By William Voegeli
Thursday, November 13, 2014
‘Bullshit” is American English’s assertion, maximally
succinct and vigorous, that a contention is factually preposterous or logically
absurd. According to philosophy professor Harry Frankfurt, however, the
“essence of bullshit is not that it is false but that it is phony.” His slender
volume devoted to the subject, On Bullshit, invites us to think of a Fourth of
July orator “who goes on bombastically about ‘our great and blessed country,
whose Founding Fathers under divine guidance created a new beginning for
mankind.’” The speaker’s point is not “to deceive anyone concerning American
history.” Rather,
what he cares about is what people think of him. He wants them to think of him as a patriot, as someone who has deep thoughts and feelings about the origins and the mission of our country, who appreciates the importance of religion, who is sensitive to our history, whose pride in that history is combined with humility before God, and so on.
It’s difficult to banish the glum suspicion that life in
the 21st century, for all its economic and technological benefits, necessitates
putting up with much more bullshit than our ancestors had to.
. . .
Frankfurt limits his discussion of bullshit to
descriptive statements, analyzing and regretting our departure from the
standard of truth. He does not take up the question of prescriptive statements,
the mainstay of politics. Criticizing Republican proposals to cut spending on
Head Start and other educational programs, for example, President Obama said,
“We know that three- and four-year-olds who go to high-quality preschools,
including our best Head Start programs, are less likely to repeat a grade,
they’re less likely to need special education, they’re more likely to graduate
from high school than the peers who did not get these services.” The first part
of Obama’s statement is not bullshit, because it does nothing worse than employ
the politician’s constant companion, the selectively revealed half-truth.
Children who attend the best Head Start programs show positive results but, as
we have seen, Head Start attendees overall are no better off than peers not
enrolled in the program. Obama invokes the sunny side of the law of averages
without acknowledging its grim side: If children who attend the best Head Start
programs do better than their peers, children who attend the worst programs
must, necessarily, have developmental problems even more severe than those
afflicting children in a control group who never enrolled in the program at
all.
The more interesting part of Obama’s statement, for our
purposes, is the generic political prescription, the assertion that government
program X will solve problem Y. Prescription lends itself to bullshitting if,
following Frankfurt, the prescriber has a lack of connection to a concern with
efficacy. Both kinds of bullshitters, de-scribers and prescribers, are more
concerned with conveying their ideals, of which idealized understandings of
their true selves are a central component, than with making statements that
correspond scrupulously to empirical or causal reality. A bullshit description
may be, at least in part, factually accurate, but any such accuracy is
inadvertent. The accurate data were incorporated into the spiel not for the
sake of correctness but because it helped express the speaker’s “values” or
“vision.”
A bullshit prescription, by the same token, might
actually work to some degree, but any such efficacy is inadvertent and
tangential to the central purpose: demonstrating the depths of the prescriber’s
concern for the problem and those who suffer from it, concerns impelling the
determination to “do something” about it. As the political project that exists
to vindicate the axiom that all sorts of government program X’s can solve an
endless list of social problem Y’s, liberalism is always at risk of descending
into prescriptive bullshit. Liberal compassion lends itself to bullshit by
subordinating the putative concern with efficacy to the dominant but
unannounced imperative of moral validation and exhibitionism. I, the
empathizer, am interested in the sufferer for love of myself, Rousseau
contended. Accordingly, an ineffectual program may serve the compassionate
purposes of its designers and defenders as well as or better than a successful
one.
. . .
Conservative critiques of liberalism sometimes concede
that liberals’ aspirations are laudable before insisting that the means
liberals favor are insufficiently practical and at least potentially
destructive. The way liberal compassion lends itself to liberal bullshit,
however, argues for a less forgiving interpretation. Liberals’ ideals make them
more culpable, not less, for the fact that government programs set up to do
good don’t reliably accomplish good. Doing good is often harder than do-gooders
realize, but doing good is also more about the doing and the doer than it is
about the good. Too often, as a result, liberals are content to treat gestures
as the functional equivalent of deeds, and intentions as adequate substitutes
for achievements.
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