By Dominic Lynch
Monday, March 20, 2017
Donald Trump’s populist victory has turned conventional
political wisdom on its head. Going into the election, the media and the
electorate largely believed Hillary Clinton would crush Trump and become the
first woman president. But as the night of November 8 wore on, it became clear
that Trump would edge Hillary out. He ended up winning the Electoral College,
but lost the popular vote by a record 2.1 percent. In contrast, George W. Bush
lost the popular vote by just one half of one percent.
Democrats have won the popular vote in six of the last
seven elections: 1992, 1996, 2000, 2008, 2012, and 2016. This is an astonishing
feat, which in any other country would have solidified them as the party in
power for the foreseeable future. But because we have the Electoral College,
the deficiencies in the Democratic coalition are thrown in contrast better than
they would be elsewhere.
November 8 revealed that the Democratic base is
retreating to urban areas (mostly along the coasts). Their decision to cut bait
with working class whites was a mistake. And the Obama coalition disintegrated
as soon as Obama was off the ballot. Unless Democrats address these issues,
they can expect to see even more losses over the next four years.
Could The
Democratic Party Fail?
The following two points are not mutually exclusive:
power ebbs and flows between the two major parties, and parties can die. The
valley that the Democratic Party currently finds itself in may very well be the
former situation. But there is a possibility—however outside the norms of what
we’ve come to expect from two-party politics—that the Democratic Party is
facing extinction.
The identity crisis facing Democrats is completely
different than the one facing the Republican Party. It is even different from
the battle for the soul of the Republican Party that came out of the Tea Party
movement.
The Tea Party, as Rob Tranciski points out, essentially
matched conservative-leaning districts with conservative representatives,
especially post-Obamacare when the unpopularity of the law translated into
Republican electoral victories. In the Obama era, the fight over the Republican
Party was usually between the “establishment”—the career politicians in
Washington who served as party thought leaders—and the “base,” or the
grassroots voters and activists.
These two factions were often at odds over policies like
entitlement spending, defunding Planned Parenthood, and, we now know, free
trade deals. But despite these conflicts there was never much dispute over most
of the core principals of the party: small government, respect for individual
autonomy, Second Amendment rights, Supreme Court appointments, and federalism.
Cohesiveness on these issues was showcased at the 2012 and 2016 party
conventions, as well in outside forums like CPAC, the March for Life, or
NRA-sponsored events.
The issue today in the Republican Party is whether or not
it will convert en masse to Trumpism
and its hostility to immigration, free trade, NATO, and an introverted foreign
policy. But as a whole, there are more holdouts to Trumpism than the media and
liberals like to admit.
Why Democrats
Suffered This Election
Contrast those issues with the ones facing Democrats: a
shrinking base, a shattered coalition, and policies that push people out of the
party. One of the main reasons Hillary lost was because of increasing
polarization between urban and rural areas. Clinton easily won large
metropolises like New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. She even ran ahead of
Obama in those places. But voters further removed from an urban core outvoted
the cities and put Trump over the top.
There are number of reasons for this discrepancy. One,
Hillary was not Obama, a fact often lost on Democrats during the campaign that
is now painfully obvious. The coalition Obama assembled for his two terms was
formidable while it lasted. But without him on the ballot, the coalition either
stayed home or backed Trump.
A few weeks after the election, The New York Times interviewed a number of less-than-enthused
Milwaukee residents about why they voted for Obama in 2008 and 2012, and why
they stayed home last year or cast a protest vote. To these voters neither
Trump nor Hillary were palatable, and for some the thought of voting for
another Democrat felt self-defeating because of the stagnation of their
communities during the Obama years.
Others felt like they couldn’t vote for either candidate
so they wrote in non-presidential candidates. This drop off in Wisconsin
clearly cost Clinton the state: Trump won by just 27,000 votes. This theme came
to the fore in the other closely won Trump states like Michigan and Pennsylvania.
When it came time to vote for Hillary, the enthusiasm gap was very real.
Progressivism Has
Coopted The Democratic Party
Secondly, the policies of the Democratic party
increasingly serve as an ideological purity test that lies outside the
political mainstream. Internal dissent is often not tolerated. The party
position on divisive issues like transgender bathrooms, wedding cake mandates,
sanctuary cities, unlimited and unrestricted abortion access, and illegal
immigration is mismatched with public opinion. Moderate Blue Dog Democrats,
once a large part of the Democratic coalition, are all but extinct. This leaves
a party consumed by progressive policies but without a counterbalancing
ideology to keep the party apparatus in check.
Finally, the decision to excise the white working class
from the Democratic coalition proved to be a fatal mistake. The Clinton team
assumed it would win the “Blue Wall” states on the backs of reliable white
working class voters who have voted Democratic since 1992 (and in some states,
like Wisconsin, since 1984). But her rhetoric on coal, globalism, social issues
and Trump’s temperament—combined with the fact that she campaigned around those
states—doomed her campaign from the start.
Trump’s message of economic nationalism, protectionism,
and “America First” was enough to carry Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania
and proved the wall wasn’t meant to last.
This Presidential
Election Revealed Democrats’ Weaknesses
Thus, Clinton’s defeat can be simplified into three core
issues: ideological extremism, a deliberate decision to campaign around a
crucial part of her base, and the enthusiasm gap. But in a sense, those causes
of defeat are also symptoms of defeat. Clinton campaigned the way she did
because she was convinced the Democratic Party had a lock on certain
demographics and trends—the so-called “demographic destiny” theory—so the party
could move in any direction and only make electoral gains.
The enthusiasm gap was explained away by saying that
turnout is always lower in the midterm elections anyway, and Democrats could
count on their base to come out for presidential elections. These assumptions
were clearly the wrong ones to make. But it led the party to move far enough
left that the middle was up for grabs. And Trump was able to capture it.
The debate among Democrats now is how far left to go, or
whether to come back to the middle. There isn’t yet much of a consensus
(although if Tom Perez’s election to DNC chair means anything, the party is
feeling compelled to go wide), but pushing even more left will lead to the
death of the Democratic Party as we know it, even if its replacement retains
the name.
This Is How The
Democratic Party Dies
Assuming the party fails to course correct, which is well
within the realm of possibility, it will inevitably become filled with
progressive candidates and a base eager to vote them into office. Conservatives
sometimes joke that there isn’t much of a difference between a Democrat and a
progressive to begin with.
But the key difference is that progressives follow the
policies of American liberalism to its logical conclusions. Under
progressivism, liberal openness to charter schools becomes a doubled-down commitment
to failed public education and its unions. Religious liberty compromises become
government-coerced mandates. Popular restrictions on abortion become a hill to
die on for unlimited abortion rights. Supreme Court appointments hinge on the
mood of the day. Of course, Democrats and liberals already spar with the right
over these issues. But as a whole, the party has not completely moved away from
its foundations.
This, then, is how the Democratic Party dies. Its death
won’t be like the Federalist Party or the Whigs, both of which existed under
certain conditions and evaporated when those conditions disappeared with the
evolution of the republic. Today’s Democratic Party will die by hollowing
itself out to progressive ideology and leaving moderate and historically
liberal voters behind.
Democrats are learning the hard way that coalitions are
not built on identity, but on ideology. The further left the party moves, the
more voters are up for grabs by Republicans. If the party moves far left
enough, it might continue to call itself Democratic—but in reality it will be
the Progressive Party of America. What 2016 showed is that the Democratic Party
as we know it is going extinct.
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