is gaining strength, and wider areas of the country are assuming a semblance of law and order.
Now, two critics of the Bush administration's policies in Iraq have returned from an eight-day visit there and published a piece in The New York Times that sounds very much as if the writers have come to Kristol's point of view. What will happen to our liberal friends if they read it? Perhaps Rep. Conyers will perceive it as satire. It is hard to imagine anything shaking his conviction that Iraq is a lost cause.
The critics writing in the Times are analysts from the liberal Brookings Institution, Michael E. O'Hanlon and Kenneth M. Pollack. They chide the defeatist critics of the administration who they say "seem unaware of the significant changes taking place" in Iraq. "As two analysts who have harshly criticized the Bush administration's miserable handling of Iraq, we were surprised by the gains we saw and the potential to produce not necessarily 'victory' but sustainable stability that both we and the Iraqis could live with." They conclude by saying, "There is enough good happening on the battlefields of Iraq today that Congress should plan on sustaining the effort at least into 2008."
That would take us into an election year with the Democrats saying the war is lost. What will they say if we are, as these analysts seem to think, winning? My guess is that they will continue to say we are losing. Return to Taranto's insight. The political culture is almost totally befogged by liberal misconceptions and bugaboos. It is, as we say at The American Spectator, a Kultursmog. It pollutes the liberals' minds and renders them oblivious of any evidence contrary to their gloomy views.
Thus, they will continue to say we are losing. They may pipe down somewhat, but they are not likely to admit to being wrong. How would they know? If their calls for retreat gain no support from the electorate, perhaps they will change the subject to another of their favorite misconceptions, to wit, the economy is going to hell. Actually, the economy is chugging along in a healthy and protracted period of growth. For the past five years, per capita gross domestic product has grown at 11 percent. We are living through a vast global economic boom, and the Democrats seem completely unawares. In 2008, their presidential candidate will be moaning that we have lost a war and are economically in a hell of a mess. The Republican candidate only will have to point to a healthy economy and the success of Gen. Petraeus' splendid Army to win. Then, the Democrats will whine that the Republicans stole the election from them. That is my prediction, and I base it on the evidence.
Too Uninformed to Vote?
By Jonah Goldberg
Wednesday, August 1, 2007
Can you name all three branches of government? Can you name even one? Do you know who your congressman is? Your senators? Do you even know how many senators each state gets? If you know the answers to these questions (and you probably do because you're a newspaper reader), you're in the minority.
A very high percentage of the U.S. electorate isn't very well qualified to vote, if by "qualified" you mean having a basic understanding of our government, its functions and its challenges. Almost half of the American public doesn't know that each state gets two senators. More than two-thirds can't explain the gist of what the Food and Drug Administration does.
Now, the point isn't to say that the American people are stupid, which is the typical knee-jerk reaction of self-absorbed political junkies. Rather, it's that millions of Americans just don't care about politics, much the same way that I don't care about cricket: They think it's boring. Ask me how cricket works and I'm likely to respond with the same blank, uncomprehending stare my old basset hound used to give me when I asked him to chase a Frisbee. Ask the typical American to explain, say, what a cloture vote is, and you'll get the same.
And yet, to suggest that maybe some people just shouldn't vote is considered the height of un-Americanism. As economist Bryan Caplan notes in his bracing new book, "The Myth of the Rational Voter," there are few subjects on which Americans are more dogmatic and ideological.
Consider the hoary cliche attributed to Democratic New York Gov. Al Smith in 1928: "All the ills of democracy can be cured by more democracy." As Caplan notes, this means that no evidence of any nature can ever, under any circumstances, be held against democracy: "A person who said, 'All the ills of the markets can be cured by more markets' would be lampooned as the worst sort of market fundamentalist. Why the double standard?"
One response is that democracy is at the core of our secular faith. But surely even democracy voluptuaries can appreciate that faith-based ideologies can be taken too far. We do not let children vote, yet no serious person would argue that our democratic values are significantly undermined because we bar 10-year-olds from the voting booth.
Voter-turnout fanatics concerned with more than mere aggrandizement for the Democratic Party argue that voting is a sign of civic health. But doesn't it matter why you vote?
Last summer, an Arizona activist went so far as to propose that every voter be enrolled in a state lottery, on the assumption that what our political system really lacks is more voters who need to be bribed with lottery tickets.
Some more serious people suggest that voting should be mandatory, believing that if the "disenfranchised" - often code for dream Democratic voters - cast ballots, the country would move profoundly to the left. John Kenneth Galbraith proclaimed in 1986: "If everybody in this country voted, the Democrats would be in for the next 100 years."
This last bit is almost certainly false. The evidence is that if every eligible voter voted, national elections would probably remain unchanged. "Simply put," political scientists Benjamin Highton and Raymond Wolfinger wrote in a 2001 article, "The Political Implications of Higher Turnout," U.S. "voters' preferences differ minimally from those of all citizens; outcomes would not change if everyone voted."
So, maybe, just maybe, we have our priorities wrong. Perhaps cheapening the vote by requiring little more than an active pulse (Chicago famously waives this rule) has turned it into something many people don't value. Maybe the emphasis on getting more people to vote has dumbed down our democracy by pushing participation onto people uninterested in such things. Maybe our society would be healthier if politicians aimed higher than the lowest common denominator. Maybe the people who don't know the first thing about how our system works aren't the folks who should be driving our politics, just as people who don't know how to drive shouldn't have a driver's license.
Instead of making it easier to vote, maybe we should be making it harder. Why not test people on the basic functions of government? Immigrants have to pass a test to vote; why not all citizens?
A voting test would point the arrow of civic engagement up instead of down, sending the signal that becoming an informed citizen is a valued accomplishment. And if that's not a good enough reason, maybe this is: If you threaten to take the vote away from the certifiably uninformed, voter turnout will almost certainly get a boost.
Wednesday, August 1, 2007
Can you name all three branches of government? Can you name even one? Do you know who your congressman is? Your senators? Do you even know how many senators each state gets? If you know the answers to these questions (and you probably do because you're a newspaper reader), you're in the minority.
A very high percentage of the U.S. electorate isn't very well qualified to vote, if by "qualified" you mean having a basic understanding of our government, its functions and its challenges. Almost half of the American public doesn't know that each state gets two senators. More than two-thirds can't explain the gist of what the Food and Drug Administration does.
Now, the point isn't to say that the American people are stupid, which is the typical knee-jerk reaction of self-absorbed political junkies. Rather, it's that millions of Americans just don't care about politics, much the same way that I don't care about cricket: They think it's boring. Ask me how cricket works and I'm likely to respond with the same blank, uncomprehending stare my old basset hound used to give me when I asked him to chase a Frisbee. Ask the typical American to explain, say, what a cloture vote is, and you'll get the same.
And yet, to suggest that maybe some people just shouldn't vote is considered the height of un-Americanism. As economist Bryan Caplan notes in his bracing new book, "The Myth of the Rational Voter," there are few subjects on which Americans are more dogmatic and ideological.
Consider the hoary cliche attributed to Democratic New York Gov. Al Smith in 1928: "All the ills of democracy can be cured by more democracy." As Caplan notes, this means that no evidence of any nature can ever, under any circumstances, be held against democracy: "A person who said, 'All the ills of the markets can be cured by more markets' would be lampooned as the worst sort of market fundamentalist. Why the double standard?"
One response is that democracy is at the core of our secular faith. But surely even democracy voluptuaries can appreciate that faith-based ideologies can be taken too far. We do not let children vote, yet no serious person would argue that our democratic values are significantly undermined because we bar 10-year-olds from the voting booth.
Voter-turnout fanatics concerned with more than mere aggrandizement for the Democratic Party argue that voting is a sign of civic health. But doesn't it matter why you vote?
Last summer, an Arizona activist went so far as to propose that every voter be enrolled in a state lottery, on the assumption that what our political system really lacks is more voters who need to be bribed with lottery tickets.
Some more serious people suggest that voting should be mandatory, believing that if the "disenfranchised" - often code for dream Democratic voters - cast ballots, the country would move profoundly to the left. John Kenneth Galbraith proclaimed in 1986: "If everybody in this country voted, the Democrats would be in for the next 100 years."
This last bit is almost certainly false. The evidence is that if every eligible voter voted, national elections would probably remain unchanged. "Simply put," political scientists Benjamin Highton and Raymond Wolfinger wrote in a 2001 article, "The Political Implications of Higher Turnout," U.S. "voters' preferences differ minimally from those of all citizens; outcomes would not change if everyone voted."
So, maybe, just maybe, we have our priorities wrong. Perhaps cheapening the vote by requiring little more than an active pulse (Chicago famously waives this rule) has turned it into something many people don't value. Maybe the emphasis on getting more people to vote has dumbed down our democracy by pushing participation onto people uninterested in such things. Maybe our society would be healthier if politicians aimed higher than the lowest common denominator. Maybe the people who don't know the first thing about how our system works aren't the folks who should be driving our politics, just as people who don't know how to drive shouldn't have a driver's license.
Instead of making it easier to vote, maybe we should be making it harder. Why not test people on the basic functions of government? Immigrants have to pass a test to vote; why not all citizens?
A voting test would point the arrow of civic engagement up instead of down, sending the signal that becoming an informed citizen is a valued accomplishment. And if that's not a good enough reason, maybe this is: If you threaten to take the vote away from the certifiably uninformed, voter turnout will almost certainly get a boost.
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