By John Yoo & Robert J. Delahunty
Wednesday, November 20, 2024
In nominating Matt Gaetz for attorney general, President-elect
Trump has signaled his support for radical change at the Justice Department. As
former DOJ attorneys, we do not doubt that the nation’s premier federal law
enforcement agency would benefit from significant reform. But by proposing a
nominee as unqualified and as troubled as Gaetz, Trump would frustrate the very
forces of reform that he would unleash.
The roadblocks to Trump’s agenda would grow even more
difficult if the returning president were to resort to an unprecedented,
untested theory of appointing Gaetz without Senate approval — a gambit that
would plunge the DOJ into a political and legal quagmire.
The DOJ’s fall began with the FBI’s 2016 efforts to
investigate Donald Trump for alleged ties to Russia and culminated in special
counsel Jack Smith’s failure to drive Trump off the 2024 ballot. The
Biden-Garland DOJ has pursued an agenda to divide Americans based on race and
gender (see its defense of racial quotas in college admissions and its effort
to force states to use race in drawing voting districts); it has sought to
suppress free debate and discussion (such as the FBI’s efforts to coerce social
media to censor “misinformation”); and it has applied the law in ways that
appear clearly biased (e.g., in failing to protect churches and pro-life
clinics from vandalization from pro-abortion extremists).
There are few reasons to nominate Gaetz to face the
daunting challenge of reforming the nation’s most powerful law enforcement
agency. But there are also bad reasons to oppose him. Among the bad reasons is
the complaint that Gaetz is a “Trump loyalist.” A president has every right to
expect his attorney general, and indeed all his appointees, to be
“loyalists.”
Attorneys general do not enforce the law as if they were
neutral judges without robes. An attorney general is, inescapably, a political
appointee and serves at the will of the president. A president must make
political choices — from interpreting the Constitution to allocating resources
for fighting crime — in deciding how to fulfill his constitutional
responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” As the
Supreme Court has made clear, an attorney general is an executive branch
officer who only assists the president in performing this core executive
authority.
Because of the sensitivity of this duty, many presidents
have chosen loyal friends and allies as attorney general: FDR and Robert
Jackson, John F. Kennedy and his brother Robert Kennedy, Ronald Reagan and his
longtime associates William French Smith and Ed Meese, Barack Obama and his
close friend Eric Holder.
Nor is it a valid objection that Gaetz is a controversial
and outspoken advocate of the MAGA movement. Or that he is a firebrand who led
the insurrection of House Republicans against ousted speaker Kevin McCarthy.
For those who supported Trump, these may be desirable qualities.
The real problem with Gaetz’s nomination is that there
are unanswered, fundamental questions about his character and fitness for the
office. Gaetz stands accused of statutory rape and sex trafficking. To be sure,
the DOJ did not file these charges after investigating them, though it has
convicted several of his associates who also appear to have been involved.
But the House Ethics Committee has also investigated the
accusations, and that committee was on the point of issuing a report of its
findings when Gaetz’s nomination — and ensuing resignation from Congress —
intervened.
Although House Speaker Mike Johnson has expressed a
desire to keep the report confidential, he does not control its disclosure,
which is the prerogative of the Ethics Committee itself. And at this point it
looks as if that committee may well release the report (even though it is said
to be incomplete), at least to the Senate. In any case, it is highly unlikely
that the Senate would confirm Gaetz without seeing it. In the past, the Senate
Judiciary Committee has opposed nominees who refused access to their executive-branch
files, for example. Unless the House report clears Gaetz, the Senate will not —
and should not — confirm him.
If the next attorney general is to overhaul the Justice
Department in the radical manner that Trump and the voters expect, he cannot
perform his duties with his credibility already significantly damaged.
Deporting illegal aliens who have engaged in sex trafficking has — rightly —
been a signature issue for President Trump. This cause would not be served by
an attorney general who former House colleagues believed had committed the same
offense.
Gaetz’s legitimacy will be further undermined if he
enters office through a legally dubious route. As the chances that the Senate
will confirm Gaetz diminish, Trump might try to make an end run around the
Senate and install Gaetz through a recess appointment. Such an attempt would
probably be far more damaging to the administration than merely letting the
Senate reject Gaetz’s nomination.
According to Article II of the Constitution, the
president shall have the power to “fill up all vacancies which may happen
during the recess of the Senate” until its next session (generally a period of
two years). As Alexander Hamilton explained in Federalist No. 76, the
Senate’s advice-and-consent power acts as “an excellent check upon a spirit of
favoritism in the President” and would operate to prevent “the appointment of
unfit characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal
attachment, or from a view to popularity.” Allowing the president to
unilaterally appoint officers made more sense when the Senate was often not in
session because senators traveled to the Capitol by horse and sail and
communicated with hand-carried letters.
More recently, presidents have resorted to recess
appointments when partisan resistance has slowed appointments. Presidential
frustration with the Senate’s slow pace is understandable, and the incoming
president obviously wants to hit the ground running. But the Senate has been
able to protect its constitutional role in the appointments process by staying
constantly in pro forma session even when it has no scheduled votes or
other business — a practice upheld by the Supreme Court in the 2014 Noel
Canning case.
Indeed, a recess appointment of Gaetz might even be
unconstitutional under the reasoning of Justice Scalia’s opinion in the Canning
case — which was joined by three other conservative justices: Roberts, Thomas,
and Alito. Scalia wrote that “the recess appointment power is an anachronism.”
In Scalia’s view, the president can make a valid recess appointment only
between sessions of Congress, not within a single session. The Senate recess in
which Gaetz would notionally be “appointed” is within a session, not between
sessions.
Resorting to a recess appointment is in any case a
strange maneuver when the same party controls both the White House and
Congress. The Republican Senate has every political incentive to consider
Trump’s nominees speedily, to which new Majority Leader John Thune (R., S.D.)
has committed.
But a recess appointment of Gaetz might rest on even more
legally dubious grounds. According to press reports, Trump is considering
invoking a never-used constitutional provision that allows the president to
throw Congress into adjournment when the House and Senate themselves cannot
agree when to go out of session. To trigger the president’s power, the House
would have to pass an adjournment of Congress that the Senate rejects. Trump
could then adjourn Congress himself and appoint not just cabinet officers, but
every nominee for whom Senate consent is required.
The Senate has ample tools to strike back. It could
immediately call itself back into session and end the recess. Gaetz’s
nomination would remain in limbo, and Trump would have succeeded only in
antagonizing the Senate. The Senate could even go so far as to call up Gaetz’s
nomination and vote it down as a show of its institutional independence.
Gaetz would still remain in office, but a Senate
rejection of his nomination would deprive him of any political legitimacy.
Senate-confirmed inferior officers, such as the U.S. attorneys who oversee
federal prosecutions in every state and major American city, might ignore
Gaetz’s commands with few political consequences.
A House that might have found Gaetz unfit to sit in
Congress could find him unfit to sit in the executive branch and launch an
impeachment investigation. Emboldened senators could use the fight over Gaetz
to stall more nominations, even those to the judiciary, and delay other Trump
priorities such as renewing tax cuts or boosting funding for border control.
The fight over Gaetz could therefore upend the new
administration’s entire program.
If Trump tried out this novel gambit, moreover, a torrent
of litigation over Gaetz’s appointment would ensue. Defendants could challenge
every DOJ investigation and prosecution as the work of an unconstitutional
attorney general. The courts might well agree. Not only would that hand the
administration embarrassing defeats, but the litigation would ensnarl, delay,
and possibly undo the very DOJ reforms that Trump seeks. Distracted from his
duties by the widespread litigation, Gaetz would lose focus in driving through
personnel and policy changes. And in the worst case, the Supreme Court could
void all of Gaetz’s decisions while occupying an illegal recess appointment.
Trump’s legal program could be set back by one or two years.
President Trump would not be well served by having an
attorney general who was preoccupied for a year or more with his own fate. For
much of Trump’s prior term, Jeff Sessions, his first attorney general, was
recused from the “Russian collusion” investigation for having had contact with
a Russian official before Trump took office. That recusal sidelined Sessions
from the Justice Department’s most important business. Sessions would have
served the president better by resigning. And Gaetz would serve the returning
president better by withdrawing.