Friday, February 28, 2025

Don’t Let Appeasement History Repeat in Ukraine

By Dean Meller & John Shelton

Friday, February 28, 2025

 

The year is 2025, or is it 1994? Once again, the United States is meeting with Russia to discuss Ukrainian disarmament. Once again, Ukraine will be forced to subjugate itself in the name of global stability and peace. And once again, that peace will surely fail thanks to Russian oath-breaking.

 

Three decades ago, Ukraine signed the Budapest Memorandum, surrendering its nuclear arsenal (then the third largest in the world) in exchange for security assurances from Russia. Time and time again, Russia has flouted those assurances. Yet, according to Steve Witkoff (U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East), the United States is working hard this year to get the Ukrainian government to sign another similarly structured and similarly ill-destined agreement: the Istanbul Protocol, which would leave “Ukraine helpless in the face of future Russian threats or aggression,” according to the Institute for the Study of War.

 

While the Istanbul Protocol (drafted in 2022) will not be adopted without modification, the idea that U.S. officials would ever agree to use it as a “guidepost” is a serious reason for concern. For all the talk of bringing peace to Ukraine, the Trump administration seems more intent on giving proof to the maxim that “the only lesson we learn from history is that we do not learn from history.”

 

Under the parameters of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, Russia made a series of commitments to Ukraine: Russia would respect the sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine, refrain from threatening or using force against Ukraine, refrain from economic coercion, seek U.N. action in the event of aggression against Ukraine, and not use nuclear weapons against Ukraine. Thirty years later, Russia has broken all of its promises to Ukraine save one — the promise to not go nuclear (though, significantly, Vladimir Putin loosened Russia’s protocols in 2024 against unleashing atomic Armageddon).

 

Perhaps the absence of a mushroom cloud is a sufficient silver lining for the Trump administration, which is eager to give Russia a mulligan on its broken promises. Or perhaps Putin’s rattling of the nuclear saber is cowing the administration into taking a deal with Russia prematurely.

 

Whatever the reason, the United States is rushing Ukraine into a half-cooked agreement. In the 2022 draft of the Istanbul Protocol, the Russians demanded that Ukraine disarm to below pre-war levels, eschew hosting foreign military personnel or weapons systems, and remove its commitment to NATO membership. In essence, Ukraine surrenders deterrence, the only thing that might prevent Russian aggression; Russia pinky-promises not to take advantage of the unarmed Ukrainians and instead to resolve disputes through the U.N. The Istanbul Protocol never passed muster because it sought peace through appeasement.

 

If Trump follows Witkoff’s guidepost, the United States will be kicking the can down the road, buying Russia time to rebuild its military while Ukraine reduces its own. Anything short of rock-solid security assurances from the West represents a cease-fire — not a peace treaty. Putin will gladly take the time to recuperate and rearm, waiting for Trump’s successor and the next major sign of American weakness to relaunch his invasion.

 

In fact, Putin’s major escalations all came roughly six months after America signaled weakness. In 2008, the Bush administration failed to give Georgia or Ukraine tangible paths to NATO membership, and about six months later, Putin invaded Georgia. In 2014, Obama failed to enforce his red line in Syria, and Putin took Crimea roughly six months later. Finally, in 2021, Biden left Afghanistan in chaos, and Putin invaded Ukraine (as you may have guessed) around six months later. While Trump likely won’t give Putin the occasion for the renewal of hostilities, some future administration almost assuredly will.

 

A wise man once said: When someone tells you what they are going to do, listen. Through his words and actions over decades, Putin has made his goals clear. The only path to peace with Putin is undeniable strength. Should Trump desire a legacy of peace, his administration must avoid repeating the age-old mistake of appeasement.

 

Rewinding to 1994 is not the answer, which leads us to ask: Mr. Witkoff, do you know what time it is?

Progressive Journalists Don’t Understand That Jeff Bezos Owns the Washington Post

By Mark Antonio Wright

Wednesday, February 26, 2025

 

Today, Jeff Bezos announced in a memo to Washington Post staffers — employees of a newspaper that he owns free and clear — that henceforth the editorial page would “be writing every day in support and defense of two pillars: personal liberties and free markets. We’ll cover other topics too of course, but viewpoints opposing those pillars will be left to be published by others.”

 

The reaction from progressive journalists was apocalyptic.

 

Jeff Stein, the Post’s chief economics reporter, is on Twitter this morning wailing about the “massive encroachment” of . . . (checks notes) a newspaper owner’s changes to the operations of a newspaper that he owns.

 

Keith Olbermann says that Bezos has declared “the paper utterly fascist.”

 

Stuart Benson, a reporter for the Hill Times, is shrieking that an “American Billionaire relieves editor of his duties in order to impose his own ideological views on the Washington Post.”

 

Post opinion columnist Philip Bump’s reaction was more direct: “What the actual f***.”

 

There’s only one explanation for all the caterwauling.

 

Progressive journalists must believe that, despite the fact that Jeff Bezos owns the Washington Post, paid $250 million of his own money for it in 2013, has lost tens of millions of dollars operating the place over the years, and pays every last employee’s salary, he doesn’t get to actually decide what happens in the company he owns.

 

The employees get to decide that, apparently. It’s the closed-guild system of journalism. Nothing more.

 

Bezos’s decision may lead to a better, more readable Post editorial page. (Or it may not! After the yearslong Amazon ban on Ryan Anderson’s book, When Harry Became Sally: Answers for Our Transgender Moment, forgive me if I don’t immediately trust Jeff Bezos’s conceptions of “personal liberties.”)

 

But Bezos isn’t forcing anyone to read his newspaper. He’s not forcing anyone to subscribe to the Washington Post, or advertise in the Washington Post, or work for the Washington Post.

 

And while he’s setting a policy for his own company, he is not preventing anyone from writing opinions he disagrees with, or that depart from the new editorial direction of the Washington Post, in the pages of the New York Times or on NBCNews.com or in a Substack newsletter. He’s not stopping anyone from tweeting or calling into C-SPAN or placing a political message on a billboard. This all might be a good — or bad — idea, and it might be a better or worse financial model for the paper, but he gets to make the decision!

 

All he’s saying is that, in the company he in fact owns, the employees are going to do things his way. If they don’t want to, they are free to leave.

 

Question for progressive journalists: In a free country, what on earth is wrong with that?

Progressives and Other People’s Money

By Charles C. W. Cooke

Wednesday, February 26, 2025

 

Mark writes:

 

Progressive journalists must believe that, despite the fact that Jeff Bezos owns the Washington Post, paid $250 million of his own money for it in 2013, has lost tens of millions of dollars operating the place over the years, and pays every last employee’s salary, he doesn’t get to actually decide what happens in the company he owns.

 

Right. That’s exactly what they believe. And it’s not just the Washington Post. This is also how progressives see the federal bureaucracy, public schools, public universities, and more — not as entities that exist to fulfill a specific goal and should be judged by how well they achieve it, but as distant check-writing institutions that have been placed into the hands of the American Left by divine design and must never be touched or questioned by those who are paying the bills.

 

How else to understand the progressive conception of the administrative state as a fourth branch of government that ought not to be “interfered” with by elected officials; or of public schools as places where experts ought to shape your children without the intervention of school boards or state legislatures; or of public universities (and federally subsidized private universities) as independent castles that ought never to suffer the indignity of being asked to account for themselves before Congress. Today, it’s the Washington Post. Yesterday, it was the Department of Justice. Last year, it was public schools in Florida. The details change, but the attitude is always the same: Give us your money, and then go away, lest you impede the advancement of our agenda.

Where Are the Protests?

By Nick Catoggio

Wednesday, February 26, 2025

 

An annoying occupational hazard of punditry is stumbling across a news story that perfectly supports the thesis of your column … after you’ve already published it.

 

Maybe “annoying” is too much. It’s gratifying to see one’s opinion vindicated by events! When the New York Times drops this six days after I wrote this, I feel like Dispatch subscribers are getting their money’s worth.

 

But it sure would have been nice to have had the Times item in hand a week ago when I was putting that piece together.

 

That’s not the only time it happened to me this week. Two days ago I wrote about Donald Trump’s habit of “kidding on the square,” framing outré policy ideas in comic terms to normalize them while granting himself and his supporters plausible deniability about his sincerity. He’s only joking about running for a third term in 2028! Although, now that you mention it, it *would* be nice….

 

Late on Tuesday night, not 48 hours after I posted that newsletter, he dropped the mother of all “kidding on the square” examples on Truth Social.



You can’t watch that clip without laughing. There’s Elon Musk stuffing his face with hummus. And a pale, husky Trump sunbathing by the pool with Netanyahu. And bearded men, er, belly-dancing in barely-there women’s clothing. (“Trump Gaza” will be vastly more “woke” than the current iteration, it seems.) Even the music is catchy.

 

If you can get past the fact that juvenile trolling of this sort coming from the president is a complete embarrassment to the United States, you’d have to call it one of the more enjoyable pieces of AI slop to reach mass circulation.

 

Buried beneath the absurdity, though, are two semi-serious ideas. One is that Trump earnestly wants the United States to take over Gaza, or so he says. The other is that he foresees the forcible displacement of the Palestinian population as a necessary step in the process.

 

Where are the cries from America’s pro-Palestinian left over the president proposing the ethnic cleansing of Gaza?

 

I can’t tell you how many times that question has come up this month in conversation. Dispatch colleagues have raised it. Family members have raised it. Strangers on social media have raised it. A year ago, campus Hamasniks were occupying buildings and setting up tent cities to protest Israel’s effort to punish the perpetrators of the October 7 pogrom. Today the leader of their own country is suggesting a gratuitous American incursion into Gaza to evict the impoverished locals and convert the land into a playground for the rich—the most grotesque conceivable expression of “settler-colonialism”—and seemingly no one cares.

 

Where are the protests?

 

Overtaken by events.

 

They haven’t disappeared entirely, contrary to popular belief.

 

Last month, on the day the spring semester began at America’s most notorious “anti-Zionist” campus, the usual suspects bearing “intifada” signs staged a walkout. According to the U.S. Campaign for Palestinian Rights, which maintains an updated list of daily agitation across the country, protests are scheduled today in Burbank, California, and Oneonta, New York, and another is set for tomorrow in Dallas, Texas.

 

There’ll be some sort of demonstration in Los Angeles on Sunday to coincide with the Oscars and an “International Day of Action” next Wednesday aimed at convincing businesses to stop supporting Israel’s military. Protests are still happening!

 

Just at one-one-thousandth or so of the intensity that we saw last year.

 

In fairness, is that really so strange under the circumstances?

 

The point of the 2023-24 protests was to force the Biden administration to pressure Israel for a ceasefire. Whether you believe those ceasefire demands were primarily motivated by a desire to protect Palestinian civilians or by a desire to protect Hamas’ ability to menace Israelis depends on how charitable you feel toward leftists. Either way, we do have a ceasefire at last. Barely.

 

So it makes sense that protests would have fallen off, notwithstanding the obnoxiousness of Trump’s interest in redeveloping Gaza. It’s hard enough to sustain the intensity of demonstrations when the mission hasn’t yet been accomplished. It’s really hard when it has.

 

And insofar as it hasn’t been completely accomplished, it’s been rendered moot. The sort of pro-Hamas degenerate who hoped last year’s demonstrations would scare a Democratic president into forcing the Israelis to back off before they weakened the group’s capabilities in Gaza has been overtaken by events. Many of Hamas’ leaders are dead, its power to wage war is degraded, and its brothers-in-arms across the border in Lebanon have been routed.

 

If the goal was to stop the war before real damage was done to the glorious jihadist cause, there’s no point in continuing to protest. That ship has sailed.

 

If, on the other hand, the actual goal of pro-Palestinian activism is something more subversive and closer to home, there’s … also no point in continuing to protest. Domestic politics has moved on and has taken the salience of the demonstrations with it.

 

Mission accomplished?

 

I agree with economist Noah Smith, who alleged earlier this month that “the purpose of the Palestine movement was (A) to seize power from the establishment wing of the Democratic party, and (B) to reduce the influence of Jews in the American left.”

 

Whether Jewish voters were scared into voting meaningfully more Republican on Election Day is a matter of dispute, but it’s always felt like more than coincidence that Kamala Harris bypassed the popular Jewish governor of Pennsylvania as her running mate despite the importance of that swing state. The protests put her on notice that her pro-Palestinian base would tolerate only so much “Zionism” at the top after Joe Biden and the Democratic establishment backed Israel’s war in Gaza. The message was received, apparently.

 

Snubbing Josh Shapiro didn’t save Harris, though. It was Trump who won the majority-Arab city of Dearborn, Michigan, a surprise outcome that seemed to confirm a backlash to Democrats among pro-Palestinian voters. That outcome makes no sense as a matter of geopolitics given that Trump’s support for Israel is far less conditional than Harris’, to the point that he’s not above using the word “Palestinian” as an insult. (Buyer’s remorse has already begun in Dearborn.) But it makes sense as a matter of domestic politics, through Smith’s frame. If the point of last year’s Gaza protests was to warn Democratic leaders that the party can’t win by governing from the center, especially but not exclusively with respect to Israel, those protests served their purpose.

 

Harris lost. Dearborn went red. Democratic leaders will think twice next time about telling the left “no,” supposedly. So why bother continuing with the protests now? The progressive mission was accomplished.

 

That’s the optimistic view for Palestinian activists, anyway. The pessimistic view is that not only did the protests not succeed in terms of foreign policy—“Trump Gaza” is certainly not what the “uncommitted” movement had in mind—but they’ve backfired domestically as well.

 

A Gallup poll published a few weeks ago asked Democratic voters and “leaners” whether they want to see the party become more liberal, more moderate, or stay the same on policy. “More moderate” earned 45 percent, up 11 points from four years ago; “more liberal” declined to 29 percent, down 5 points over the same period. That jibes with the sense that it wasn’t just inflation and immigration that did Harris in, it was working-class voters across the partisan spectrum concluding that Democrats have grown far too fringe-y on cultural matters to be trusted with power.

 

“Defund the police,” gender weirdness, and an antisemitic streak ugly enough that even progressive stars like Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez have gotten nervous about it: The Democratic Party looks so radical to so many swing voters that a proto-fascist convicted felon seemed like a more responsible option in November.

 

The sort of left-wing activist who protests the war in Gaza in hopes of “seizing power” from Democratic leaders, as Smith imagines, won’t care about losing elections. But the sort of activist who prefers government by milquetoast centrist Democrats to government by a proto-fascist convicted felon will. Pro-Palestinian protests that too often played like pro-Hamas protests are, or were, yet another progressive cultural excess that ended up scaring the horses on Election Day.

 

Can you blame those more sensible liberal activists for not wanting to participate anymore? No wonder the number of demonstrations is down.

 

The Trump factor.

 

In many ways, the fact that Donald Trump rather than Joe Biden is now president has also undercut the rationale for protests.

 

For starters, it’s harder now for activists to get the media’s attention. Every day since January 20 the press has been forced to prioritize between covering the end of the American-led world order, the probably illegal subversion of federal agencies by the richest man in the world and his band of twentysomething geeks, the appointment of comically unfit nutjobs to positions of high influence over public health and law enforcement, and more mundane stuff like a new tax-cut bill that’s going to blow another sucking wound in America’s fiscal stability.

 

The press is a little busy. Who wants to go to the trouble of building a tent city if reporters don’t have time to come out and gawk at it?

 

Fear is another consideration for demonstrators in the age of Trump, as it is for all of us.

 

A week after he was sworn in, the president signed an executive order pledging immediate action by the Justice Department to punish unlawful acts of antisemitism on college campuses. The fact sheet that accompanied the order contained a bonus threat for foreign students. “To all the resident aliens who joined in the pro-jihadist protests, we put you on notice: come 2025, we will find you, and we will deport you,” it declared, pledging to “also quickly cancel the student visas of all Hamas sympathizers on college campuses, which have been infested with radicalism like never before.”

 

Is it legal for the government to punish someone who’s here lawfully for expressing an opinion with which it disagrees? Probably not. Would you want to be the foreign student who tests that theory in court? Also probably not. The legal cost of protesting has gone up since Trump signed his executive order, and as with any good whose price has risen, demand for it has begun to fall.

 

It’s not just Trump whom activists need to worry about, though. Universities have grown bolder about punishing unruly campus demonstrators since Election Day 2024.

 

On Monday Barnard College, affiliated with Columbia University, expelled two students who disrupted a class on the history of Israel last month. Not once since the war in Gaza began in October 2023 had that happened at Columbia—until this week. Another example: In December a student at the University of Chicago was arrested in a dorm by local cops and detained for 30 hours for having grabbed the hand of an officer while he was swinging a baton at a protest in October. The student was designated a “threat” by the school administration and barred from campus.

 

It’s hard to say whether universities are acting out of heartfelt fear of Trump, perhaps fretting that he might meddle in their federal funding if they don’t “monitor” disfavored activism by students, or whether they’re using that as a pretext to follow through with a crackdown they’ve secretly longed to implement. I strongly suspect that the American corporations rushing to jettison their diversity programs were eager to unburden themselves of being ideologically policed by wokesters—and the attendant compliance costs—and viewed Trump’s election as a convenient excuse. (“We don’t want to to do it but we can’t risk angering our vindictive president!”) The schools, or at least some of them, might be behaving similarly.

 

Either way, protesting is obviously riskier when you know that people with influence over your career prospects are looking to make an example of those who cross a line. There’s a reason some pro-Palestinian activists went anonymous last year when law firms started rescinding job offers from the most obnoxious agitators.

 

Even if the spirit among demonstrators is willing, the financial flesh might be weak. The tents in those tent cities aren’t free, you know; left-wing fatcats are already at high enough risk of being persecuted by Trump’s administration that they might understandably decline to antagonize the White House by funding a new round of campus chaos.

 

Futility.

 

The biggest effect that “the Trump factor” has had on progressive protesters, though, is also the simplest. What would be the point of demonstrating against his Gaza plan, exactly? Now that he’s president, whose opinion would theoretically be moved by a new round of protests?

 

Protests, in theory, are designed to pressure the government into changing its policies. Trump won’t do that. Not only won’t he do it, he won’t even pretend to take the demonstrators seriously, as Biden and Harris were required to do. He’d love to have them as a foil, I’m sure: Nothing would make his insane “Sandals: Gaza” resort plan seem more appealing than watching pimply teens in Hamas headbands cosplaying as revolutionaries screeching about it at Columbia.

 

“Forget Trump. Protests might move public opinion,” one might answer. I guess? But how much will public opinion move, realistically, now that the war in Gaza is (sort of) over, Americans are distracted by rising inflation and dozens of daily new Trump insanities, and his “kidding on the square” shtick has made his plans to ethnically cleanse the Palestinians momentarily seem like just another bit of outrageous comic excess that he doesn’t really mean.

 

Can’t these protesters take a “joke”?

 

If and when he alarms Americans by turning serious about bulldozing the Gaza Strip and creating a seaside paradise for hirsute belly-dancers, that might finally trigger another burst of large pro-Palestinian demonstrations. But until then, “Trump Gaza” will cause precisely as much public anxiety as turning a crazed, possibly high mega-billionaire loose on the federal government and inviting him to shut down whatever he likes. It’s the sort of thing that would have shocked the activist class and galvanized a response had a “normal” president done it. But when Trump does it?

 

Americans knew what they were signing up for and handed him a near-majority in the popular vote anyway. Protests only work when the government’s conduct defies popular expectations. How do you build a protest movement in a country that now expects, and accepts, lunacy?

‘Christian Nationalists’ Have One Little Democratic Point

By Kevin D. Williamson

Friday, February 28, 2025

 

The United States is a Christian nation in the same sense it is an English-speaking nation. There isn’t any law mandating it—that’s just the way it is: Go out on the street, and you’ll mostly hear people speaking English, obeying (more or less!) laws written in English by English-speaking people in accordance with a Constitution written in English by people who had been, until the Revolution, Englishmen annoyed with the English king, whose court had been speaking English mainly since the time of Henry IV. That English king was the titular head of a Christian church, from which Christian dissenters had separated themselves by founding a colony in Massachusetts, which eventually joined with other colonies—many of which were explicitly Christian, with taxpayer-supported churches and clergy—and their overwhelmingly Christian populations, whose members often could be found reading English translations of the Bible named for another king of the English. (But not an “English king”—a Scottish one.) The population remains in the majority Christian, with the share of Americans who identify as Christian outweighing those who identify as Republicans or Democrats combined. But to say “This is a Christian nation” is a kind of political and social shibboleth—as is denying the obvious fact that this is a Christian nation. Of course there are people who live here who aren’t Christian or who don’t speak English, just as there are people who live in Japan who aren’t ethnically or culturally Japanese or who don’t speak Japanese—but, even though Japan has some pretty aggressive nationalists who worry the liberals, nobody really gets bent out of shape if someone says Japan is a Japanese nation: Who could deny it?

 

Who doubts that Hindustan—the Hindustani name for India—is Hindu? Yes, there are Hindustani Muslims and Hindustani Sikhs and Hindustani Christians and Hindustani Jains there, but if you put a replica of New Delhi on Mars and rocketed any halfway culturally literate human being to it, he’d get out of the landing module, take a look at that 108-foot-tall statue of Hanuman and say: “Oh, look: Hindu civilization.” Even though they have McDonald’s and rock ’n’ roll and polo shirts.

 

I have this on my mind because I recently participated in a Poynter Institute presentation for journalists on what we now call, for lack of a better term, “Christian nationalism.” I have some unhappy history with these people, but I try to do as many of these events as I can in the hope of making some marginal improvements in my struggling occupation. It was a very fine example of “diversity” as imagined by progressives: a panel of people with different demographic features who all basically agreed about the subject at hand. (We was agin’ it.) I’m a longtime merciless critic of these “Christian nationalist” fanatics and the riffraff they milk for power and profit, and I was the most sympathetic member of the panel by a mile. Journalistic groupthink is poison, and it is a real threat to the credibility (and economic viability) of the business.

 

One of the panelists, a very well-intentioned pastor with a new book out, objected to the host’s citing an organization critical of Christian nationalism because the group supposedly has retrograde views on other subjects and isn’t as opposed to Christian nationalism as she wishes it were. And there’s some great diversity for you: It isn’t enough that we’re all critics of the idea in question (and that nobody thought to invite anybody sympathetic to it to present an alternative point of view) but, apparently, we all have to be critical in the same way and to the same degree. That this is preposterous did not seem to occur to anybody except me.

 

What I tried to explain to the viewers—and I am afraid this fell on deaf ears—is that the Christian nationalists have a kernel of truth at the heart of their complaint, and it is a kernel of political truth rather than a kernel of religious truth. The heart of the matter isn’t revealed truth but democratic legitimacy.

 

The so-called wall of separation between church and state in the United States may be excellent policy—the more time I spend in churches and talking with politicians, the more I think it is!—but it has a problem: Nobody voted for it.

 

The First Amendment prohibits the “establishment” of religion, which means the creation of a national church—a state church is what an established church is. And while many of the men who negotiated, argued about, wrote, and ratified the Constitution had wall-of-separation (the phrase itself is, of course, Thomas Jefferson’s) views and many didn’t, none of them thought that they were proposing or voting for a document that might make it illegal to put up Christmas decorations at a public building in Jackson County, Indiana, a couple of centuries hence.

 

It is worth reminding modern Americans what the actual politico-religious landscape of the United States looked like before the Revolution, in the Founding era, and in the generation after. Most of the colonies (and, later, the states) had established churches, by which I do not mean that they had state education budgets that included money for students who might prefer to attend a school with a religious affiliation (many did; this was generally uncontroversial until Catholic immigration ticked up in the 19th century) but that they had state churches, i.e., taxpayers paid taxes that were used to finance the ministries and clergy of particular Christian denominations, such as the Congregational Church in Massachusetts and Connecticut. Henry David Thoreau complained about this, and Jefferson (along with James Madison) worked for the disestablishment of the Anglican church in Virginia. Antidisestablishmentarianism (it is rare that one has an opportunity to use the word correctly!) was stronger in New England than in the South, where the established churches were mainly Anglican and, as such, suspected of being tainted with monarchism.

 

And the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment ought to be understood as having at least as much to do with monarchy as it does with a liberal Anglo-Protestant sympathy for religious liberty. At the time, established churches were everywhere in the Protestant world (Catholic “establishment” is a different kettle of ichthyses) institutions of monarchy. And that is still mostly the case: If you consider the few remaining countries in the Western world with established churches—the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Norway—what you will see is not countries with a great deal of Christian passion (these comprise some of the least-religious countries in the world) but countries that are constitutional monarchies. Iceland is unusual in having an established church (the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Iceland) but no monarchy, while Canada is unusual in the opposite way, having a monarch as head of state but no established church. (The Church of Canada isn’t.) Many of the Founders would have agreed with Thoreau that forcing a man to pay a tax to support a church with which he wishes to have no association is wrong, but none of them thought the First Amendment prohibited that. Which is why the disestablishmentarians were obliged to take other action—sometimes statutory, sometimes constitutional—to accomplish those ends. With Massachusetts being the last holdout, the states eventually did disestablish their churches—mostly democratically. 

 

Americans tend to accept democratic outcomes more readily than outcomes arrived at through undemocratic or antidemocratic means. That is partly a matter of time (democracy is slow), partly a matter of voice (everyone who wants a say gets one), partly a matter of these changes often being gradual, and—in considerable part—because the democratic process itself confers legitimacy in the minds of most Americans. To take one relevant example: There were many social changes affecting the lives of American women in the 20th century that were much, much bigger than the abortion right exnihilated into existence by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. But Roe became a rallying point, while there was no successful 50-year campaign to overturn the 19th Amendment or to strip women of their gradually acquired equal economic rights or to undo the no-fault divorce laws.

 

The extent to which the democratic process provides political lubrication is remarkable: Ronald Reagan ran for president as the champion of American conservatives, including Christian social conservatives; in California Gov. Reagan had signed into law the nation’s first laws legalizing abortion and no-fault divorce. By contrast, the Supreme Court in Roe claimed to discover a right to abortion in the Constitution—but that was a constitution no one had voted for. The actual constitution, ratified in 1788, has nothing to say on the question, and the people who voted for it surely did not believe they were creating a national mandate for abortion or for same-sex marriage—or for unquestionably desirable things such as the abolition of racial discrimination.

 

When the Christian nationalists insist that our current climate of aggressively enforced secular homogeneity is an ahistorical innovation imposed on American life by progressive activists and allied judges over the course of the past several decades and that this regime lacks democratic legitimacy, they are not wrong in the particular—a fact that should be obvious even to people who do not share the Christian nationalists’ political agenda, including those of us who find it generally contemptible as politics and as religion both.

 

When John Adams was a grown man visiting Philadelphia for the first time, he saw something he never had seen before: a Catholic Church. In Massachusetts, the law allowed for the hanging of Catholic clergy simply for being present there. And while the revolution did provoke a good deal of welcome liberal sentiment throughout the new republic, the first public Mass was not celebrated in Massachusetts until years after the Revolution. The established church at the state level survived the founding generation into the age of Jackson. Government support of religious schools was an accepted and common fact of life until the post-Civil War era, when Irish Catholics started showing up in numbers that made the old Puritan elite nervous. But even such exercises in bigotry as the Blaine Amendments were generally enacted by democratic means.

 

If you want people to accept social change, then give them a voice, a vote, and, above all, a little bit of time. Or a lot of time, as needed. That isn’t what you want to hear if you are a member of an oppressed minority group or a marginalized community demanding change. But the undemocratic imposition of radical social change is a near-guarantee of radical reaction. There may be times when we judge that this is worth it, but how much better would it have been for the country—and everybody in it—if desegregation, for example, had been achieved more through democratic means and less through judicial fiat? The Union Army may have flattened the South, and the federal government could have imposed whatever it wanted under martial law, but it was critically important that Congress pass and the states ratify the 13th Amendment. Unless you are a hopeless utopian, you have to realize that there are trade-offs in all things political: Democratic processes are slow and halting, often by design, while nondemocratic methods provoke backlash and impose other long-term political and social costs.

 

One of those costs is giving juice to batty radical movements and providing career opportunities for irresponsible demagogues—not that we blessed Americans know anything about that!

 

There are a few intellectually serious Christians out there with some profoundly illiberal ideas about the relationship between church, state, and social order. Amusingly, about half of them are Catholics (team Leo XIII) and half Calvinists (team R.J. Rushdoony), meaning that each half sees the other as heretical. But, ultimately, this isn’t about theonomy—it’s about democracy.

 

And two cheers for that, maybe two-and-a-half.

The Conservative Lifestyle Is Suddenly in Fashion

By Noah Rothman

Thursday, February 27, 2025

 

Much has been made of the so-called “vibe shift” that followed Donald Trump’s reelection. To the extent that it is a measurable phenomenon, it is gauged by the degree to which the formerly permissive center-left institutions and individuals who grudgingly tolerated the progressive cultural revolution have withdrawn that indulgence and sloughed off their chains. Of course, the underlying conditions that created a seismic social upheaval to which those individuals and institutions are responding did not materialize overnight. They were, however, poorly understood because they were insufficiently studied.

 

The earthquake some recent studies of evolving American cultural attitudes have produced is illustrative of that general blindness. Taken together, those surveys suggest traditional conservative prescriptions for a functioning society experiencing a revival. Indeed, that revival has been underway for a while, and all under the noses of America’s elite cultural arbiters.

 

In a Thursday New York Times op-ed, three political scientists analyzing survey data compiled late last year found something that apparently surprised them. Led by Republicans, the public is increasingly inclined to embrace a “traditional view of gender roles,” but that attitude has not been accompanied by a newfound comfort with “gender discrimination.” Imagine that!

 

Sure, Americans still believe that women face undue prejudice in the workplace and society. They resent the extent to which American society discourages what they call “stereotypically feminine qualities” in men, “like being affectionate and caring.” They still “reject stereotypically masculine behaviors like fighting, getting drunk, sleeping around, and talking about women in a sexual way.” And they don’t think the measure of a man is the size of the brood he sires. What Americans are disinclined toward are hostile cultural attitudes toward conventional masculine virtues.

 

“It is possible, then, that any growing gender traditionalism may be a reaction to societal trends and not a cause of these trends,” the authors conclude. That’s a reasonable inference, particularly given the degree to which the backlash against the popular culture the authors identify seems even more pronounced among women.

 

Citing another study conducted by the Public Religion Research Institute, the authors note that those who identify as Republicans are vastly more likely to say that “society as a whole has become too soft and feminine” than they were 15 years ago. Sixty-seven percent of men said as much in 2011. Today, nearly 80 percent say the same. But the rise is sharper among Republican-identifying women, growing from just 41 percent at the outset of the last decade to fully two-thirds of GOP-leaning women today. The authors turn to the Pew Research Center, synthesizing their data with PRRI’s findings, and they correctly note that the public — including Republicans — believe American society has either gotten the balance right when it comes to “men taking on roles typically associated with women” or isn’t “accepting enough.” But far more say that America has gotten that balance wrong than did so in 2017.

 

Some intrepid researchers, like the American Enterprise Institute’s Daniel Cox, saw this coming. He chronicled an emerging intramural dispute in which the Democratic pollsters argued over whether their party should be a welcoming place for Americans who subscribe to traditional gender dynamics. James Carville suggested that would be prudent, but his fellow Democratic pollsters disagreed. “Carville may not like it, but the Democratic Party is the women’s party,” Democratic pollster Anna Greenberg wrote. “Sixty percent of self-identified Democrats are women.”

 

That’s not an argument but a restatement of the problem Carville identified. And as Cox noted, Democrats made themselves deaf to the concerns of young men who increasingly identify as victims of misandrist prejudice. Those young men were gravitating rightward because Democrats didn’t see them as people with problems but as people who are the problem. Deliberately alienating men is the sort of politically suicidal act that only makes sense if you assume the women making up your self-inflicted electoral deficit are contemptuous of the men in their lives.

 

The Times op-ed should be read as a companion to another piece in the paper of record on some recent Pew Research Center data, which found that a decades-long trend toward secularization in the United States has abruptly reversed course.

 

“After years of decline, the Christian population in the United States has been stable for several years, a shift fueled in part by young adults,” Times religion reporter Ruth Graham observed. Those who report having no religious affiliation — once a growing demographic — has “leveled off.” Graham observes that the data depart from historical patterns in which women reliably describe themselves as more religious than men. Among the young people who are driving this new trend, “the gender gap is small or nonexistent in measures of whether they pray daily, identify with a particular religion, and believe in God.”

 

University of Notre Dame political scientist David Campbell said the shift was significant but brushed it off as more cultural than spiritual. “If you’re a young white male these days and you think of yourself as conservative, then being religious is a part of that,” he said. That possibility cannot be dismissed. Long ago, political affiliation became a substitute for identity among those without deeper attachments to their communities. Young people’s pursuit of identifying characteristics and tribal associations may be the foremost factor behind this emergent Great Awakening. But Campbell’s diagnosis is too dismissive of ongoing trends to attribute this phenomenon to young people’s desire for a costume that helps them integrate into society.

 

As I detailed in my last book, The Rise of the New Puritans: Fighting Back Against Progressives’ War on Fun, the old virtues have been making a comeback among those who were assumed to be the most hostile toward them for years. Although it was festooned with the incomprehensible jargon native to progressive academe, the movement that concealed itself with “woke” shibboleths had committed itself to re-moralizing American society.

 

It rediscovered the virtue of abnegation. It saw the value in hard work and self-sacrifice. It was contemptuous of earthly comforts if they detract from spiritual fulfillment. It rediscovered ancient truths, like the fact that socially destabilizing things can happen when men and women are encouraged to socialize in libertine environments that are also bathed in alcohol. And it applied all these lessons with a convert’s zeal to their surroundings, often to excess and in ways that persecuted and oppressed their compatriots. But at the root of the movement was disdain for their permissive elders’ licentiousness.

 

When the book was published, the youngish activist class resented the suggestion that they were resurrecting a small-“c” conservative theory of social organization. They seem much more comfortable with that reality today. Maybe Dr. Campbell is right, and the young adults who have gravitated toward Trump’s movement are merely adorning a disguise they think will help them navigate their environs. But he risks confusing a symptom of a larger social convulsion for its cause.

 

Regardless of the contributing factors, it’s hard to overlook the conclusion to which they lead: Conservatism as a lifestyle choice is increasingly en vogue

Thursday, February 27, 2025

Clipped Wings

By Nick Catoggio

Tuesday, February 25, 2025

 

Marco Rubio has a “minder.”

 

Well, maybe. That’s what HuffPost reporter Jennifer Bendery claimed back on February 5, citing a State Department source. “He has a minder, like a Trump campaign minder,” the source told her of the man now ostensibly leading the agency. “Someone in his office, not of his choosing…. They sent somebody over because he wasn’t totally within the fold.”

 

The thought of that pleases me, even though I’m no more than 50-50 on whether it’s true. In my mind’s eye I picture the “minder” as a pimply 19-year-old twerp in the same mold as Elon Musk’s DOGE henchmen. I like to imagine him having to officially approve the text whenever Secretary Marco drafts a new diplomatic communique to Russia or China.

 

A 🔥 emoji means it’s okay to send. A 💩 emoji means it’s back to the drawing board.

 

The only consolation classical liberals can expect from a second Donald Trump presidency is the schadenfreude that comes from seeing the toadies who serve him get what they deserve. The ongoing humiliation of Marco Rubio will be a delightful subplot of U.S. politics until either Trump tires of him or Rubio tires of being humiliated—almost certainly the former, as the new secretary’s willingness to be embarrassed appears limitless.

 

Some humiliations will be more enjoyable than others, though.

 

For instance, it was not fun to read in Tuesday’s Washington Post that two DOGE bros whose combined age is less than Rubio’s have begun “vetoing” USAID payments that the State Department had approved. Among them is funding for PEPFAR, which has saved millions of lives by providing HIV treatments to African countries and was lavishly praised in the past by … Sen. Marco Rubio. According to the Post, by mid-February the DOGE boys were the only officials capable of accessing the USAID payment system; with the PEPFAR funding in limbo, AIDS clinics in Africa have started shutting down.

 

That episode, while tremendously humiliating for Rubio, isn’t enjoyable at all.

 

Other reports are more fun. Last week, for example, Politico alleged that, due to their long records as Reaganite hawks, Rubio and national security adviser Michael Waltz “are under intense internal scrutiny” from “America First” Russia simps in the West Wing like Stephen Miller and Sergio Gor. A source close to Rubio said the new secretary of state “knows the knives are out for him” already, with junior diplomat Ric Grenell supposedly wielding the sharpest blade: “He knows that [Grenell] is gunning for his job and will go to Trump and demand he fires Marco the first time he says anything that contradicts the boss.”

 

None of that proves that the rumors about a MAGA “minder” watching Rubio are true. But, lord knows, it sure doesn’t contradict them either.

 

On that note, I have a question for Secretary Rubio—and for Sen. Tom Cotton and Sen. Lindsey Graham and Ret. Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, the White House’s envoy for Ukraine and Russia. All are well-known hawks, all have accommodated themselves to Trump and Trumpism, and all have now been enlisted to greater or lesser extents in the grand postliberal project of dismantling the American-led western order.

 

My question is this: What have you gotten in exchange for helping to make America, and the world, safe for autocracy?

 

The UN sellout.

 

On Monday, the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the United Nations adopted a Ukrainian resolution condemning Moscow for its aggression and demanding the return of conquered territory. Only 18 nations voted no. They were the usual “Axis of Evil” suspects—Russia and North Korea, and … the United States.

 

Later, the U.S. introduced its own resolution calling for an end to the fighting and carefully withholding any judgments about culpability. Several amendments were offered to add language critical of Russia to the text; when those amendments passed, the U.S. delegation chose to abstain rather than vote in favor of its own amended resolution.

 

“The U.N. doesn’t matter,” you might say to all that, fairly enough. In any matter of international relations, “The U.N. doesn’t matter” is a solid response.

 

But I’d turn that logic around: It’s because the U.N. doesn’t matter that the United States joining Russia in opposing Ukraine’s resolution is significant. We didn’t need to do it. Peace talks would not have collapsed if America had voted against Moscow, as the White House under both parties has been doing since the 1940s.

 

We did it because Trump wanted to do it. It was an opportunity for moral signaling and the signal he chose to send was that the U.S. no longer deems fascist expansionism as inimical to its interests. Former Dispatch-er Andrew Egger put it well: “I think UN votes are cosplay and it’s in fact notable that this administration would choose to cosplay as one of the baddies.”

 

Precisely because the vote meant so little, one might think Trump would have used it to throw Rubio, Cotton, Graham, Kellogg, and other GOP hawks a bone by supporting Ukraine’s resolution. It’d be good politics, if nothing else—most Americans hate Vladimir Putin—but it’d also be a small gesture of thanks to the many Reaganites who work so hard day after day to rationalize his authoritarianism at home and abroad.

 

Formally agreeing that Russia has been naughty was, quite literally, the least the president could have done to soothe the moral consciences of his conservative allies as he turns Ukraine upside down and shakes it until change falls out of its pockets. But in the end, he wouldn’t even do that.

 

And so I ask again: What exactly are his hawkish golfing buddies in the Cabinet and in the Senate getting in return for defending him? If courting Trump is designed to gain his trust and steer him toward supporting the Pax Americana, at what point do these people conclude that they’ve failed utterly and it’s time to rouse popular opposition to his sellout to Moscow by aggressively denouncing it?

 

Because the U.S. choosing to vote with Russia against Ukraine kind of feels like that moment.

 

The kids’ table.

 

It was Marco Rubio, of all people, who gave an interview defending America’s disgrace at the U.N. to Trumpist propaganda outlet Breitbart.

 

Rubio’s Reaganite foreign policy views used to have an intense moral component. On Tuesday, the New York Times recalled how, as a senator in 2017, he opened his questioning of Rex Tillerson, Trump’s nominee to serve as secretary of State, by confrontationally asking, “Is Vladimir Putin a war criminal?” When Tillerson dodged, Rubio scolded him: “I find it discouraging, your inability to cite that which I think is globally accepted.” The senator worried, with reason, that the new president’s interest in détente with Moscow (and the new nominee’s business relations with Russia) would lead him to whitewash Putin’s fascism.

 

That was Rubio 1.0 to the core. To lead the West against the enemies of liberalism, he believed, America needed to speak the truth about them clearly and unapologetically. “Vladimir Putin is not interested in a better working relationship with the United States,” he told an audience in 2018, per the Times. “He believes that the only way to make Russia stronger is to make America weaker.”

 

Rubio 2.0 has become the same mealy-mouthed apologist wary of antagonizing Russia that he suspected Tillerson of being in 2017. In speaking to Breitbart on Monday following the U.N. vote, he couldn’t bring himself to utter words blaming Moscow for the war; the furthest he’d go was to say that “everyone knows [who’s responsible], and you can go back and read newspaper articles over the last three years and figure out what happened.” Not only is clarity no longer a diplomatic priority for him, in fact, it’s an obstacle. “We didn’t feel it was conducive, frankly, to have something out there at the UN that’s antagonistic to either side,” he told Breitbart.

 

You can imagine the sweat droplets beading on his forehead as he said that, hoping it was anti-anti-fascist enough to satisfy Ric Grenell.

 

Needless to say, Rubio was lying. Donald Trump had no problem being “antagonistic” toward Volodymyr Zelensky when he called him a dictator last week, a criticism from which he’s conspicuously exempted Putin. And sparing Russia from blame for the war is hard to square with Trump’s typical impulse to demonstrate “strength” and “toughness” in all things. Russia is the aggressor; Russia alone can end the conflict unilaterally by laying down its arms; it stands to reason that Russia, not Ukraine, should be the target of “tough” American pressure tactics aimed at forcing a ceasefire. Why hasn’t it been?

 

Marco Rubio has spent nearly a decade trying to earn back Donald Trump’s trust, successfully enough to have landed in his Cabinet. But not only has he failed to convert Trump to hawkishness, he himself has been converted into a spin doctor muttering apologias for the very sort of amoral authoritarian power politics that he despised as a senator. “Cabinet 2.0 is likely to function as a coterie of glorified press secretaries tasked with defending the actually meaningful decisions that are made in the West Wing,” I wrote a week after the election. Isn’t that exactly what’s happened?

 

He’s not the only hawk who’s been made to seem ridiculous, though.

 

Kellogg, the president’s nominal envoy for Russia and Ukraine, was cut out of talks between the U.S. and Russia in Saudi Arabia and instead dispatched to meet Zelensky in Kyiv, at what some officials derisively describe as “the kids’ table” in peace-brokering. The White House ended up canceling a planned press conference between the two men, likely fearing that Kellogg would undermine Trump’s pro-Russian position due to his Ukraine sympathies.

 

Tom Cotton? He discovered last week how little years of loyal service matter to Trump’s supporters when a postliberal foreign policy priority is on the line. Cotton is reportedly troubled by the nomination of Elbridge Colby, who wants the U.S. to pivot away from Russia and the Middle East and toward China, for a top position at the Pentagon. But Colby is a favorite of “America First” demagogues like Charlie Kirk, who began accusing Cotton publicly of trying to sabotage Colby’s important work of “stopping the Bush/Cheney cabal at DOD.”

 

In a party in which high officials now answer to people named “Catturd,” that was too much heat for the senator. In response to the criticism, he agreed to meet with Colby and will, I assume, talk himself into supporting his nomination the same way he talked himself into supporting Tulsi Gabbard’s.

 

As for ol’ Lindsey Graham, his supposed influence over Trump’s Ukraine policy now seems to consist mainly of tweeting statements of support for Kyiv that matter not a bit to anyone and in no way reflect the sentiments of his good friend Donald.

 

It’s one thing to sell one’s soul, it’s another to sell one’s soul for nothing. To watch hawkish Republicans be sidelined by the White House or, worse, reduce themselves to mouthing anti-NATO bromides about “provocations” like some ‘70s-era commissar is to reflect on the Reaganite effort to convert Trump and wonder: Who, exactly, ended up assimilating whom?

 

Did these guys get anything policy-wise from their decade of kissing Trump’s ass?

 

Haley or Rubio?

 

“If not for the influence of hawks,” they might respond, “Trump wouldn’t have supported Ukraine as much as he did in his first term.”

 

Fair enough, I guess, if you don’t count the attempted shakedown that got the president impeached in 2019. Trump was surrounded by hawks like Mike Pence and Mike Pompeo in his first administration, and his Ukraine policy was bound to reflect that. But that was a product of circumstance: There was no “bench” of postliberal ideologues on the right at the time for him to draw from, and the slavish loyalty that defined the right-wing base hadn’t yet fully infected the Republican professional class.

 

Circumstances change. Trump now has the people he wants and his Ukraine policy has begun to reflect that. He doesn’t need to listen to hawks anymore, so he isn’t. What he’s doing instead is remaking the world order in a way that seems almost scientifically engineered to mortify the likes of Marco Rubio, Tom Cotton, and Lindsey Graham. And he dropped plenty of hints during the campaign that he was headed in that direction.

 

Why did these chumps continue to support him after he did so?

 

“If not for the influence of hawks,” they might contend, “Trump wouldn’t support Israel as staunchly.” But that’s nonsense: Israel is a priority for all but the most Tucker-ish elements of the Republican base; Reaganites, evangelicals, and nationalists keen to protect the Judeo-Christian tribe from Muslim usurpers all have their reasons for supporting the Jewish state. I’ll concede that Trump might have been less antagonistic toward Iran without Republican hawks advising him—but then, he might end up being less antagonistic than they’d like him to be regardless.

 

“If not for the influence of hawks,” they might insist, “Trump wouldn’t be as tough on China.” That’s also nonsense. Trump, the great protectionist, was treating China as the job-stealing global villain-in-chief from his early days as a candidate in 2015, and if he hadn’t been, the COVID-19 pandemic would have pointed him in that direction by now without any help from hawks. Ultimately, in fact, I think China will prove to be a better example of how little influence hawks have over the president rather than how much. When Beijing finally makes its move on Taiwan or South Korea or Japan, it’s farcical to believe that a guy who’s busy right now selling out Europe to Russia will decline to sell out further-flung liberal allies to a much more menacing military power.

 

Trump will make some sort of “great, big, beautiful deal” with the Chinese that concedes their hegemony over the Far East. And demoralized hawks like Rubio, Cotton, and Graham will dutifully do interviews with Breitbart polishing that turd to a mirror shine.

 

The real reason Republicans in Washington have made peace with an American-led authoritarian project to demolish the liberal order is simple, I think. In the end, you’re either Marco Rubio or you’re Nikki Haley. There are no other options.

 

On Monday, after the U.S. had disgraced itself at the U.N., Trump’s former U.N. ambassador tweeted her disappointment. “America has always been a pillar of freedom and democracy,” Haley wrote. “We have to have the moral clarity to know the difference between good and evil and right and wrong. We can’t blur those lines. We must choose a side, and it should never be the side of dictators.”

 

No one cared. I didn’t care, Trumpists didn’t care, leftists didn’t care. Haley’s message was correct, but insofar as it evoked any emotion, that emotion was contempt from all sides. The populist right hates her for her Reaganite outlook; the rest of us hate her for having sold out that outlook by endorsing Trump knowing full well that he would govern as he has.

 

Would you rather be her or Marco Rubio?

 

They’re both politically irrelevant. They’ve both shed every ounce of honor they possess in the course of reconciling themselves to Trump. They’re both doomed to live out their lives in a country which, day by day, they recognize less and despise more. But they took different paths at a fork in the road: Haley chose to gamble her political future by challenging Trump in last year’s primary whereas Rubio chose to remain a loyal ally of the president’s.

 

He took what I call the “money pit” approach to Trumpism. Eventually, you’ve spent so much of your dignity in defending what the right has become that the only thing to do is to keep on spending in the name of protecting your “investment.” It’s the sunk-cost fallacy, except for morals.

 

Haley’s choice led her to political oblivion; Rubio’s choice led him to the illusion of relevance. He rides around now in limousines and meets with VIPs and gives important statements to Breitbart—provided his “minder” signs off, of course—and maybe, occasionally, he influences the president’s thinking a tiny bit at the margins. Just not enough to convince him not to join the Axis of Evil or jackhammer the Pax Americana.

 

Would you rather have oblivion or the illusion of relevance? Would you rather be Mike Pence or a senator for life in a safe seat, like Cotton and Graham? Would you rather host a podcast or get to be the bagman in a world-historic attempt to extort a country fighting for its survival, like Marco Rubio?

 

Would you rather be forgotten or remembered as a villain?

 

Some men yearn to be remembered and will do what’s needed to ensure that they are, rather than join the rest of us in obscurity. That’s Rubio, Cotton, and Graham. Good news, fellas: You will be remembered. I’ll do my part to make sure of it.

 

Which Way, American Journalist?

By Charles C. W. Cooke

Wednesday, February 26, 2025

 

I see that we have the first tell-all book on “President Biden’s decline,” and the “cover-up” that followed. It’s by Jake Tapper and Alex Thompson. I expect that I’ll be annoyed by most of these books — which, in their schizophrenia, will remind me of nothing more salubrious than O.J. Simpson’s If I Did It — but I’ll reserve judgment on this one, given that, unlike the majority of his peers, Alex Thompson spent the first half of 2024 telling the truth about Joe Biden, and the second half of 2024 telling the truth about Kamala Harris. If anyone in the mainstream press has earned the right to report on Biden’s decline, it’s Thompson.

 

As for everyone else? They can shove it. Since last summer, I have talked to a good number of people who nominally work as “reporters,” and they have told me that they were genuinely “blindsided” by the White House. This, they seem to think, lets them off the hook — or even makes them the victims. I’ve never bought this for a moment. First off, I simply don’t believe a lot of them. If I could discern Biden’s condition, why couldn’t they? Heck, if supermajorities of American voters could see it, why couldn’t they? I daresay that the executive branch has some power to keep journalists off the scent. But this wasn’t exactly a classified secret or a complicated story or a detailed issue that required access. It was right there before our eyes — for three years straight. If you were fooled, it was because, at some level, you wanted to be fooled.

 

Perhaps journalists are just idiots? That’s certainly plausible. What is not plausible, however, is the implied claim that this story was treated like any other, and that the Biden administration was simply able to stay one step ahead. Over the last decade, we have learned two things beyond any doubt: (1) that if the media wants to believe or promulgate a story, as it did with the Russiagate hoax, it will do so irrespective of where the evidence stands; (2) that, when it is determined to make a splash, someone will do so without reference to the niceties of the trade. In 2012, David Corn secretly recorded a private Mitt Romney fundraiser and then released the audio. Where was the David Corn of the Biden-is-senile cycle? Was he busy that administration?

 

I hear a lot of defenses of the press’s reticence that boil down to, “Well, that was off the record.” And that’s fine, as far as it goes. But, while important, those rules do not require their adherents to attack anyone who says what they privately know or suspect to be true — as was common practice every single time someone here at National Review said that Biden was too old to be president — and they do not prevent them from writing the “on background” stories that, when a Republican is the subject, suddenly become de rigueur. At this stage, the only person in America who believes that the media faithfully follows a series of neutral rules is Brian Stelter — and he’s paid to say as much.

 

Which is to say that my view of the affair remains exactly the same as it was in the immediate aftermath of the presidential debate that tore away the curtain: There is simply no way of looking at this “failure” that does not indict everyone involved. If the press genuinely did not know, then it is staffed by people who cannot see what is in front of their noses. If the press had suspicions but did not want to investigate them for fear that it would help Donald Trump, then it is staffed by people who are corrupt and who ought never to work again as a result. And if the press knew, but felt pressured or obliged to stay quiet about it, then we are dealing with a conspiracy of world-historic proportions. I do not know what is in Tapper and Thompson’s book, but if it is not primarily an indictment of the media — coupled with some white-hot rage at the federal government for having orchestrated such a dastardly conspiracy — then it will represent a missed opportunity. At present, the media’s approval rating is about 20 percent. If, over the next two years, the press elects to forget its complicity in the ruse and dispassionately cash in on its own failure, I suspect that its popularity will soon be pushing single digits — if that.

The Myth of the ‘War That Created Israel’

By Seth Mandel

Wednesday, February 26, 2025

 

The Israeli War of Independence has no other name. This shouldn’t create much of a problem, even for anti-Zionists: they simply oppose the state that won its independence in that war.

 

But lately, the trend of discounting Israel’s existence has picked up steam in the media, which has latched onto the “nakba” narrative. Now, “nakba” is not a replacement for “Israeli War of Independence.” Nakba is a descriptive term coined by Arab intellectuals after the war for the combined Arab armies’ military defeat by Israel. (Later on, it was repurposed to refer to the flight of Arabs during the war.)

 

The fact that nakba isn’t a substitute for the war’s name poses a problem for the Western press: What does one call the war if one doesn’t want to accurately convey what one is talking about?

 

It would appear the current answer is: Call it “the war that created Israel.”

 

Now, it should be noted that this, too, is purely descriptive. So it is possible to use this phrase organically and not necessarily to signal one’s disapproval of the fact of Israel’s existence. But the context in which it is usually used makes clear that, most of the time, it is deployed in bad faith.

 

Sometimes the bad faith is overt and undisguised.

 

In the New York Times this week, Fatima AbdulKarim and Erika Solomon published a highly editorialized “report” about Israel’s current operation in and around Jenin, where Iran-backed separatists have dug in and threatened the security of both Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

 

Israel’s attempt to suppress the terrorist hive required evacuation of certain neighborhoods. (There is a dispute as to whether 14,000 or 40,000 were temporarily displaced, and a few thousand have already returned to their homes.) Although Palestinians were already returning home after three weeks, AbdulKarim and Solomon claim the displacement “evoked painful memories of the Nakba, the Arabic word that has been used to refer to the mass flight and expulsion of Palestinians during the 1948 war that created Israel.”

 

You can see from the text how awkward it would be to call the war by its name: It would make clear that the nakba has always been about the failure to destroy the Jewish nation.

 

The clunky phrase “war that created Israel” isn’t new, but it has been cropping up all over print media recently. (It is rarely used even in the written stories of broadcast news agencies like CNN and Fox.) In October, the Financial Times ran an absurd piece making the case for UNRWA—the Hamas-adjacent agency whose employees were involved in the Oct. 7, 2023 slaughter—to win the Nobel Peace Prize. In it, UNRWA is described as having a “mandate to care for Palestinian refugees from the 1948 war that created Israel.” The Financial Times had used that exact same phrasing just months earlier in reporting on UNRWA’s Hamas-connected employees.

 

In the wake of the Gazan invasion of Israel and the subsequent war it sparked, the Washington Post described the nakba as “the mass expulsion of Palestinians during the months before and after the 1948 war that created Israel,” misleading readers with every part of the sentence. It used the phrase again weeks later in a story explaining why young people were more likely to support Palestinians over Israel than previous generations. (Perhaps those young people read the Washington Post.)

 

The Guardian uses this phrasing too, in a piece whitewashing early Hamas leaders: “Its founders, such as the late sheikh Ahmed Yassin, were children of the Nakba, the Palestinian ‘catastrophe’, when about 750,000 people were forced from their homes in 1948 during the war that created Israel.”

 

Time magazine, USA Today, and others have also taken to using the phrase.

 

The problem, obviously, is not just that it’s a clunky phrase, though it is. And the problem is not just that it usually tends to spring from bad faith, thought that’s certainly not a good thing. The primary objection to it is that the phrase is, quite simply, wrong. It’s not true.

 

Attempts to annihilate the Jews in their historic homeland obviously preceded partition. Throughout the 20th century, massacres of Jews in Palestine found some success in convincing the British to forbid Jewish immigration and further land ownership, even after the Holocaust. But it did not prevent partition.

 

The United Nations partition plan passed in November 1947 and made explicit what would take place the following year: The British mandate would end and the area would be divided between Jewish and Arab sovereignty. That is indeed what happened, although Palestinian Arabs rejected a separate sovereignty of their own and the land outside of Israel was claimed instead by Egypt and Jordan.

 

On May 14, 1948, Israel declared its independence, in accordance with the agreement. In response, the surrounding Arab countries tried to murder the infant state—a theme that would come, sadly, to define the ensuing permanent Arab war on Israel.

 

The war on the State of Israel was launched after the State of Israel already existed and with the specific intent of defeating the State of Israel. “The war that created Israel” is a thing that doesn’t exist, and never has. I understand that it is painful for Western media types to acknowledge this, and I feel zero sympathy for them. The truth is the truth; speak it, or find a different industry.