By Noah Rothman
Friday, August 15, 2025
The Wall Street Journal’s reporters summoned every
ounce of their capacity for professional understatement when they called the
Trump administration’s demand to recoup 15 percent of the profits derived from
the sale of sophisticated electronics to the Chinese “unusual.”
That’s one way to describe the federal government shaking
down private companies for a vig in exchange for unlocking the formerly
restricted sale of sensitive components and resources with military
applications to a great-power rival. A less charitable observer might call it a racket.
The maneuver is an extraordinary intervention into the
private economy in ways that expand the remit of the president. It’s also an
abdication of the commander in chief’s conventional obligation to preserve U.S.
national security. Not that the American targets of Trump’s squeeze seemed to
mind. Both Nvidia and Advanced Micro Devices were more than happy to kick a
taste up to the big boss if it restored their access to the lucrative Chinese
market. They’re not alone.
On Thursday, Bloomberg revealed (and its competitors in media
subsequently confirmed) that the U.S. government is looking to secure a
stake in the high-end chipmaker Intel. “The agreement could bolster the
struggling chipmaker, which has fallen behind rivals after missing key
technology waves,” CNN reported. That’s what Intel’s shareholders seem to
think. The embattled tech company’s stock price rose by 7 percent on the news.
Intel has struggled to “gain significant share in
artificial intelligence chips” even as it spent “heavily to build its foundry
business, which manufactures chips for other companies,” CNBC reported.
“Intel’s foundry business has yet to secure a major customer.” That’s perhaps
to be expected. After all, when the government got into bed with Intel to the
tune of $7.865 billion in grants under the CHIPS Act, Uncle Sam
sought to remove the profit motive from the equation. The goal of the CHIPS Act
as a shining example of industrial policy, a sanitized euphemism for central
economic planning, was to repatriate the production of sensitive electronic
components. As a bonus, CHIPS would create thousands of new engineering and
manufacturing jobs right here at home. The legislation has been a failure on all counts. Now that Intel has gotten in bed
with the government, the feds are taking an even bigger interest in the
business. It’s a familiar, if not exactly reputable, model, and it doesn’t
end well.
Indeed, the Trump administration has sought to break down
the already far-too-permeable barrier between private enterprise and state
control in subtler ways but with a far broader array of targets. Axios reported Thursday that the president’s inner circle has
created a “scorecard that rates 553 companies and trade associations on how
hard they worked to support and promote” the One Big Beautiful Bill Act that
the president signed in July. Private companies are graded on the degree to
which they effuse praise for the bill, and it must be sincere praise. The
ranking system “helps us see who really goes out and helps vs. those who just
come in and pay lip service,” one administration official told Axios.
Of course, there are no explicit consequences for the
firms that find themselves on the “bad” side of this ledger, but no firm with
an interest in self-preservation would take the risk. Investors and
stakeholders in these companies understand the lay of the land. They know how
exposed their firms are to the executive branch’s reprisals, and they know an
activist — and vindictive — government when they see one.
Allegations of hypocrisy have never been much of an
obstacle for ambitious politicians. Today, the charge isn’t even a deterrent.
And yet, the degree to which the Trump administration is leaning into what the Journal’s
Greg Ip alleged amounts to “state capitalism” — “a hybrid
between socialism and capitalism in which the state guides the decisions of
nominally private enterprises,” as he defines it — should alarm anyone who
retains their familiarity with the tenets of market economics. In addition to
Nvidia, AMD, and now Intel, Ip throws on the pile the “golden share” of the
stake that the U.S. government will take from the sale of U.S. Steel to a
Japanese firm, as well as the “$1.5 trillion of promised investment from
trading partners Trump plans to personally direct.”
Ip does not dwell on the obvious hypocrisy in which the
Trump-led GOP is engaged. Rather, he identifies the real problem with “state
capitalism”: It doesn’t work.
No matter how enlightened the central planners might be,
they will never possess perfect knowledge of the billions of individual daily
interactions that together constitute macroeconomic activity. There has never
been any viable substitute for the price mechanism as a means of conveying
information about the marketplace. “Moreover,” the Foundation for Economic Education’s contributors observed
in 2010, “it defies human nature to assume that those who would implement state
capitalism would promote solely the general welfare, without any bias toward
shaping these institutions to benefit themselves or the special interests they
represent.”
If this all sounds like something Democrats would do,
that’s only because it is something Democrats did do. And when they did,
conservatives and free-market advocates condemned it — and not just because
it produced a woefully inefficient allocation of capital but also because it
was a naked attempt to exert political control over private interests.
The right even had a fairly ubiquitous term for it:
“gangster government.” Michael Barone, author of a book with that very title, saw
it in the Obama administration’s supposed rescue of the auto industry, in which
the rights of creditors were brushed aside “in order to pay off the Auto
Workers Union.” He and others identified it also in the Obama administration’s
efforts to intimidate health insurance providers into hiding the costs
of Obamacare — a scheme Kathleen Sebelius was foolish enough to put into
writing when she warned that “there will be zero tolerance for this type of
misinformation and unjustified rate increases.” David Freddoso, the author of another book on Obama’s
strong-arm approach to the presidency, saw it in how the administration and its
congressional allies funneled tax dollars to special interests and
well-connected firms, as well how the Obama administration wielded executive
power to challenge cultural conditions and religious precepts the left
rejected.
Democrats are loathe to revisit these precedents. They
will not concede that Obama’s expansion of the terms of political engagement
begat a Republican Party that was willing to play the same game — albeit better
and with even more retributive zeal. The right understands that dynamic almost
intuitively, but they should also internalize its logic. Bad precedents beget
worse precedents. Retribution, even the appearance of it, yields
disproportionate reprisals. They started it, might be gratifying, but it
only forestalls an inevitable reckoning with the real question: Where does
it end?
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