National Review Online
Tuesday, December 11, 2018
If Prime Minister Theresa May had not “deferred,” at the
last minute, a “meaningful vote” on the Withdrawal Agreement she negotiated
with the European Commission, the editors of National Review would have urged MPs to reject it. There are a
number of good grounds for giving such advice. The Withdrawal Agreement does
not implement Brexit, as she claims, because, among many other defects, it does
not allow a post-Brexit Britain to reach free-trade deals with the U.S.,
Australia, or other countries, nor to deviate from the EU’s regulatory rulebook
(which would magically become a “common rulebook”). The Withdrawal Agreement’s
so-called backstop provision — stopping the U.K. from leaving the EU customs
union without EU permission if both sides can’t agree on how to avoid a hard
border in Northern Ireland — would be an extraordinary restraint on British
sovereignty. In a longer perspective, it would also threaten serious conflict
with the EU because it gives the EU an incentive either to refuse such
permission or to demand excessive concessions in return. And, finally, the
Withdrawal Agreement’s provisions committing Britain to joining the EU
defense-union structures, which the U.K. has traditionally opposed, would
undermine the U.K.’s links with NATO, with the U.S., and with its other
military partners around the world (of which more below).
These are not minor drawbacks.
Mrs. May deferred a vote on the Withdrawal Agreement,
however, not because she recognized its dangers but because she knew that it
would be defeated by such a large majority in the House of Commons that her
position as prime minister would likely be lost. Her present tactic is to
postpone a vote, perhaps until as far away as the 21st of January, in the hope
that she can persuade Brussels to qualify the provision requiring EU consent
for Britain to rescind this Withdrawal Agreement. We shouldn’t dismiss that
possibility outright. The tactic of concentrating Parliament’s attention on a
single ground for opposition which, when overturned, becomes a reason for
forgetting all the other grounds is an old one. It has worked before. Also in
its favor is that May is something of a specialist in obtaining meaningless
“declarations” and “politically binding” (i.e., not legally binding) deals that soften and obscure real commitments.
And briefings since her parliamentary statement suggest she is now seeking such
a toothless protection from Brussels that is unlikely to be enough.
Her chances of getting the Withdrawal Agreement through
may also have been further weakened by an intervention of the European Court of
Justice, delivered on the day before the expected vote, that was probably
expected to assist her. This was a ruling that the U.K. can unilaterally
withdraw its Article 50 notice that it is leaving the EU and reverse Brexit
before it happens. It can, that is, decide to stay in the EU even after giving notice
that it is leaving. The ruling itself is a radical rewriting of a treaty
provision explicitly composed to make leaving the EU irreversible (and thus too
dangerous to contemplate). It’s also a prime example of a political ruling
designed to meet the court’s other unwritten duty of always interpreting laws
to advance European integration. It should warn the Brits that even legally
binding agreements with the EU are not to be relied upon. In the present
British context, however, it is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it
greatly encourages Remainer MPs to continue plotting what might be called a
“Hard Remain.” On the other, because it makes their maximum objective easier,
it discourages them from supporting May’s Withdrawal Agreement, which would mean
the U.K. ceases to have full legal status as an EU member.
All in all, May has now postponed a decision on her
spavined agreement for another few weeks with little reason to think that she
will get a concession from Brussels substantial enough to change enough minds
among Tory MPs to get a majority for it. She has reached this impasse because
she determined to pick — or was maneuvered by Remainer cabinet ministers and
civil servants into picking — a fight over Brexit with the majority of her own
party in and outside Parliament. It has proven a disaster for her government,
the Tory party, and a sensible approach to Brexit. Her decision to continue
this fight by delaying tactics is deeply irresponsible. It means that U.K.
businesses will have no idea of what policy the U.K. government will be
pursuing until after the vote is finally held. It also means that May and her
ultra-Remainer finance minister, Philip Hammond, are likely to maintain their
refusal to make serious preparations for a “No Deal Brexit” — if for no other
reason than because it will make “No Deal” almost impossible and their own
alternative harder to avoid. As a result, a deliberate campaign of Project Fear
will falsely portray a Brexit under the rules of the World Trade Organization
as a recipe for chaos and ensure that both Brexit and other policies will be
made in an atmosphere of exaggerated hysteria.
Before the vote was canceled, it was widely accepted that
a substantial defeat for May and the government would and should mean that May
should resign. Withdrawing a vote in order to avoid a substantial defeat should
carry the same penalty. Mrs. May can unite neither her party nor the country on
a Brexit policy, and numerous opinion polls make plain that her own solution is
the least popular of those canvassed. If she were to leave or be ousted by an
internal Tory vote of confidence as a result, there would follow a contest for
the leadership of the Conservative party. In addition to choosing a new leader,
that contest would enable a serious discussion of how best — with what mix of
policies — the Tories can achieve the Brexit that both the referendum and the
2017 election committed them to achieve. Conservative-party MPs should start
that process tomorrow. There is no time to lose even if May is determined to
keep losing it.
That is a matter for the Tory party, of course, just as
Brexit is a matter for the British people. But some aspects are matters of
state interest to Americans and the United States as well. Of the three reasons
for rejecting May’s Withdrawal Agreement given in our first paragraph, the
first is solely a matter for the Brits. But the other two reasons impinge on
U.S. policy — the third in particular. On December 7, Sir Richard Dearlove,
formerly the U.K.’s top spook, sent a letter to Downing Street reaffirming
(contrary to what the Cabinet Office claimed) that the U.K.’s commitment to the
EU’s growing defense-union structures amounted to a major danger to — among
other important considerations — Britain’s relationships with the U.S.
military, with NATO, and with its other non-EU military partners. His full
statement can be read here, and it is worth noting that the May government has
been deliberately concealing the extent of this additional surrender by May.
Here is Dearlove on just one aspect of it:
These structural relationships
threaten the Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance that is the bedrock of western
security. The Government has to choose between the anglosphere and wider world
and structural subordination to Military EU. It has chosen Military EU which is
absolutely the wrong choice. It is therefore an inescapeable fact that the
Withdrawal documents pose a real and present threat to UK national security.
It would be sensible and right if U.S.-government
officials such as Mike Pompeo and James Mattis were to speak out frankly on
these questions — and on the almost inevitable U.S. response of reducing its
intelligence cooperation with Britain. The Brits need to know what is at stake.
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