By Arthur Herman
Friday, December 23, 2022
On Wednesday Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky made
an impassioned plea to Congress and America to continue providing support in
general—and military aid in particular—for his country’s defense against
Russia’s invasion. Congress and the administration look ready to answer that
plea to the tune of $45 billion in the latest omnibus bill.
Skeptics are quick to say that’s money America’s heavily
indebted federal government can’t afford to spend. In fact, it’s money the U.S.
can’t afford not to spend. America has a clear national
interest in preventing a Russian victory in Ukraine, but keeping the young
democracy armed also ensures that the American defense industrial base keeps
our own military armed and ready.
The war in Ukraine has been a crucial stress test for our
defense industrial base, which has been in the doldrums since the end of the
Cold War. The war on terror made few demands on that base’s ability to
manufacture conventional arms like tanks, artillery, and missiles. Enthusiasts
(including myself) stressed the importance of investing in next-generation
systems as the key to victory in future wars. That meant billions for new
technologies like autonomous systems or drones, directed-energy weapons,
hypersonics, and artificial intelligence.
Now the threat of a major conventional conflict with
China over Taiwan—or a wider war between Russia and NATO—looms large. A revived
defense manufacturing base supporting Ukraine will be critical for our own
ability to defer antagonists and protect our interests elsewhere.
Something like this happened just before World War II,
when the U.S. committed itself to supporting Great Britain against Nazi Germany
with Lend-Lease and other programs. Allowing American firms to build planes,
tanks, machine guns, and ships to keep Britain fighting created a productive
defense industry almost from scratch, one that was ready to arm our military
when Pearl Harbor came and we found ourselves in a two-front global war.
In Ukraine’s case, the scale of the support is beyond
anything that our defense industry has had to face in decades. America has
committed more than 104 million rounds of small-arms ammunition, at least 1
million rounds of 155-millimeter artillery shells, 8,500 Javelin anti-armor
missiles, 46,000 other anti-tank weapons, more than 1,600 Stinger anti-aircraft
missiles, and 1,200 Humvees, according to the Pentagon’s own
count.
These are also the weapons that will be critical for our
own defense in conventional conflicts.
A good example is the FIM-92 Stinger, the portable,
shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile that we’ve been sending to Ukraine, where
Ukrainians have effectively downed Russian drones and helicopters.
Prior to Putin’s invasion, the Pentagon hadn’t planned to
replenish its own stockpile of Stingers until the 2030s. Now, the weapon’s
maker Raytheon is struggling to get the parts and workers it needs to satisfy
surging demand. Raytheon’s chief executive told the New
York Times, “we went through six years of Stingers in 10 months. It will
take us multiple years to restock and replenish.” This means the Pentagon and
Raytheon have to tackle the tough supply chain and logistics problems now,
instead of when America has a full-blown conflict to deal with.
Raytheon also produces the Javelin missile jointly with
Lockheed Martin. Usually the defense giants make 2,100 Javelins a year, but
that’s only 25 percent of what the Ukrainians have used since war broke out in
February. In September the Pentagon gave the companies a $311 million contract
to ramp up production and fill their empty shelves.
It’s the same story down the munitions line—from guided
multiple launch rocket systems and Hellfire missiles to ammunition plants in
places like Scranton, Pennsylvania, and Kingsport, Tennessee, which are getting
$678 million in preauthorization funds to ramp up production. BAE Systems was
about to shut down its production line for M777 howitzers until the Pentagon
called.
All in all the Pentagon has awarded $6 billion to
military contractors to resupply these and other items sent to Ukraine—for the
Ukrainians, of course, but eventually also for us.
All this reflects the realization that the government has
to rebuild our industrial capacity for our military and create a defense
production system more like the one we enjoyed in World War II and the Cold
War, one that can either surge or stockpile things like munitions beyond
immediate needs.
That’s why Congress moved this year to give the Defense Department
more authority to make multi-year spending commitments for certain weapons
systems and shipbuilding operations, and it’s why it created a new blue-ribbon
commission to look over the entire system by which the Pentagon allocates the
money Congress gives to support its services and operations and to recommend
reforms.
The key is to absorb the lesson we learned in World War
II: By arming allies to fight the wars we don’t have to, we also increase our
own readiness to fight wars that inevitably come our way.
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