By Victor Davis Hanson
Wednesday, October 24, 2012
A tourist mecca like Venice now boasts that it dreams of
breaking away from an insolvent Italy. Similarly Barcelona, and perhaps the
Basques and the Catalonians in general, claim they want no part of a bankrupt
Spain. Scotland fantasizes about becoming separate from Great Britain. The
Greek Right dreams of a 19th-century Greece without Asian and African
immigrants who do not look Greek. Belgium increasingly seems an artificial
construct, half Flemish, half French, with the two sides never more estranged. These
days Texas and California do not even seem like two parts of a united nation,
just as Massachusetts is growing ever more distant from Wyoming.
Here at home, it is not just that taxation and government
are different in red and blue states, or that for the last two decades national
elections have hinged on what the shrinking number of purple-state voters
prefer. Social and cultural questions are also dividing us, almost as much as
slavery did in the 1850s. Fault lines over abortion, the role of religion, gay
marriage, affirmative action, welfare, illegal immigration, and gun ownership
are starting to manifest themselves regionally. We have long had the Blue–Gray
game; soon will there be a Red–Blue Bowl?
If Mexico plays against the U.S. soccer team in Merced, Fresno, or L.A.,
will the spectators root for the country in which they live or the country that
they left?
Europe may in the not-too-distant future end up as it was
in the 16th century, before the rise of the nation state. If current trends
continue, the United States may unwind in the reverse of the manner in which
frontiers became territories and then states. No entity is ensured perpetual
union. The process of forming nations and empires and then disassembling them
back into small city states or provincial units is certainly not novel, but
rather ancient, and more likely fluid and cyclical than linear — even if the
process takes decades or at times centuries. When an empire or even a nation
state can no longer guarantee locals that the increased security and wealth of
a vast union makes it well worth transcending their parochial customs and
ethnic profiles, then we have a Greece of 1,500 city states, or a medieval
Europe of castles and moats.
Why is there today a nostalgia for localism? Shrinking
Western populations with growing numbers of elderly and unemployed can no
longer sustain their present level of redistributive taxation and entitlements.
Europe, which can endure neither the disease of insolvency nor the supposed
medicine of austerity, is only a decade ahead of what we should expect here in
the United States, or what we see now in California — a construct more than a
state, where the Central Valley is to the coast as Mississippi is to
Massachusetts.
Voters are also disgusted with government, and feel that
their overseers are not even subject to the consequences of what they impose on
others: We expect the Obamas to trash the 1 percent as they jet to Martha’s
Vineyard, or a zillionaire John Kerry to demand higher taxes as he seeks to avoid
them on his yacht, or an upscale French Socialist president to have a home on
the Mediterranean — or, on the other side of the ledger, social-conservative
elites to speak and act like metrosexuals.
The frustration with the distant redistributive state
extends beyond the technocracy to the very nature and legitimacy of the
bureaucracies themselves. We know that no one trusts the National Bank of
Greece or believes much in Eurobonds, but who trusts any more the GSA, the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, or even the Secret Service to fulfill their
missions competently, and with honesty and decorum?
Nor can the redistributionist technocracy any longer make
the case that its certifications, its very claims to legitimacy and entitlement
— a PhD from Harvard, a JD from Yale, an MBA from Stanford — and its experience
— tenure at Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae, two years in OMB, a billet at the CBO,
three years at the Federal Reserve — have warranted our trust. We certainly do
not believe any more that such a résumé makes one a better legislator or
administrator than another who has run a company, built a business, farmed,
piloted a plane, or served in the military. Certainly an Al Gore or Barack
Obama does not seem wise, no matter where he was educated or how many government
posts he has held.
High-tech communications of the 21st century are a force
multiplier, in real time conveying the failures of redistributionist schemes,
through cable news, Internet blogs and tabloids, and downloaded videos. A nurse
in Des Moines has the power in the palm of her hand to read the Wall Street
Journal, watch a YouTube video, or browse a news site at Google, accessing more
information than what the aristocratic class was privileged to obtain just a
few decades ago. The result is that we see and hear instantaneously what “They”
do and say, even though we rarely meet them any more in our daily lives. They
have become Orwellian visages on our collective screens, whose empty platitudes
seem instantaneously familiar and yet irrelevant to the people we live, work,
and enjoy our leisure with.
As those who run the nation state become ever more
estranged, we yearn for the safety and security of our own neighbors, who seem
to think, speak, and live more as we do. In other words, we are unhappy residents
of Hellenistic Greece who dream of the romance of the lost face-to-face city
state, or the bread-and-circuses turba of fourth-century Rome, who feel that
their fellow citizens in Gaul, Numidia, and Pontus seem hardly Roman. These
days the problem is not just that an Italian wants to leave the EU, but that a
Florentine or Venetian would prefer to leave Italy itself. A Texan not only
wants us out of the U.N., but may feel he is already out of the U.S. Britain
may want no part of the EU, but Scotland wants no part of Britain.
In terms of race and ethnicity, the classical-liberal
tradition of emphasizing our character rather than our appearance has been
eroded by the self-serving multiculturalism of our elites. Formal support for
assimilation, intermarriage, and integration became passé, as hyphenation began
to strain credulity, the “salad bowl” replaced the melting pot, and grand
proclamations about the “other” became the new normal. Even as we intermarry
and our popular culture blends us together, our elites tear us apart,
distributing rewards and punishments in terms of jobs, entitlements, and
education based on notions of difference.
Where does this all lead? Are Westerners to become
Flemish against Walloons, Scots vs. Brits, and Catalonians tired of the
Spanish? In our lifetime, we will certainly see the dissolution of the
eurozone, and perhaps of the EU itself. At best, “Europe” may return to a
common market; at worst, to the nationalism and rivalries of the first half of
the 20th century. Not that the nation state itself is safe; language, locale,
religion, and tradition are powerful bonds that reassert themselves once
unionists fail to make the case that people are better off uniting across
natural divides than fragmenting into logical enclaves.
And the United States? Are we doomed to being drawn and
quartered into blue and red provinces: a postmodern Pacific Coast and New
England, an Hispanic zone extending 200 miles north of the Mexican border, and
a rusting Great Lakes industrial belt with its inner cities, all in loose
alliance — as our red/blue Electoral College maps suggest — against the Plains
states, the Rocky Mountains, and the South?
Barack Obama and his administration apparently believed
that by asserting a fictitious Republican war on women, by fostering a new
racial divide of “punish our enemies” and “nation of cowards,” by claiming a
new economic Mason-Dixon line between the 99 percent and the suspect few who
make over $250,000, and by running up $5 trillion in debt in less than four
years, they could cobble together majority support for their neo-socialist
agenda.
That divisiveness proved as foolish as borrowing $5
trillion to increase the number of dependent constituents. Well before Obama
emerged from his Chicago organizing, there were already forces of political
disunion in the West brought about by demography, globalization, and an
out-of-touch technocracy — ill winds that he should have calmed rather than
fanned. Indeed, Obama himself from 2002 to 2008 lectured about red/blue divides,
and warned us about people like himself who would seek to exploit them for
partisan advantage.
Somehow in just four years Obama has almost done to the
United States what it took Brussels apparatchiks three decades to do to the
European Union: alienated the people both from their technocracy and from
themselves. The results could be medieval.
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