The Supreme Court Is Wrong on the Death Penalty

By Laurence H. Tribe
Thursday, July 31, 2008

It's not often that the U.S. Supreme Court is asked by a state and the federal government to reconsider a case it has just handed down because it missed key evidence.

But that is what is happening now in Kennedy v. Louisiana. In that case, the court ruled in late June that Louisiana could not execute someone convicted of violently raping a child. Dividing along familiar 5-4 lines, the court held, speaking through Justice Anthony Kennedy, that the death penalty must be reserved for killers and traitors. To apply it to others, including the most reprehensible violators of young children, would constitute a "cruel and unusual punishment" violating the Constitution's Eighth Amendment.

Emphasizing the evolving character of what constitutes an "unusual" if not an unduly "cruel" punishment, the court rested its condemnation of executing the rapists of children largely on what it described as a trend away from the use of death to punish such crimes both here and abroad.

But there was a problem with the court's understanding of the basic facts. It failed to take into account -- because nobody involved in the case had noticed -- that in 2006 no less an authority than Congress, in the National Defense Authorization Act, had prescribed capital punishment as a penalty available for the rape of a child by someone in the military.

Defenders of the court's decision in Kennedy v. Louisiana would have it ignore that embarrassing wrinkle by treating the military as a parallel universe that simply does not intersect civilian justice on the plane of constitutional principle. But a court searching for universal principles of justice in the name of the Eighth Amendment would be hard pressed to accept that view of the military/civilian distinction. Particularly when the court's division tracks the usual liberal/conservative divide, its credibility depends on both candor and correctness when it comes to the factual predicates of its rulings.

Whatever one's view of the death penalty -- and I have long expressed misgivings on both its wisdom and its constitutionality -- it's important that the inequities and inequalities in its administration be minimized. Commitment to that principle, not a rush to the center, lay behind Barack Obama's disagreement with the court's ruling in this case even before the 2006 federal death penalty provision came to public attention.

Many who applauded the court's original ruling did so not on the basis of the court's (now evidently faulty) trend-spotting rationale but, rather, on the premise that any way of containing the spread of capital punishment -- such as by confining its use to murderers and traitors -- is a good idea. But even those who harbor serious doubts about capital punishment should feel duty-bound to oppose carve-outs from its reach that denigrate certain classes of victims, or that arbitrarily override democratic determinations that such victims deserve maximum protection.

If a legislature were to exempt the killers of gay men or lesbians from capital punishment, even dedicated death penalty opponents should cry foul in the Constitution's name. So too, should they cry foul when the judiciary holds the torturers or violent rapists of young children to be constitutionally exempt from the death penalty imposed by a legislature judicially permitted to apply that penalty to cop killers and murderers for hire. In doing so, the court is imposing a dubious limit on the ability of a representative government to enforce its own, entirely plausible, sense of which crimes deserve the most severe punishment.

To be sure, holding the line at murder and treason gives the judiciary a bright line that blurs once one says a legislature may include other offenses in its catalogue of what it deems the most heinous of all crimes. But the same may be said of virtually any bright line. Placing ease of judicial administration above respect for democracy and for principles of equal justice under law is inexcusable.

The Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause should not be construed in a manner that puts it on a collision course with the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause. The Supreme Court would do well to take that overriding consideration into account as it decides whether to revisit its seriously misinformed as well as morally misguided ruling.