Brussels vs. Moscow

By Andrzej Olechowski and Pawel Swieboda
Tuesday, September 9, 2008

The European Union is finally getting a decent grip on its foreign policy, courtesy of Russia's engagement in Georgia. Some commentators said last week's EU summit failed to show enough resolve in the face of Russian aggression. But these critics are missing the point. The meeting in Brussels showed that EU leaders have finally begun to think in strategic terms, recognizing that we face a new problem in Europe: a resurgent nuclear power prepared to use military force in pursuit of its interests.

Much still needs to be done to consolidate European foreign policy given the different traditions, historical experiences, interests and perceptions of EU member states. But last week's summit resulted in the promising beginnings of a common view. For years, Russia was the issue on which EU leaders differed the most. Now they all subscribe to a loud and clear message that calls on Moscow to come to its senses.

The main point is not to prevent Russia from recovering its position as a global power, a position it certainly deserves. The challenge is to convince Moscow that instead of using the barrel of the gun to achieve its goal, it should use the irresistible power of attraction.

Given its vast reserves of natural resources, Russia will of course play a major role in the world. But it has chosen the wrong model, repeating the bankrupt patterns from past centuries: tightly controlling its neighborhood; building spheres of influence; taking unilateral action; and aggressively pursuing national interests, including with the use of force. Russia's anachronistic principles and objectives pose a threat for Europe and the international order.

If Russia succeeds in re-establishing its dominance over much of the former Soviet empire, we will have two competing blocs on the continent. The Russia of Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev is about a return to the confrontation of the past. To meet this challenge, the EU would be increasingly pressed to contradict itself. It would have to depart from the very policies and principles that are at its core. Instead of seeking cooperation with its neighbors, if not outright enlargement, the EU would have to build new walls. We must stop this bleak outlook.

Former Georgian Foreign Minister Salome Zurabishvili is right when she says it is possible to "win over Russia with the help of intelligence and political experience but not with a demonstration of strength."

What needs to happen is threefold: First, while Europe must continue to talk with Russia, the dialogue cannot be as open and romantic as in the past. We need strategic discipline, distance and caution. The EU should monitor the behavior of Russian enterprises on its markets to ensure they are not pursuing any hidden agendas on behalf of the Kremlin. Brussels must also warn European investors against excessive engagement in Russia and do its homework on energy policy.

Energy security has to be factored into the equation when the EU considers its climate change package, the flagship project of the current European Commission. To achieve Brussels' emissions targets, Europe would have to switch around 430 terawatt-hours, 13% of its energy production, from coal-fired to gas-powered plants, according to Swiss bank UBS. This would enormously increase our dependency on Russian gas.

If the European Union is serious about dealing with Moscow with self-confidence, it needs to introduce safety mechanisms, such as price ceilings and floors, into the emissions trading system. This would prevent an excessive rise of the price of carbon, which would only further fuel the demand for Russian gas.

Second, EU accession must become a credible perspective for our eastern neighbors, especially Ukraine. Only a tangible "Western option" can convince public opinion in the region that their fate is not irrevocably linked to Russia. Such a European perspective does not mean immediate membership but a binding promise of membership once these countries meet all the criteria. Europe's leaders need to make the region a strategic priority and reject the logic of division.

Third, we should edge toward defining a place for Russia in the European architecture. Today we are incapable of conceptualizing a role for Moscow that would be both satisfactory for Russia and useful for Europe. That lack of a concept is one of the reasons for our policy failure.

Without such a concept, Europe has little to offer to Russia, which in turn will find it hard to think of a different role for itself than that of a separate power without any allies. As opposition politician and Putin critic Boris Nemtsov has put it, unless Russia can be embedded in some sort of Western security concept, Moscow will "venture around threatening everybody in search for an enemy."

Much of Russia's resurgent self-confidence is built on a weak foundation. Russia's economic growth is largely based on raw materials. Its infrastructure and industry is in desperate need of modernization. Russia's population is aging rapidly. To solve its problems, Moscow needs cooperation with the West. It can't afford to be isolated and lose its standing in global political and economic institutions and among investors -- as the withdrawal of foreign funds and the fall of Russia's stock market since the invasion of Georgia illustrates.

Russia's self-perception as a country without friends and allies has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The war in Georgia has led to Moscow's total isolation. No one supported its blitzkrieg.

There is much for Russians and their leaders to reflect upon. A united and principled European Union with a strategy for the whole continent would be able to help Russia choose cooperation over confrontation.