National Review Online
Thursday, December 22, 2022
Flying from his embattled country to Washington cannot
have been a decision that Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky took lightly.
That he went ahead and made the visit, meeting with President Biden and
addressing a joint session of Congress, must have reflected unease in Kyiv
about its allies’ willingness to stick with Ukraine in a war that shows no
signs of ending.
Zelensky’s speech, complete with references to the Battles
of the Bulge and Saratoga, was carefully crafted. He expressed his gratitude
for the assistance that Ukraine has received, while making the case that this
was not just Ukraine’s fight, but the Western world’s too, even if only
indirectly: “I assure you that Ukrainian soldiers can perfectly operate
American tanks and planes themselves.”
Aid for Ukraine was not, Zelensky maintained, “charity.”
It was “an investment in . . . global security and democracy.” Helping Ukraine
is, we believe, the correct thing to do, but it can be justified based on
calculations colder than the defense of a principle (“democracy”). Helping
Ukraine is yielding real returns too. Approved U.S. spending to date on Ukraine
has been some $68 billion. An additional $45 billion is now on the table. These sums, even
today, are a great deal of money. That said, looking at them against a 2022
defense budget of some $740 billion and, probably, the mid-800 billions of dollars in 2023 makes them look
less daunting, even more so when factoring in the massive Russian losses of men
and matériel that aid has helped buy.
Those losses, in time, will be replaced (just as we will
replace the American equipment destroyed in Ukraine), but the reduction for now
in the threat posed by Russia’s conventional forces in Europe represents
a good return on “investment.” Moreover, should Ukraine
fall, Putin’s words and deeds give every reason to expect that Russia will, one
way or another, start probing further west. When Zelensky warned that “it is
just a matter of time [before Russia] will strike against your other allies if
we do not stop them now,” he was right. The form that that “strike” might take
is a matter of conjecture, but, unless the U.S. decides to wash its hands of
Europe, dealing with such a strike will cost far more than our support for
Kyiv.
Most of Putin’s vulnerable neighbors are much smaller
than Ukraine and would therefore require more direct outside assistance in
order to defend themselves against Russia. We should be thankful that Zelensky
asks us only for money; he can supply the warriors and the will.
Nevertheless, we cannot indefinitely dodge the question
of what we should do if the war drags on, or how we intend to pay for
this. According to the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, our current rate of spending on Ukraine is running at
just under $7 billion a month. That means that, if the war continues (and it
probably will), another aid package will have to be agreed to in the course of
next year. That will be entirely deficit spending if no effort is made to
sacrifice other spending priorities. The U.S. also needs to have formed a
clearer view of its strategy before then. Waiting for Putin to die or be
overthrown is not a strategy. And neither is waiting for a Russian economic or
military collapse. However unlikely, the last of these possibilities, in
particular, comes fraught with nuclear peril.
If our strategy is to continue on our current path, that
needs to be acknowledged, as does the importance of ensuring that our European
allies do their part, something that cannot be taken for granted. We must also
face the reality that the longer this conflict persists, the greater the danger
of a more widespread and, possibly, nuclear war. To reduce that possibility, we
should still avoid supplying weapons that Ukraine could use to strike deep into
Russia.
If we are unwilling to maintain our current level of
support for Ukraine indefinitely, we should be working behind the scenes to
push Kyiv toward a deal. One reason to do so now is the stronger bargaining
power that Ukraine should enjoy as a result of its battlefield success.
In his speech, President Zelensky maintained that “this
battle cannot be frozen or postponed. It cannot be ignored, hoping that the
ocean or something else will provide a protection.” The use of the word
“frozen” was, in all probability, aimed at those arguing that “freezing” the conflict,
perhaps by aiming for a Korean-style armistice, is the best that can be hoped
for under current circumstances. This would mean that Russia would keep some of
its ill-gotten gains. Should the U.S. decide to go down this route, it should
do so by beginning the discussions with Kyiv, not Moscow. And it should do so
in the full awareness that any such armistice would be fragile. The best chance
that the peace would hold would be a rearmed Ukraine on a clear path to closer
integration with, and eventual membership in, the EU. Anything less, and the
risk of renewed Russian aggression would, in time, become a certainty.
No comments:
Post a Comment