By Anne Applebaum
Monday, March 31, 2025
Flashy hotels and upmarket restaurants now dominate the
center of Budapest, a city once better known for its shabby facades. New
monuments have sprung up in the center of town too. One of them, a pastiche of
the Vietnam War memorial in Washington, D.C., mourns Hungary’s lost
19th-century empire. Instead of war dead, the names of formerly “Hungarian”
places—cities and villages that are now in Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine,
Poland—are engraved in long granite walls, solemnly memorialized with an
eternal flame.
But the nationalist kitsch and tourist traps hide a
different reality. Once widely perceived to be the wealthiest country in
Central Europe (“the happiest barrack in the socialist camp,” as it was known
during the Cold War), and later the Central European country that foreign
investors liked most, Hungary is now one of the poorest countries, and possibly
the poorest, in the European Union. Industrial production is falling
year-over-year. Productivity is close to the lowest in the region.
Unemployment is creeping upward. Despite the ruling party’s loud talk about
traditional values, the population is shrinking. Perhaps that’s because young
people don’t want to have children in a place where two-thirds of the citizens
describe the national education system as “bad,” and where hospital departments
are closing because so many doctors have moved abroad. Maybe talented people
don’t want to stay in a country perceived as the most corrupt in the EU for
three years in a row. Even the Index of Economic Freedom—which is published
by the Heritage Foundation, the MAGA-affiliated think tank that produced
Project 2025—puts Hungary
at the bottom of the EU in its rankings of government integrity.
Tourists in central Budapest don’t see this decline. But
neither, apparently, does the American right. For although he has no critical
mineral wealth to give away and not much of an army, Hungary’s prime minister,
Viktor Orbán, plays an outsize role in the American political debate. During
the 2024 presidential campaign, Orbán held multiple meetings with Donald Trump.
In May 2022, a pro-Orbán think tank hosted CPAC, the right-wing conference, in
Budapest, and three months later, Orbán went
to Texas to speak at the CPAC Dallas conference. Last year, at the third
edition of CPAC Hungary, a Republican congressman described the country as “one
of the most successful models as a leader for conservative principles and
governance.” In a video message, Steve Bannon called Hungary “an inspiration to
the world.” Notwithstanding his own institution’s analysis of Hungarian
governance, Kevin Roberts of the Heritage Foundation has also described modern
Hungary “not just as a model for modern statecraft, but the model.”
What is this Hungarian model they so admire? Mostly, it
has nothing to do with modern statecraft. Instead it’s a very old, very
familiar blueprint for autocratic takeover, one that has been deployed by
right-wing and left-wing leaders alike, from Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Hugo
Chávez. After being elected to a second term in 2010, Orbán slowly replaced
civil servants with loyalists; used economic pressure and regulation to destroy
the free press; robbed universities of their independence, and shut one of them
down; politicized the court system; and repeatedly changed the constitution to
give himself electoral advantages. During the coronavirus pandemic he gave
himself emergency powers, which he has kept ever since. He has aligned himself
openly with Russia and China, serving as a mouthpiece for Russian foreign
policy at EU meetings and allowing opaque Chinese investments in his country.
This autocratic takeover is precisely what Bannon,
Roberts, and others admire, and are indeed seeking to carry out in the U.S.
right now. The destruction of the civil service is already under way, pressure
on the press and universities has begun, and thoughts of changing the
Constitution are in the air. But proponents of these ideas rarely talk about
what happened to the Hungarian economy, and to ordinary Hungarians, after they
were implemented there. Nor do they explore the contradictions between Orbán’s
rhetoric and the reality of his policies. Orbán talks a lot about blocking
immigration, for example, but at one point his government issued visas to any
non-EU citizen who bought 300,000 euros’ worth of government bonds from
mysterious and mostly offshore companies.
He rhapsodizes about family values, even though his
government spends among the lowest amounts per capita on health care in the EU,
controls access to IVF, and notoriously decided to pardon a man who covered up
sexual abuse in children’s homes.
Orbán also talks a lot about “the people” while using his
near-absolute power not to build Hungarian prosperity but to enrich a small
group of wealthy businessmen, some of whom are members of his family. In
Budapest, these oligarchs are sometimes called NER, or NER-people, or
NERistan—nicknames that come from Nemzeti Együttműködés Rendszere or System of
National Cooperation, the Orwellian name that Orbán gave to his political
system—and they benefit directly from their proximity to the leader. Direkt36,
one of the few remaining investigative-journalism teams in Hungary, recently
made a documentary, The
Dynasty, showing, for example, how competitions for state- and
EU-funded contracts, starting in about 2010, were deliberately designed so that
Elios Innovatív, an energy company co-owned by Orbán’s son-in-law István
Tiborcz, would win them. The EU eventually looked
into 35 contracts and found serious irregularities in many of them, as well
as evidence of a conflict of interest. (In a 2018 statement, Elios said that it
had followed legal regulations, which is no doubt true; the whole point of this
system is that it is legal.)
That story is just one of many that Hungarians recount to
one another, just not in public. The Dynasty also describes the
Kisfaludy Tourism Development Programme, which distributed 316 billion
Hungarian forints ($860 million) in grants. Two-thirds of those grants went to
0.5 percent of the applicants; almost one-fifth of them went to projects that
were, or later became, connected to Tiborcz. Not that Tiborcz is the only
recipient of government largesse. Lőrinc Mészáros, at one time the richest man
in Hungary, a gas fitter turned entrepreneur who is an old friend of the prime
minister’s, once attributed
his fortune to “God, luck, and Viktor Orbán.” Other beneficiaries come and
go, depending on Orbán’s whim. One Hungarian businessman told me that “you can
tell who is in, who is out by seeing whose companies begin growing. If you are
in, then your company is growing. If you’re out, your company goes from this
big to this small. You see it in a year or two.”
This kind of corruption is, again, mostly legal, because
the laws, contracts, and procurement rules are written in such a way as to
permit it. Even if this activity were illegal, party-controlled prosecutors
would not investigate it. But the scale of the corruption is large enough to
distort the rest of the economy. The Hungarian businessman and a Hungarian
economist I spoke with—both of whom insisted on anonymity, for fear of
retaliation—had separately calculated that NERistan amounts to about 20 percent
of the Hungarian economy. That means, as the economist explained to me, that 20
percent of Hungary’s companies operate “not on market principles, not on
merit-based principles, but basically on loyalty.” These companies don’t have
normal hiring practices or use real business models, because they are designed
not for efficiency and profit but for kleptocracy—passing money from the state
to their owners.
Not that the regime ever acknowledges the role that the
oligarchy plays in the system, or even concedes that Hungary might face a
structural crisis. Another Hungarian economist told me that Orbán always
predicts “very bright days in the future; success, unimaginable success.”
“Please trust us,” Orbán declared in his annual
state-of-the-nation speech in early 2023. “You can bet on it: By the end of the
year, we will have inflation in single digits.” In fact, annual average
inflation in 2023 was more than 17 percent. In 2024, the government predicted 4
percent growth; the reality was 0.6 percent. Anyone who contradicts this
messaging is unlikely to be widely heard. Independent economists are rarely
invited to appear on public television, or in any media controlled by the ruling
party. In February 2024, the regime created
the Sovereignty Protection Office, a sinister body that harasses and smears
independent Hungarian organizations. It has redoubled its efforts since the
U.S. election and the assault on USAID. The office’s targets include the
Hungarian branch of Transparency International, the anti-corruption
investigative group, as well as an investigative-news portal, Atlatszo.hu—any
entity that could tell the truth about how the country really works.
But the truth is not hard to perceive for anyone who
cares to look, because the beneficiaries of this corrupt system are not shy
about showing off their wealth. When I mentioned the shiny hotels in central
Budapest to a Hungarian friend, he snorted. “Of course, that’s where the
NER-people live,” he said. “They want it to look nice.” Also, they own quite a
few of them. The Dynasty, the documentary, includes footage of the
Hungarian elite partying at clubs and in palaces, and garnered more than 3
million views within a month, a large number in a country of 9.6 million.
Thousands of comments underneath the video on YouTube thank the Direkt36
reporters for showing “true reality” not available anywhere else.
In many ways, Hungary is about as different from the U.S.
as it is possible to be: small, poor, homogeneous. But I watched the film with
a sense of foreboding. As Elon Musk, a government contractor, sets
fire to our civil service and makes decisions about the departments that
regulate him; as the FBI and the Justice Department are captured by
partisans who will never prosecute their colleagues for corruption; as
inspectors general are fired and rules about conflicts of interest are ignored,
America is spinning quickly in the direction of Hungarian populism, Hungarian
politics, and Hungarian justice. But that means Hungarian stagnation, Hungarian
corruption, and Hungarian poverty lie in our future too.
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