By Kevin D.
Williamson
Wednesday, June
30, 2021
China is in a tough neighborhood, bordering
Afghanistan, Bhutan, India, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Laos,
Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Vietnam. But for
both historical and current reasons, one of the countries that looms largest in
its political thinking is a neighbor that doesn’t quite border it: Japan.
Japan, one of the few successful examples
of U.S.-imposed “nation building,” has followed an official policy of
semi-pacifism since the end of World War II. Given the atrocities committed by
Japan during that war and before, the world, and particularly Japan’s near
neighbors, were thankful for a quiet and friendly Japan.
But things have changed since the end of
the war: Japan has now been in its postwar liberal-democratic mode for almost
as long as Joe Biden has been walking the Earth, and it has shown itself to be
a good citizen of the world. But it is also a nervous one, and Tokyo’s biggest
long-term foreign-policy challenge is the same as Washington’s: the
so-called People’s Republic of China ruled by the Chinese Communist
Party, which will be marking the 100th anniversary of its founding on Thursday.
Speaking at the Hudson Institute on
Monday, Deputy Defense Minister Yasuhide Nakayama was frank: The independence
of Taiwan is a “redline” for Japan. “We have to protect Taiwan as a democratic
country,” he said. Beijing was, predictably, enraged by the characterization of
Taiwan as a country of any kind. But Taiwan is a country, a matter of practical
fact that is obscured by the fiction of the “one China” policy.
Taiwan is only a few miles from the
Japanese islands of Okinawa, so a Chinese incursion there would bring Chinese
forces to Japan’s doorstep. But Chinese forces make regular incursions into
Japanese waters, having done so dozens of times this year alone. These
incursions come in the form of official Chinese coast-guard vessels and the
vessels of China’s effectively militarized fishing fleet, which Beijing itself
describes as a maritime militia. Chinese incursions into other nations’
sovereign airspace are an increasingly common occurrence, as well. Both are
part of an obvious intimidation campaign meant to soften up China’s neighbors
and their Western allies on the matter of Taiwan along with China’s many other
disputed territorial claims.
Chinese adventures in and around Okinawa
bring Beijing into direct conflict with Japan but also invite conflict with the
United States: There are 80,000 Americans in Okinawa — active-duty military,
civilian support staff, and their families.
In his remarks, Nakayama was blunt about
the panoply of Chinese threats, including long-range missiles. “We have to wake
up,” he said.
Japan already has stirred itself. Among
other changes, Tokyo has announced plans to raise military spending above its
traditionally modest level of 1 percent of GDP. China greeted this announcement
with complaints that Japan is engaged in an “arms race,” which it is. We should
do what we can to ensure that Japan wins that race, which would serve our own
national interest as well as the interests of Asia and the world at large.
There are political limitations and
cultural sensitivities that will complicate Japan’s awakening, especially on
the matter of nuclear weapons. As a matter of official policy, Japan forswears
the production and possession of nuclear weapons, including nuclear weapons
controlled by allies based in its territory. As recently as 2016, then–prime
minister Shinzo Abe affirmed that Japan would never even consider possessing
nuclear weapons. But earlier this year, Japan refused to ratify the U.N. Treaty
on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and the possibility of developing such
weapons has been a quiet part of the Japanese political conversation for some
years.
If Japan should decide to change its
anti-nuclear posture, then the United States should support its decision, if
only quietly or tacitly. But the most pertinent question is not whether Japan
changes its position on nuclear weapons — nuclear warheads are only one
technology among many, and Japan, which is among the most technologically
sophisticated of all countries, has many choices when it comes to the instruments of
its defense. The more significant change is not in its arsenal but in its
geopolitical outlook and its domestic political attitudes. Though China looms
large in Washington’s imagination, it is far away from American shores. Japan’s
Senkaku Islands are within 200 miles of the coast of mainland China.
Japan is a reliable and, by this point,
longstanding American ally. That distinguishes it from many of China’s
troublesome and potentially troublesome neighbors: Any trouble Kim Jong-un of
North Korea makes for Beijing is bound to be trouble for Washington, too. But a
stronger and more assertive Japan would be a good thing from the point of view
of American interests. It would also be a headache for Beijing, and we should
encourage the development of those, within reason.
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