By Kevin D. Williamson
Wednesday, January 30, 2019
Bob Litterman, who is the chairman of the risk committee
of Kepos Capital and the former head of risk management at Goldman Sachs, has
an interesting column in the New York
Times on his specialty: risk.
Litterman is interested in the question of risk
particularly as it applies to climate change and its financial effects, in this
case its role in the bankruptcy of PG&E. (Many readers will be skeptical of
his specific claims about climate change; he acknowledges that it is “not easy
to attribute any particular event to climate change,” and you don’t have to buy
his climate-change policy preferences to appreciate the more general point of
the column.) Risk, as a concern in
and of itself, is something that does not get the attention it deserves in our
political debates.
In the classical-liberal model of government intervention
in economic affairs, the state overrules the market in a couple of general
circumstances: One is in order to secure the provision of public goods, which
range from public-health programs to missile-defense systems; public goods are
defined as those that are non-excludable in consumption (you cannot design a
missile-defense system that protects a paying customer on First Street while
leaving out his non-paying neighbors on Second Street) and non-rivalrous in
consumption (Smith’s enjoyment of a city free of cholera epidemics does not
diminish Jones’s ability to enjoy the same thing, whereas every apple Smith
eats leaves one less apple for Jones). The second is to prevent, mitigate, or
correct “externalities,” meaning the negative effects of a business
relationship between A and B on C, who is not a party to the trade. For
example, if you build a sports stadium that you expect to draw 50,000 visitors
on any given Sunday, you are creating traffic and parking demand that may be in
excess of the existing capacity. Government may respond to that with regulation
— a requirement that you build a certain amount of parking — or by using taxes
to fund mitigatory measures of its own.
Risk can be understood as an externality. (You’d think
that that 2008–09 housing crisis would have made that clear enough.) It is also
a liability that can be priced. That is part of what underwriting is supposed
to do in the world of credit: assess the risks involved in the loan or other
transaction. One of the neat tricks of government accounting is that it can
price risk at zero for budgetary purposes and therefore make a program seem to
be a better deal than it is. The bailouts following the financial crisis were
sometimes “profitable” on paper — because the government made financing
available to institutions at rates that priced risk well below what the market
would have. The government took on the risk without charging an appropriate
price for doing so (that’s what a bailout is, really), which is as much a
subsidy as it would have been to just send those institutions bags full of
cash. Similarly, the government bears the risk for some $1.5 trillion in
student-loan debt, most of which has been subjected to no analysis of
creditworthiness at all. There’s a great deal of risk in that, too, but
charging borrowers an interest rate appropriate to their creditworthiness would
defeat the purpose of the federal student-loan program, which is to shunt
enormous sums of money into the pockets of a favored political interest group
without putting a corresponding tax line on the budget.
Risk-mitigation is a useful way to think about climate
change and climate-change policy. There is good reason to be skeptical of the
alarmist view of climate change and the maximalist approach to climate-change
policy; the case for assessing the risks associated with climate change at zero
— and pricing them at $0.00 — is considerably more difficult to make.
Litterman is an advocate of the Baker-Shultz
carbon-dividend proposal. He writes: “Economists generally agree that rather
than regulate behavior, it is more effective to allow individuals to choose
their actions, as long as the prices appropriately reflect the costs, including
the risks posed by climate change. To date prices of energy have not reflected
the risk of future climate damages.”
(And what do those risks look like? The editor in me
can’t help himself when Litterman writes: “The thousand-year flood is now a
regular event.” It already was: Something that happens every 1,000 years is
regular, i.e. happening once every thousand years.)
The Baker-Schultz model appeals to some progressives
because the dividend would be redistributive. (In theory.) My own view is that
a more straightforward emissions tax (and why only on carbon dioxide to the
exclusion of other greenhouse gasses?) would be more appropriate. (In theory.)
If indeed we are assuming that the federal government is taking on a great deal
of risk as the presumed lead actor in response to climate change, then it is
going to need revenue.
And it needs revenue, anyway. Yes, yes, I think the
federal government should spend a lot less than it does and would be happy to
take a meat ax to much of the federal budget. But we live in a different
political reality, and even we libertarians have to nod in the general
direction of reality from time to time. And here is one aspect of that reality:
When the federal government is collecting 19 percent or 20 percent of GDP in
taxes, we balance the budget or run a small surplus. When the federal government
is collecting 16 percent or 17 percent of GDP in tax revenue, we run a
substantial deficit. For the next several years, spending is expected to be
just over 20 percent of GDP, and taxes are expected to be less than 17 percent
of GDP. My English-major math calculates that this will produce a deficit
running somewhere between 3 percent and 4 percent of GDP. There are substantial
risks involved in that, too. If interest rates on federal debt should return to
their historical average, things are going to get very ugly very quickly.
If we had a politics less interested in tribal
drum-beating (“Derka derka, you’re a racist!” vs. “Derka derka, you’re a
Marxist!”) and more interested in the difficult and boring and thankless
business of responsible government, some compromises would look pretty obvious,
at least to me. A modest carbon tax in exchange for meaningful entitlement
reform and broader rationalization of the tax regime — a compromise whose
components would together do a great deal to put the country on more-stable
long-term fiscal footing? That looks to me like the beginning of a pretty good
deal.
I’m generally skeptical of grand bargains and have a
strong preference for piecemeal reform with modest ambitions. But where there
are opportunities for intelligent compromise — reducing meaningful risk in two
different categories — then the responsible thing is to at least explore the
possibilities.
There’s risk in cleaving to the status quo, too.
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