Monday, March 31, 2025

You Can’t Win a War on Prices

By Noah Rothman

Friday, March 28, 2025

 

To hear Donald Trump’s senior counselor for trade and manufacturing, Peter Navarro, tell it, the president’s proposal for a 25 percent tariff on imported cars and auto parts will do everything and nothing all at once.

 

The tariffs will yield a bounty of at least $100 billion in revenue to the U.S. Treasury, which will be paid not by domestic consumers but foreign producers. American automakers and repair shops will “eat” whatever additional costs are imposed on them, which, we should remember, amount to nothing. In addition, Congress will pass a retroactive tax cut to cover the zero additional costs that consumers will incur as a result of these tariffs. And none of this will contribute to inflation. It makes sense if you don’t think about it.

 

Meanwhile, in the reality the rest of us inhabit, the Trump administration is attempting to forestall the inexorable consequences of the president’s artificial trade barriers and the unnecessary economic disruption that will accompany them.

 

“When President Trump convened CEOs of some of the country’s top automakers for a call earlier this month, he issued a warning: They better not raise car prices because of tariffs,” the Wall Street Journal reported. The president himself reportedly left carmakers “rattled and worried they would face punishment if they increased prices,” but all that muscle has not repealed the laws of supply and demand.

 

“Tariffs, at any level, cannot be offset or absorbed,” one auto parts supplier mourned. “It is difficult to see how imposed tariffs over time would not have some impact on prices,” Matt Blunt, the president of the trade group that represents the largest U.S. automakers, confessed. “The math would tell you, that’s going to cost us multibillions of dollars,” an exasperated automotive executive lamented. “So, who pays for that?” Who, indeed?

 

Their frustration is understandable. Tariffs do one thing: increase the price of goods. Honest proponents of trade barriers concede as much. Sometimes, their rationale is understandable if not entirely compelling. If a country is being flooded with below-market goods from a competing country to bankrupt a domestic industry, for example, or — more parochially — some favored constituency is being muscled out of the global market by virtue of its own inefficiencies or inability to compete, appealing to tariffs makes some sense. But trade protectionism makes no sense if your objective is keeping consumer prices for targeted goods low in the near term.

 

The administration’s hostility to prices is akin to a meteorologist artificially adjusting observed air pressure because he doesn’t want it to rain. Prices are only signals, but they convey a universe of information to the consumers. What is the current demand for a product? What are the costs of the industrial inputs that go into making that product? What is the price and availability of the labor used to make that product? What incentives are compelling producers to generate and market that product? That little barcode conveys all this information and more. Governments can intervene in that process and distort the signals that producers and consumers alike intuit from prices, but that leads to undesirable second-order effects we should all hope to avoid.

 

Some historically literate observers have concluded that, if the administration followed its own logic, it would soon begin to flirt with something approximating price controls. Prudence dictates that we not rule out that prospect despite America’s unenviable experience with fixing prices, if only because posterity’s lessons appear lost on the Trump administration’s top economic minds.

 

When Richard Nixon implemented price and wage controls in 1971, the circumstances that compelled him to do so were far more dire than they are today. Inflation was rising steadily, as was unemployment. The nation’s far more robust but equally avaricious labor unions and the corporate entities that catered to them were driving up wages and, thus, consumer costs. The dollar was facing serious pressure from abroad as foreign debt holders sought to redeem their American currency holdings for gold. Voters were feeling the pressure, and they welcomed a 90-day freeze (which was later extended, dropped, and reimposed again over the course of Nixon’s presidency) on price and wage hikes — at least, initially.

 

The experiment proved a costly failure. Inflation was not “whipped,” and unemployment continued to rise. By 1973, the economic disruptions that accompanied price controls produced behaviors that were simultaneously inexplicably illogical but also entirely rational. In their masterly book, The Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World Economy, Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw detail the unanticipated costs of artificially low prices: “Ranchers stopped shipping their cattle to the market, farmers drowned their chickens, and consumers emptied the shelves of supermarkets,” the authors wrote.

 

The result of Trump’s leverage on automakers probably won’t be as dramatic as that. Still, if the White House attempts to force carmakers to swallow the new cost of utilizing the North American supply chain — which, especially for cars, is now so thoroughly integrated that total automotive autarky is hard to envision — the pain automakers are willing to absorb would still not shield consumers from the effects of price distortions. Consumers would experience shortages, fewer available options, and lower quality: all conditions that induce some predictable behaviors from consumers and producers alike.

 

“Automakers may spread that cost between U.S.-produced and imported models, cut back on features, and in some cases, stop selling affordable models aimed at first-time car buyers, as many of those are imported and less attractive if they carry a higher price tag,” Reuters reported. In the short term, carmakers that are less exposed to foreign supply chains may suffer lower revenue to crowd upstarts out of the market. In the long run, “major automakers would have to decide whether to ride out tariffs on a bet that they won’t last,” the dispatch added. But because most car and parts-makers will have to shift at least some additional costs onto consumers, “tariffs will cause annual U.S. vehicle sales to fall to a range of 14.5 million to 15 million in coming years from 16 million in 2024.”

 

All this is quite unnecessary. It’s a rejection of the hard-learned lessons Yergin and Stanislaw described. By the end of the 1970s, “what had been confidence in government knowledge was now turning to cynicism,” they observed. “The Keynesian paradigm was not what it seemed to be. It was not all that easy to manage the economy by wielding the levers of fiscal policy. In fact, it was not clear, with all the lags and uncertainties, that it could be done at all.” Thus, the stage was set for the Reagan Revolution and the triumph of supply-side economics.

 

Today, with progressives now decrying unnecessary governmental red tape and talking up the importance of increased efficiency and Republicans emphasizing aggregate demand, we’re through the looking glass. History’s lessons are, however, clear: The Trump administration can declare war on prices, but that’s like doing battle with gravity. The only question that remains is whether Trump and his allies are so ideologically committed to higher consumer costs that they’re willing to respond to the inevitable consumer backlash before that frustration produces corresponding electoral consequences.

Trump Warns Iran That Without a Nuclear Deal, ‘There Will Be Bombs’

By Jim Geraghty

Friday, March 28, 2025

 

As of Friday afternoon, there are at least five U.S. Air Force B-2 bombers at Diego Garcia. That’s a quarter of the B-2s in the fleet — a deployment that Air & Space Forces magazine characterized as “unusual”:

 

 

It’s an unusual deployment for the B-2. While Diego Garcia hosts Air Force bombers on a fairly regular basis, B-2s haven’t spent significant time there since 2020. Last August marked the first time in four years that a B-2 even touched down there when a bomber made a quick “hot pit” stop with its engines running.

 

A spokesperson for AFGSC said multiple bombers are on the island but could not comment on why they are there. An official previously said that the command “routinely conducts global operations . . . to deter, detect and, if necessary, defeat strategic attacks against the United States and its allies.”

 

Northrop B-2 Spirits are what the U.S. Air Force uses when it needs to drop very powerful bombs in a very stealthy manner. Among those very powerful bombs is the Massive Ordinance Penetrator (MOP) Bunker-Buster, a 30,000 pound bomb that is described as “the most powerful and deeply burrowing non-nuclear bunker buster on earth.” In fact, the B-2 is the only plane that can carry a MOP.

 

The MOP is exactly the sort of weapon you would use if you wanted to hit Iran’s underground nuclear facilities. On March 25, Iranian state media “showed Iranian Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Mohammad Baqeri and Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Aerospace Force commander, showing off what Iranian media said was an ‘underground missile city.’”

 

(Howard Altman of The War Zone noted that from what viewers could see in the video, “The munitions are stored out in the open in long continuous tunnels and large caverns with no, or at least limited, blast doors or separated revetments. That could result in devastating consequences should the facility be breached in an attack. The lack of these protective measures could lead to an absolutely massive chain reaction of secondary explosions.”)

 

As of May 2024, Iran has 42 declared facilities and at least 8 suspected facilities in its nuclear program.

 

The Pentagon used Diego Garcia for airstrikes against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001 and Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in 2003, and for several years afterwards.

 

Earlier this month, the Pentagon sent a second aircraft carrier to the Middle East; the USS Carl Vinson and its accompanying destroyers will join the USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group.

 

You may recall that one week after President Trump took office, the Iranian regime instructed commanders of Iran-backed militias to avoid provocative actions that could escalate regional tensions. (Apparently, the Houthis missed that memo, and you saw how that turned out for them.)

 

Back in February, Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei declared that negotiations with America “are not intelligent, wise or honorable” and that “there should be no negotiations with such a government.”

 

Undeterred, Trump reached out. In an interview with Maria Bartiromo on March 7, Trump said he had written to Khamenei: “I said, I hope you’re going to negotiate, because it’s going to be a lot better for Iran.” “There are two ways Iran can be handled: militarily, or you make a deal,” he said. “I would prefer to make a deal, because I’m not looking to hurt Iran. . . . I’m not sure that everybody agrees with me, but we can make a deal that would be just as good as if you won militarily.”

 

This weekend, the answer from Khamenei and the Iranian government was clear. They’re not interested in direct talks. “In this response, although direct negotiations between the two parties are rejected, it has been stated that the path for indirect negotiations is open,” Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said, according to Iranian state media.

 

Also over the weekend, an Iranian official talked up his country’s potential retaliation in an interview with The Telegraph:

 

A senior Iranian military official told The Telegraph that Tehran would strike the joint US-UK naval base on Diego Garcia in response to any US attack.

 

“There will be no distinction in targeting British or American forces if Iran is attacked from any base in the region or within the range of Iranian missiles,” he said on Saturday.

 

He added: “When the time comes, it won’t matter whether you’re an American, British, or Turkish soldier — you will be targeted if your base is used by Americans.”

 

Iranian state media said that Tehran would strike the Diego Garcia facility with ballistic missiles and suicide drones in retaliation for any US “hostile action against the Iranian nation”.

 

It warned: “Iran possesses adequate weapons for such an attack from its mainland, such as newer versions of the Khorramshahr missile that have an intermediate range, and the Shahed-136B kamikaze drone with a range of 4,000km [2,485 miles]”.

 

As long as that drone’s range sounds, Diego Garcia is 2,358 miles from the closest point in Iran; there are American defense experts who doubt the range and capability of Iran’s long-range attack missiles and drones. With that said, the regime in Tehran can take a lot of shots; the United States Strategic Command declared in its most recent review that Iran has built the Middle East’s largest and most diverse arsenal of conventional ballistic missiles.

 

As I discussed with Hugh Hewitt Friday afternoon, the irony is that a negotiation with Donald Trump is far and away the best opportunity the Iranian regime is ever going to get. In Trump’s first term, he negotiated with Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, and Kim Jong-un. At minimum, none of those leaders were harmed by negotiating with Trump. You could argue that Kim Jong-un got the attention and engagement he craved, at least for a while.

 

What does Iran have to lose by reestablishing relations with the U.S. and having a summit meeting? Almost nothing. They could drag out negotiations if they wanted, creating more time for enrichment. They’ve got less and less leverage. They lost their allied regime in Syria. Russia is largely tied up with Ukraine. China isn’t going to stick its neck out for them.

 

In an early morning interview with NBC News Sunday, President Trump said of Iran, “If they don’t make a deal. there will be bombing. It will be bombing the likes of which they have never seen before.”

 

Trump really loves reaching a deal that no one else could reach. If “only Nixon could go to China,” then perhaps only Trump could sign a deal with the Iranians and convince Republicans it is a good idea. And he’s not the kind of guy who gets hung up on details. First-term Trump made a huge deal about tearing up NAFTA, only to replace it with USMCA, which was “actually mostly identical to NAFTA.”

 

The fact that Iran has rejected the offer for direct talks reaffirms what many of us have suspected for decades: That in the end, the mullahs and the whole regime are so vehemently and inextricably hostile to the United States that no reasonable deal can ever be reached with them. All of that “death to America” chanting isn’t for show. Or perhaps now that they’ve spent more than four decades chanting that, and demonized (quite literally) America so intensely, they’ve boxed themselves in and can’t turn around and make a deal with the Great Satan, even when a good deal is on the table.

 

I am fond of looking back at Fareed Zakaria’s June 2009 cover piece for Newsweek declaring, “Everything you know about Iran is wrong,” asserting that Iran didn’t really want to build nuclear weapons, that the regime isn’t suicidal, that the regime “behaves in a shrewd, calculating manner, advancing its interests when possible, retreating when necessary,” and that the country isn’t a dictatorship. It turns out that almost everything Zakaria knew about Iran was wrong, and that many of the Iran experts urging engagement were seeing what they wanted to see — that is, when they weren’t advising the U.S. government while being on Tehran’s payroll.

 

ADDENDUM: Yesterday on Fox News Sunday, Trump White House senior counselor for trade and manufacturing Peter Navarro once again insisted “tariffs are tax cuts.” Credit Jeff Blehar for recalling that just last summer, JD Vance said in an interview with Ross Douthat, “Well, as the libertarians always say, a tariff is a tax.”

Is the Trump Administration Sabotaging Its Own Peace Deal?

By Noah Rothman

Friday, March 28, 2025

 

On Monday, the Trump White House announced that it had reached separate but contingent agreements with Ukraine and Russia to pause their respective attacks on each other’s maritime and civilian energy targets. In exchange, the White House agreed to provide Russia with sanctions relief. Ukraine, by contrast, got little more than constraints on its ability to execute some of its most effective asymmetrical operations against Russian targets. But that agreement, if there ever was an agreement, was not to last.

 

In a Friday statement from Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, Moscow announced that it reserves the right to resume strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. The statement was unnecessary. Russia had already resumed its attacks on Ukrainian civilian energy installations. Moscow insists it is merely responding to the shelling of a gas-metering station near the front lines in Russia’s Kursk Oblast, but Kyiv denies the claim and insists its firepower is used “exclusively against military targets of the Russian occupation army.” Regardless, the limited cease-fire, such as it was, is off.

 

America’s allies in Europe had warned Trump to expect as much. “The collective view is that Russia is playing games, that Putin is back to his old playbook,” British Prime Minister Keir Starmer told reporters this week. Still, he and the rest of the 27 European leaders who gathered in Paris to present a united front in opposition to Moscow’s territorial expansionism put on a brave face. “President Trump is waiting for a clear answer from the Russians,” French President Emmanuel Macron posited. “If he has the clear message the Russians are not coming [to the negotiating table], he will feel deceived, betrayed. And he would have to react.”

 

That’s an optimistic outlook. If the administration experiences any frustration when confronted with Russian recalcitrance and duplicity, that emotion has consistently produced only additional pressure on Ukraine. The latest example of that tendency is particularly egregious.

 

For weeks following Trump’s second inauguration, his administration muscled Ukraine into accepting an onerous agreement compelling Kyiv to provide the U.S. with at least 50 percent of the revenue it derives from the exploration of its mineral and hydrocarbon deposits — now and in the future. “That,” Vice President JD Vance explained, “is a way better security guarantee than 20,000 troops from some random country that hasn’t fought a war in 30 or 40 years.” Kyiv agreed, although with deep and understandable reluctance (politics happens in other countries, too).

 

Over the weekend, though, the United States suddenly insisted that the deal it had muscled into existence was no longer good enough. According to the Financial Times, Washington’s new proposal would compel Ukraine to submit “all mineral resources, including oil and gas, and major energy assets across the entire Ukrainian territory” to a joint investment fund with the United States, over which Washington retains control and veto power. Again, Washington withheld the promise of security guarantees even if Ukraine complied with this monumental demand.

 

The Ukrainian sources with whom FT’s reporters spoke bristled at the deal, calling it “unfair” and the equivalent of “robbery.” They suspect that the proposal — a recipe for a slightly milder form of colonialism than the one on offer from Russia — is designed to be rejected. Why would the Trump administration erect obstacles before Ukraine’s compliance with the peace deal the White House insists it so desires if not to scuttle the project while securing a plausible narrative that allows the administration to blame Kyiv for its failure?

 

All this suits Moscow just fine. Indeed, sensing its new freedom of action, Vladimir Putin’s regime has only grown bolder. “Just recently, I said that we will push through,” Putin said while reviewing Russian troops on Friday in Archangelsk. “There are grounds to think that we will finish them off,” he said of the Ukrainians. Indeed, Putin is already speculating openly that the process over which Trump is presiding should give way to a United Nations–administered provisional authority governing the whole of Ukraine. “Only then” should there be “peace negotiations,” the Russian autocrat averred.

 

That’s a big ask, but why shouldn’t the Kremlin press its advantage — both on the battlefield and in negotiations with its pliant American counterparts? It’s hard to avoid Putin’s determination that there is nothing he can do that would exhaust Trump’s patience with Moscow. In his pursuit of a lopsided peace in Europe that favors Russia, Putin has ample evidence to conclude that Washington is on his side.

The Vibe Shift Hits Hollywood

By Ross Douthat

Thursday, March 27, 2025

 

Let’s not talk about Snow White, the Disney artistic dud and box office disappointment. The only interesting thing about the movie is the political conceit that gave it shape, the theory that the American cultural inheritance can be ideologically cannibalized indefinitely, so that a company like Disney can keep getting rich off its own past while making “equity” rather than truth or beauty the measure of all things.

 

Guess what? It can’t. While Snow White was meeting harsh reviews and audience indifference, my New York Times colleague Ezra Klein was interviewing the Democratic pollster David Shor about the 2024 election, and both were marveling at the indicators that young people are moving right, with Gen Z “becoming potentially the most conservative generation that we’ve experienced maybe in 50 to 60 years.”

 

This is not just a political fact; it’s a commercial one as well. Throughout the first Trump presidency, as the Great Awokening rolled over Hollywood, movie big shots could tell themselves that by disappearing potentially problematic tropes and genres (romances in Disney movies, romance generally, traditional male action heroes, broad and potentially offensive comedy, historical dramas with too many white people), they were just pivoting to where the younger generation expected them to be, and keeping themselves viable in the age of endless TikTok and YouTube competition.

 

But if the younger generation isn’t actually defined by its super-progressive elements, if Generation Z is recoiling from the woke maximum, if young men especially are never going to show up for woke cinema, then as of 2025, commercial self-interest should be dictating a real pivot. And certainly Hollywood has executed pivots in the past: You need only contrast 1970s cinema with the movies of the 1980s and 1990s to see how a political vibe shift can alter cultural production.

 

So, if studio heads had any sense, they would be studying that not-so-distant past. The formulas involved are not very complicated, and don’t require some kind of stark return to 1950s values. The Disney renaissance that began with The Little Mermaid, for instance, was achieved through the straightforward idea that you could take traditional fairy tales and adapt them with light-touch rather than heavy-handed modernizations. (Beauty and the Beast, too, managed to give Belle an extra dose of female agency and use its villain to satirize machismo — but all within a still deeply traditional fairy-tale structure.)

 

Likewise, it shouldn’t be that hard to recover the spirit of the action movies of the 1980s and 1990s; the most successful Hollywood action blockbuster of the post-Covid era, Top Gun: Maverick, did just that. The action vehicles of the Reagan era already had plenty of minority stars and active female characters; they just weren’t imprisoned by the schematics of diversity. You could have a female action hero, but it had to feel earned — which is why the best examples were in sequels: Linda Hamilton in Terminator 2 and Sigourney Weaver in Aliens, where you could see the unusual pressures that made them so violent and tough.

 

More important, alongside action heroes who weren’t as omnicompetent as John Wick or Jason Bourne, you could have a strong female lead who wasn’t a Strong Female Lead™ — who served as a complement and counterpoint to the male star, such as Bonnie Bedelia’s corporate mom in Die Hard or Sandra Bullock’s harried commuter in Speed, in a way that made the action movie feel like a slice of life rather than a dose of total unreality.

 

Finally, any aspiring vibe shifter should study the lost art of the Hollywood comedy. As the conservative cultural critic Peachy Keenan noted recently, you know we’ve reached levels of severe comedic deprivation when a movie like the Best Picture–winning Anora gets widely described as a “screwball comedy.” It is a genuinely funny film — I laughed out loud more than I usually do at the movies nowadays — but it’s funny inside a frame of realism; its humor is in the service of a gritty drama. It’s not funny in the same sense as Tootsie or Mel Brooks or Ivan Reitman or the Farrelly Brothers, or the Vince Vaughn–Owen Wilson run, or Bridesmaids and The Hangover from 2009 and 2011, respectively — the last hits of their kind.

 

Comedy, especially, requires a real political shift to recover, since it thrives in all the touchy areas of human life: ethnic differences, class differences, sex differences, all the embarrassments that surround cultural and physical embodiment. And a pessimist about the future of the movies would say that it isn’t just wokeness that’s rough on comedy; it’s the general retreat from embodied existence that characterizes digital and virtual life. You aren’t going to leave your house to go to the movies to laugh along with people suffering real-world pratfalls and embarrassments and sexual humiliations if you aren’t willing to risk experiencing those things yourself.

 

That’s the dark scenario for cinema, and indeed for humanity. But even if that’s where we’re headed, a Hollywood vibe shift would be a way for the industry to go down fighting — whereas every new movie like Snow White is an act of premature surrender.

Sunday, March 30, 2025

Commanding His Own Reality

By Jonah Goldberg

Friday, March 28, 2025

 

Greetings from the parking lot of the town hall in Dumfries, Virginia. Feel free to leach some of the excitement and glamour from the pundit’s life. I’ve got plenty to spare.

 

What I don’t have is time to spare. I’m driving (not at this exact moment—safety first!) to Williamsburg for a talk to the freedom conservatives. They often go by the sobriquet “FreeCons.” I thought this was a risky name given how it can be read as “Freak On”—as in let’s bust out some Hayek and get our FreeCon.

 

Wordplay! Nerd humor!

 

Speaking of both, the other day I was on TV talking about the economy or trade or some such. Donald Trump had recently boasted that egg prices have come way down, thanks to him, of course.  And you know what? They have. At the beginning of the month they hit a record of $8.17 a dozen and have since dropped almost 50 percent to just below 5 bucks. Now, the reason this has happened is complicated and has much less to do with administration policy than Trump claims. The main reason is that people adjusted to the high prices and so demand dropped, which gave producers time to rebuild their flocks after culling a millions of hens because of bird flu.

 

One thing the administration is doing is importing a lot more eggs, from Turkey, Brazil, and possibly the EU, which gets me to my self-indulgent wordplay. I pointed out, sarcastically, that the administration seems to understand that importing eggs will help lower the cost of eggs. But they seem to understand this only about eggs. It is, I said, an “eggcentric” trade policy.

 

Eyes rolled. Groans were heard.

 

But here’s the thing: That’s fantastic wordplay—if I do say so myself—because it is both literally and figuratively true. Figuratively, I was playing off the word “eccentric,” which means unusual or weird behavior or an unusual or weird person. “I know it’s weird that Todd eats the wrapper on his Filet-o-Fish, but he’s just a harmless eccentric.”

 

Etymologically eccentric comes from Ptolemaic astronomy (The Greek ek means “outside of” and  kentron means “center” or “centric”).  A body with an eccentric orbit is one with an “orbit not having the Earth precisely at its center.”

 

But it’s also literally true. It is an egg-centric view of trade. Apparently, the laws of supply and demand apply only to eggs.

 

And if you still don’t think that’s great wordplay: Screw you, that’s gold! Don’t be so hard-boiled.

 

I should note eggsperts say the administration plan probably won’t help too much with lowering the price of eggs. Not because the idea wouldn’t work, but because the administration isn’t importing enough eggs. America produces more than 100 billion eggs per year, and the Department of Agriculture is looking at bringing in hundreds of millions of eggs, mostly from Turkey, Brazil, and South Korea. That’s not chicken feed—though technically it started out that way (think about it!)—but it’s probably not enough. Also, these foreign eggs won’t be sold at the stores, they’ll be used by industrial bakers. But in theory importing enough would free up domestic production for retail.

 

I didn’t know all this stuff when I cracked my golden “eggcentric” bon mot, but the point remains. If you think importing more eggs lowers the price of eggs, maybe that’s true of, you know, other stuff too.

 

Here come wages and price controls?

 

I don’t like to make public predictions. The unwritten rule for pundits is to caveat their predictions in percentages. I think there’s a 70 percent chance that so-and-so wins his primary. Or: There’s an 80 percent likelihood that we have a recession. This way, you get most of the benefit of making a prediction, but on the off chance you’re wrong, you’re covered. Though it is nice when you’re proven right. I think the last time I made an outright prediction, it was that Joe Biden would pardon his son.

 

So it’s not without trepidation that I predict Trump will try some kind of price controls. One reason I’m willing to put on my Carnac turban (which makes me look quite eccentric in this parking lot) is that he’s already doing it.

 

First of all, tariffs are a kind of backdoor price control because they artificially inflate the price of imported goods, indirectly setting a minimum price level in the domestic market. Contrary to what we hear from Trump, tariffs don’t automatically lower the prices of domestically produced goods and commodities. They more often just lead to higher prices, period. If tariffs made domestic stuff cheaper, why not tariff foreign eggs?  When Trump announced his steel tariffs, domestic producers raised their prices, too.

 

But this is too much in Scott Lincicome’s wheelhouse.

 

So let me back up. As Yuval Levin and I discussed on the Remnant this week, the big-picture theme of the second Trump administration so far is that he is waging an all-fronts battle on restraints on his power and freedom of action.

 

This is a hugely important point that a lot of folks on the right are not grappling with very well, me included. The tendency is to break things down into categories like “good Trump” and “bad Trump” as we judge each controversy on its individual merits. There’s much to recommend this approach. It’s the grown up, judicious approach and it’s a bulwark against the more rabid tendency to assume the worst, ignore inconvenient evidence, and refuse to acknowledge that there are good arguments for some things he does.

 

So, what’s the problem with taking each tree for what it is and ignoring the forest?  The problem is the forest matters too. Trump’s invocation of the Alien Enemies Act, his scurrilous and sinister war of intimidation against law firms, his relentless pursuit of firing potential dissenters and installing loyalists—many appallingly unqualified for the job—throughout the government speaks to his actual motivations and worldview. Dividing everything into Good Trump and Bad Trump is an artificial distinction imposed on the organic whole of Trump. A Unified Field Theory of Trump ignores this artificial distinction.

 

Let’s do this Hannibal Lecter style.

 

Hannibal Lecter: First principles, Clarice. Read Marcus Aurelius. Of each particular thing, ask: What is it in itself? What is its nature? What does he do, this creature you seek?

 

Clarice Starling: He says crazy things?

 

Hannibal Lecter: No! That is incidental. What is the first and principal thing he does? What need does he serve by saying crazy things?

 

Clarice Starling: Attention? Adoration?

 

Hannibal Lecter: No: He craves. That’s his nature. And what does he crave? Make an effort to answer.

 

Clarice Starling: Praise?

 

Hannibal Lecter: No! He wants to dominate! To be seen as the master of things.

 

The whole Trump wants reality to cooperate with him and when it doesn’t, his instinct is to assume that sinister anti-Trump forces are responsible. When it comes to economics, this view is traditionally associated with the left. Remember “Greedflation”? This was the idea that inflation wasn’t real and that evil corporations were raising prices when they didn’t have to.

 

As Dominic Pino wrote a few weeks ago, Republicans are already laying the groundwork for their own version of greedflation. Trump and his surrogates have insisted—despite all evidence—that foreign countries will absorb the cost of tariffs to retain access to our market. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent flatly predicted that China will “eat any tariffs that go on.” Well, as Pino noted, that’s not what happened with Trump’s first-term tariffs. And if it was true, the benefit of tariffs would be negligible because Americans would just keep buying Chinese stuff.

 

The Wall Street Journal reported yesterday:

 

When President Trump convened CEOs of some of the country’s top automakers for a call earlier this month, he issued a warning: They better not raise car prices because of tariffs.

 

Trump told the executives that the White House would look unfavorably on such a move, leaving some of them rattled and worried they would face punishment if they increased prices, people with knowledge of the call said.

 

In other words, he’ll treat these companies the way he’s treating various law firms. Trump’s 25 percent  tariffs on foreign cars—including cars made by American companies in Canada and Mexico—will undoubtedly and incontrovertibly raise costs for automakers for myriad reasons. And Trump is suggesting he will punish firms that pass those costs onto consumers. In other words, while he hopes Chinese firms will eat increased costs, he’s demanding that American firms do it.

 

At some point they will not be able to. Then what? Well, lots of things. But let’s stay on point. Trump cannot tolerate the idea that he’s wrong about tariffs (or anything else). As a result, when reality proves him wrong, he will not confess error and embrace free trade. I mean this is the guy who tried to float the idea that the Access Hollywood tape was faked. He’ll say the price increases are a conspiracy to hurt him, to increase profits, or both. And then he will look for ways to set prices to where they “should” be if sinister forces weren’t undermining him.

 

Donald Trump is not an autocrat, not because he doesn’t want to be one, but because our system is designed to thwart autocrats. He’s trying to hack that system. But fixing prices is what autocrats, and people with autocratic personalities or ideologies, always try to do. Right now, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is giving it whirl. Earlier this month he issued price controls on 30 different foodstuffs and accused supermarkets of price gouging (aka “greedflation”). “Prices don’t rise, they are raised,” he declared. This isn’t just a necromantic incantation intended to make Friedrich Hayek spin in his grave, it’s the kind of thing people do when they are drunk on power and think reality is theirs to command.

 

I am comfortable with my prediction that Trump will eventually try to do something similar. Fortunately, he doesn’t have the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 to empower him the way Richard Nixon did. But I have every confidence his lawyers will find some pretext, perhaps the Defense Production Act (which Harry Truman used to seize steel mills).

 

There are only two ways I think I could be wrong. First: if he backs off tariffs entirely for fear of tanking the stock market (and I have no doubt he’d accuse the stock market of being in on the anti-Trump conspiracy). Second: if Congress actually grows a spine and stops him (stop laughing). But if he follows through on his cockamamie trade theories, economic reality will deliver a harsh verdict. And then the war on economic reality will really go into overdrive.

Yes, Recognize the Unique British Contribution to Slavery — Ending It

By Mike Coté

Sunday, March 30, 2025

 

Since its establishment in the 1750s, the British Museum has been the cultural institution at the heart of the United Kingdom. Intended to cover all aspects of study, from history to science, it was always meant to be open to visitors from all across the world. It has evolved with the times, shifting based on developments in human knowledge and collecting a smorgasbord of cultural and historical artifacts from civilizations throughout mankind’s past. It is simply astounding in the breadth and depth of its collections and exhibits. But now, progressive activists wish to add one more permanent display to this cornucopia of culture: a dedicated section lambasting Britain for its role in the African slave trade.

 

The museum is currently undergoing a major renovation, expanding its galleries and reorienting many of its exhibits. The plan is to bring the institution into the 21st century as a place where visitors can experience the sum total of world knowledge in the novel ways in which we can explore it today. Technological integration, changes in how artifacts are displayed, and physical expansion will help accomplish that mission and allow the museum to fulfill its original purpose long into the future. This much-needed renovation, however, is being targeted by left-wing political activists who see it as an opportunity to weave their favored ideology into the fabric of the organization.

 

The Good Law Project, a progressive group linked with social-justice causes and anti-Brexit activism, is the driving force behind the “No Room for Slavery” project, which seeks to commit the British Museum to create a permanent exhibit about the country’s role in the transatlantic slave trade. It argues that Britain played a uniquely pernicious part in the trade in humans that characterized the early modern era and that this reading of history should be ensconced in the nation’s preeminent museum. The project is also backed by the racial justice organization The World Reimagined. Both of these groups gained significant resources — including government funding — in the wake of the 2020 “racial reckoning,” and they are using them to push this ideology into all facets of British life. The British Museum is a ripe target, especially during this restructuring.

 

The activists claim that it is necessary to properly educate British citizens about the “awkward truths” of their past to help avoid “racist violence.” They say that cultural institutions must ensure that the progressive conception of British history, one focused on the purported evils of the imperial past, is the dominant vision of the “national story.” The campaign’s frontman, a former Labour MP candidate, said that:

 

What is currently on display at the British Museum is an inadequate representation of the history of British involvement in the trade of enslaved Africans. . . . This is not about moralising, being right or wrong, or introducing something that is contested; our calls are for a clear, comprehensive and permanent exhibit to present this defining period of our national story.

 

The campaign paid for a survey which found, unsurprisingly based on its phrasing, that 53 percent of respondents thought a permanent exhibit on Britain’s role in slavery was appropriate and 66 percent saw the British Museum as having a role in educating the public about the topic.

 

The British Museum should listen to public sentiment by creating a permanent exhibit about Britain’s unique part in the slave trade. But it should do so in a way that is historically accurate. If they focused on the most important British contributions to global slavery, the result would be extremely useful in educating a public that lacks such an understanding: Britain was not special in participating in slavery, but it was in ending it.

 

Nearly every human civilization engaged in some form of human bondage. European empires and Western Hemisphere states during the early modern period were no exception. The Arab slave trade, bringing in captives from sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, and Europe, lasted for over 1,000 years and was profoundly brutal. Ancient Roman slavery involved horrendous conditions where slaves would be worked to death within a matter of months. Slaves built the pyramids of Egypt, the temples of India and China, and the cities of Mesoamerica. Slaves were used as field labor, conscripted soldiers, sexual playthings, and human sacrifices. People held slaves of the same race, as well as different ones. They sold and bought their own just as much as they did outsiders. Humanity was defined by this horrific institution for thousands of years. The British Museum holds artifacts from many of these societies; should each be contextualized by explaining their relation to the universal institution of slavery?

 

If one wishes to examine the truly unique aspect of Britain’s involvement with slavery, the outcome is the exact opposite of that which the “No Room for Slavery” advocates promote. Instead of showing Britain as just another force for evil that requires modern-day recompense, it would prove that the British Empire did far more than any other society or power in world history to end the scourge of human bondage for good.

 

Abolitionism — the idea that slavery is a moral stain on mankind and that it should be legally forbidden and physically excised — was a creation of Britain itself. Both reason-loving philosophers and morality-focused religious nonconformists argued against slavery in the 1700s, when such sentiments were anything but widespread in Europe and practically nonexistent in the rest of the world. By the turn of the 19th century, abolitionism was a popular cause, with upwards of 30 percent of British men signing antislavery petitions. Led by men like William Wilberforce and groups like the Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade, their efforts succeeded, with parliament outlawing the trade in 1807. Britain was the first nation to do this in a durable fashion, and given its immense maritime strength and trading interests, it was the most important one to make that choice.

 

Over the next decades, British abolitionist sentiment grew even more popular and muscular, especially as the institution lingered on in the colonies. The planters living in these colonies had significant legal autonomy within the Empire and did everything they could to slow the dissolution of slavery, refusing attempts by parliament to phase it out. After decades of intransigence, the metropole became fed up and passed the Slavery Abolition Act, which, on August 1, 1834, freed every slave within the British Empire. This piece of legislation emancipated millions of men, women, and children from the chains of bondage; it was perhaps the greatest immediate boon to human freedom in world history.

 

This was not economically beneficial for the Empire. The trade was still quite profitable upon its destruction in 1807, and enslavement itself was a lucrative proposition through emancipation in 1834. Unfree labor allowed for cheaper commodities, more accessible foodstuffs, and a higher standard of living for the nascent middle classes of Europe. Yet these benefits were discarded because Britons thought slavery a moral evil. British trade with its prosperous Caribbean colonies declined significantly after the prohibition of human importation, which itself took place during the height of the Napoleonic Wars. Instead of waiting until after the defeat of their greatest foe, London pulled the trigger on abolition at the peak of a highly taxing global conflict. Such was the moral importance of the abolition movement that it even superseded the imperatives of national security and economic prosperity.

 

Britons were dissatisfied with merely ending their participation in the slave trade and their citizens’ ability to hold men in bondage. They wanted to destroy this evil institution everywhere and forever. Such a moral crusade had never before been attempted, and the British threw their entire military, economic, and diplomatic might behind the effort. The world’s largest navy used a full 13 percent of its total manpower pursuing this objective. It bombarded forts (e.g., Lomboko), seized ships (e.g., HMS Pickle‘s victory over the Voladora), and forced various governments to abolish the trade. Britain used military force against Brazil and several African polities, including Lagos and Zanzibar, as well as areas deeper inside the continent. It ended slavery in Sudan and Egypt, forbade it in India, and eliminated the practice in Malaysia and Indonesia. When it made treaties with neutral parties in places like Central Asia, it cajoled the leaders to emancipate slaves and cease trading in humans.

 

Indulging local customs around human bondage would have been far easier to extend British governance and arrange more favorable economic deals, but the moral imperative was more important. Britain rarely sought to reach into the heart of Africa, preferring to ply its trade along the more lucrative and established coasts, yet expended a great deal of men and materiel penetrating deep inland to cut off the source of slaves for export and punish their captors. Britain would have been much better off with the key statelets along the approaches to India had they ignored their involvement in enslavement. But they insisted on radical reform and often lost these Great Game competitions to the Russians as a result. Not only did they incur military and geopolitical costs in support of this tenacious anti-slavery stance, they spent incredible sums of money in the process.

 

The historian David Eltis tried to account for the costs of the naval suppression of the transatlantic trade and found that the British spent the equivalent of more than £1.25 billion per year for over 50 years on quashing worldwide slavery. According to his calculations, “by any more reasonable assessment of profits and direct costs, the nineteenth-century costs of suppression were certainly bigger than the eighteenth-century benefits.” Broader calculations made by the historians Chaim Kaufmann and Robert Pape — including not only naval costs but lost business opportunities and increased tariffs against slave-labor-produced commodities — found that the suppression of the transatlantic trade over the period from 1808–1867 cost the British “roughly 1.8 percent of national income.” That is nearly equivalent to the percent of GDP most European nations spend on their defense today. Kaufmann and Pape wrote that this British effort against slavery was “the most expensive example [of costly international moral action] recorded in modern history.”

 

Unfortunately for the activists, history is not on their side. The British Empire indeed participated in slavery, as did nearly every organized society across all of human existence. However, the unique aspect of Britain’s role in this despicable human institution was not the fact that it engaged in trade during the 17th and 18th centuries; it was the truth that it led the world in suppressing and destroying this historic and universal evil. Britain was the font of abolitionism and the first major nation to end enslavement in any durable and systematic way. It sought to end the scourge of human bondage worldwide, spending enormous sums of economic and human capital to do so. In the meantime, it undermined its own pecuniary and geopolitical interests, alienating important constituencies at home and abroad to do the right thing. It was largely alone in this quest, yet it made abolition a primary goal of what was then the greatest and most powerful empire on the planet.

 

The British Museum should absolutely take this incredible opportunity to create a permanent exhibit on the unique part that Britain played in the universal stain of human enslavement. If done properly and in accordance with historical fact, the exhibit would be a triumphant telling of the Empire’s immense sacrifices to end this evil once and for all. That may not appease the activists, but it would do justice to the truth of the past. And what else is a museum for?

No, People Aren’t Being ‘Kidnapped’ or ‘Disappeared’

By Rich Lowry

Sunday, March 30, 2025

 

When is a lawful arrest a kidnapping?

 

The detention of a Tufts graduate student by immigration agents went viral last week after it was caught on video.

 

The woman, Rumeysa Ozturk, a Turkish national, was approached by plainclothes, masked agents on a sidewalk near her apartment building in Somerville, Mass.

 

She was, understandably, confused and scared, especially by an agent’s initial approach, and the Left has called her detention a “disappearing,” “abduction,” or “kidnapping.”

 

Chris Hayes of MSNBC declared the arrest “as flatly authoritarian as anything we have ever seen in the United States,” making it apparently as bad as the internment of Japanese Americans in World War II, the Trail of Tears, and chattel slavery.

 

In the video, which was captured by a bystander, the woman is approached by a man in a hoodie and baseball cap who obstructs her path and starts grabbing her wrists. We can’t hear what he’s saying, but she is clearly very frightened and doesn’t know what’s going on. One critique of the arrest is that she had no way of knowing that the plainclothes agents were legitimate authorities.

 

But, even if the first agent didn’t announce himself (he may well have and we just can’t hear it), a second agent with a badge around his neck quickly approaches. And then a female agent enters who tells Ozturk what is happening and repeatedly reassures her.

 

As she’s being cuffed and led to the waiting car, an agent can be heard saying, “I understand it’s scary.”

 

Why were the agents masked, which we aren’t used to seeing? Because DHS agents are being doxxed.

 

Why was she “snatched” off the sidewalk? Presumably the agents had an administrative warrant that didn’t provide for entry into her apartment.

 

And would that really be any better? Any arrest involves taking someone away against his or her will, which is always going to be, at the very least, unsettling for the arrestee.

 

Usually when we talk about a controversial arrest, it involves throwing someone to the ground or using some other force that is excessive or perceived as excessive. In this case, DHS agents might — I emphasize might — have better identified themselves at the very outset, but unquestionably behaved professionally and treated with respect someone who was stunned at what was happening to her.

 

Immediately, left-wing activists and commentators described her detention in terms that apply to an act of criminality, or the work of a dictatorial state that grabs people off the streets, puts hoods over their heads, and sends them to torture chambers.

 

Instead, the United States government, which has sovereign control of its borders and allows selected people, as a privilege, to come here on visas for a specific purpose, revoked her visa.

 

Ozturk isn’t “disappeared.” It’s true that she was walking to a meal at one moment, and then at another moment wasn’t — again, that’s inherent to any arrest. But after an initial period when her family and attorneys reportedly had trouble finding out where she was, everyone now knows that she is in a facility in Alexandria, La. We can assume she will have ample legal representation in a case that achieved instant notoriety.

 

It’s also important to acknowledge that, whatever happens, she’s not going to go to Leavenworth. The question is whether she’s staying here, or going home. As someone who believes this is the greatest country in the world, I can understand that being in the United States is preferable to being anywhere else, but there are much worse fates than to go home to live your life however you please (and agitate against Israel however you please).

 

That said, if Ozturk’s only offense was, as has been suggested in news accounts, co-authoring an anti-Israel op-ed, this case might be tougher for the administration than the Mahmoud Khalil case.

 

Since she hasn’t been abducted or disappeared, though, the process will work itself out under our laws.

 

The lurid terms applied to the case are another indication that the Left, at bottom, doesn’t accept that borders are legitimate and our nation gets to decide who comes here and who doesn’t in keeping with our national interests.

Here on Lost Island

By Abe Greenwald

Friday, March 28, 2025

 

Earlier this week on the podcast, Matt Continetti noted the degree to which Donald Trump is turning his second presidency into a TV show. I then added that Trump is really producing several shows in addition to his own, and he’s casting them with assorted figures from the administration. At least one of them is on the air at any given moment. Trump is the star of the Executive Order Hour and Tariff Time, but there’s also Witkoff’s World, the Rubio Roundup, Divesting with DOGE, and so on.

 

Trump, being the master programmer that he is, knows what gets viewers to come back for more. Which is partially why all these shows seem to be perpetual cliffhangers: Will he or won’t he slap on the new tariffs? Will the court rule against the latest deportation effort? Will the administration defy the judge? Will Putin say yes to a deal? Will Musk reveal his work? To find out the answer to these and other questions, tune in next time.

 

The president likes to whet the public appetite for the next big reveal—which often ends up being another tease. But as I say, that’s only a part of what’s going on here. Maybe the cliffhanger strategy is disguising the fact that we’re in another genre altogether. Seeing the Trump shows play out, I’m starting to get the feeling that we’re watching what we could call Lost TV, after the thrilling show whose creators nonetheless had no idea what story they were telling or where it was headed. The aimlessness of Lost frustrated a lot of viewers, but its success inspired many copycats. It now seems clear that Severance is one.

 

And so, I suspect, are the Trump shows.

 

In the Lost genre, nothing gets resolved. As one question goes unanswered, two more are raised to divert the viewer’s attention. What happened to the Canada-statehood plotline? Never mind, JD Vance is headed to Greenland now. So we paused tariffs on Canadian and Mexican goods? That was weeks ago, we’ve got a 25 percent tariff on cars coming up. If DOGE got rid of 24,500 federal workers, why are they back? Let it go, Elon Musk found a $1 billion wasted on a useless park survey. Hey, wasn’t Putin ready for peace a few episodes ago? Peace-shmeace, he prayed for Trump and gave him an oil painting.  Whatever came of that mineral deal? It’s in rewrites, but Zelensky is now a good guy, by the way. What’s the latest on the Trump Gaza plan? Haven’t heard much, but Steve Witkoff thinks that Hamas might not be “intractable.” Wasn’t that Columbia Hamas supporter supposed to be out of the country by now? It hit a speedbump, but they’re rounding up a lot more troublemakers. How is inflation supposed to go down with a trade war looming? Forget that, Hyundai is building a new plant in Georgia. And on it goes.

 

To be fair, statecraft isn’t screenwriting, and no administration knows where the plot is headed. And we are little more than two months into the new administration. But this is ridiculous. Everything is up in the air, and nothing comes back down. This is what happens when you rely on executive orders, outside advisers, and sheer impulse to enact sweeping change. All those EOs are floating in space waiting for legal clearance to land. And Elon Musk and Steve Witkoff are taking one step forward and two steps back as they try to get their bearings. The Trump storylines will resolve at some point, but they’ve largely been taken out of the administration’s hands. Courts will rule and foreign leaders will decide on peace or war.

 

In the meantime, we’ll keep watching the Trump shows as if they’re going to satisfy our questions. Because with so much hanging off so many cliffs, we can’t afford to tune them out.

Saturday, March 29, 2025

Free Trade Is How You Live Your Life

By Dominic Pino

Thursday, March 27, 2025

 

Every free trader has heard it: Sure, we’d all love for there to be free trade, sounds nice in theory, but in the real world it can’t happen. Supposedly free trade is a utopian position, and protectionism is the pragmatic, realistic alternative.

 

This common framing of the issue of international trade is exactly backward. Protectionism is a utopian theory based on the assumptions that individuals and businesses will act contrary to their self-interest, government will act in the national interest, and special interests will stay on the sidelines. Free trade is how you live your everyday life.

 

In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith endeavored to show how people acting in their self-interest could benefit others. The mechanism by which that happens is the division of labor. When people specialize in what they do best and trade for the rest, they make themselves and the people they trade with richer than they would otherwise be.

 

This insight lies at the heart of economics. It is not obvious in the abstract, but experience has shown it to be true. Countries where people don’t specialize and trade — countries where people grow their own food, make their own clothes, build their own houses — are the world’s poorest. The country that elevated self-sufficiency to a foundational national principle and has almost completely isolated itself from international trade — North Korea, with its Juche ideology — is a communist police state.

 

North Korea has to be repressive to prevent trade, because trade is natural to human beings. “In almost every other race of animals each individual, when it is grown up to maturity, is entirely independent, and in its natural state has occasion for the assistance of no other living creature,” Smith wrote in The Wealth of Nations. He imagines the absurdity of dogs deliberating over trade in bones.

 

“But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only,” Smith wrote. “He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and shew them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them.”

 

This is the first area where protectionism’s utopianism shows. Protectionism says that the natural human regard for self-interest that undergirds trade is actually a disease in need of treatment. It posits that people need to act contrary to human nature to really thrive and that therefore their desires and preferences must be reformed.

 

The agent of that reformation is the government. Protectionists must hold a very idealistic view of government and must place an extraordinary amount of trust in government to execute their plans. If the government is not as competent or as beneficent as they believe, their plans won’t work.

 

The protectionist believes that government is the right agent to cure the supposed disease of self-interest because it can take the entire country’s interests into view. Government transcends the concerns of individual people and businesses and looks out for the good of everyone. It lacks self-interest and holds national security and prosperity as its aims.

 

This is a very romantic view of government. It’s hard enough to get the government to focus on the national interest in military matters, which is the most fundamental purpose of government, and military members have sworn oaths to renounce their self-interest and serve the country. Citizens at large have sworn no such oath, nor in a free country should they be expected to, and government is very unlikely to be able to redirect their economic activity for their benefit.

 

It is not an unfortunate side effect of tariffs and other trade restrictions that they benefit some people and industries over others; that is their purpose and goal. Tariffs are, by their nature, redistributive. They redistribute between industries by reshaping patterns of trade and their associated flows of money. Because they are a tax, they also redistribute money from the private sector to the public sector.

 

The protectionist must have faith that government will pick the “right” industries to benefit for the good of everyone. This is supposedly based on careful analysis of national security needs, the benefits of job creation, the balance of trade, the trade practices of other countries, the government’s revenue needs, and other factors.

 

Even if this analysis is done competently and fairly, these goals will conflict, and the analysis will not recommend a clear course of action. For example, the only reason the U.S. has a trade deficit with Canada is the large amount of energy we import from our northern neighbor. Excluding energy trade, the U.S. has a trade surplus with Canada. Crude oil from western Canada trades at a steep discount on global markets, in part because it is relatively difficult to refine and transport. Several major U.S. refineries are specially built to process western Canadian oil.

 

Though Canadian oil imports are largely responsible for the U.S. trade deficit with Canada, they probably reduce the U.S. trade deficit with the rest of the world, because the refined products that we export are more valuable than crude oil. Canadian oil imports are widely viewed as good for national security, since they have largely supplanted imports from the Middle East, but they are still outside the United States’ jurisdiction and could be cut off in a war. Restricting Canadian oil imports would cost jobs at the U.S. refineries designed for them, but those businesses exist only because the Canadian oil is allowed to come into the U.S. at a discount and undercut American crude oil producers.

 

So what’s in the national interest with respect to Canadian oil imports, from the protectionists’ point of view? Their superficially sophisticated view of trade and the national interest can be used to talk people into just about anything. And if people can be talked into just about anything, then some people will be willing to spend lots of money to talk government officials into the thing that benefits them.

 

The word for this practice is “lobbying,” and it is an integral part of protectionism, not an unfortunate side effect. Trade restrictions by the U.S. government are usually legally required to take into account comments from the public, which includes businesses and trade associations. Even if they weren’t, the First Amendment guarantees the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Protectionism in a democracy will always involve special interests.

 

There’s also the simple fact that trade associations often have the best information about the industries they represent. When the government is doing its analysis as protectionists want, it will be reliant on potential beneficiaries of the policies it is crafting. This obvious conflict of interest is ripe for exploitation.

 

The protectionist case rests on the belief that people in government will ignore these special interest groups when they are arguing against the national interest. But of course, when making its case before the government, every group will argue that its interests are in the national interest, so politicians will have cover to decide however they want.

 

Politicians also have a way of arguing that the national interest coincides with their own political considerations. And so it’s probably not such a mystery why domestic steel firms are the top beneficiaries of protectionism in recent years. (It’s not national security: The secretary of defense said in 2018 that the military needs only 3 percent of domestic steel production, and during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Pentagon procured specialty steel from foreign producers to build vehicles to protect soldiers from roadside bombs.) Both major-party candidates in 2024 were basically running to be president of Pennsylvania, known for its steel industry and powerful steelworkers’ union. The candidates knew that whoever won that highly competitive state and its 19 electors would be very likely to win the Electoral College, and they acted accordingly.

 

Political decision-making is the rule, not the exception, for politicians — that’s their job. It’s naïve to pretend otherwise. But protectionists must pretend otherwise, or else their plans have little chance of working.

 

It’s possible to design an academic case for tariffs. Economics textbooks often mention an “optimum tariff,” with supply–demand graphs to illustrate. It posits a scenario where a country has monopoly power over a particular good, so other countries will not retaliate with their own tariffs, and the tariff is set at a low rate, calculated to improve the terms of trade with the rest of the world without raising prices too much domestically. It works on paper, and it’s important to note as a theoretical exception, but it hardly resembles any real-world tariff and certainly doesn’t justify blanket tariffs on all goods from entire countries.

 

Economist Stephen Miran has created an academic case for tariffs in a paper titled “A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System.” He argues that the U.S. dollar is overvalued because of its status as the world’s reserve currency, which makes U.S. exports unduly expensive for others to buy. He devises a scheme of tariffs, deregulation, and currency actions to rectify this perceived wrong.

 

It might work on paper, and Miran’s advocacy for tariffs earned him a spot in the government as the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. But even putting Miran in the government has not led to Miran’s ideas being executed as he described.

 

Miran in his paper says that because Trump has “a history of caring deeply about financial markets,” a second Trump administration would be likely to “take steps to ensure” that “large structural changes to the international tax code occur in ways that are minimally disruptive to markets and the economy.” He writes that, “to help minimize uncertainty and any adverse consequences of tariffs, the Administration can use credible forward guidance, similar to what is used by the Federal Reserve across a range of policies, to guide expectations.”

 

Instead, different administration officials have said different things at different times, leaving businesses bewildered about what to expect. The president announces changes in tariff policy in all-caps social media posts. The confusion has spurred large sell-offs in the stock market, and U.S. markets have been consistently underperforming European markets since Trump’s election.

 

Miran also advocates phasing in tariffs gradually, subject to clear conditions. He suggests in his paper that Trump’s promise of a 60 percent tariff on Chinese goods be accomplished by making a list of demands of the Chinese government and then increasing the tariff rate by two percentage points per month until the demands are met. This is not how the administration has acted, either.

 

“There is a path by which the Trump Administration can reconfigure the global trading and financial systems to America’s benefit, but it is narrow, and will require careful planning, precise execution, and attention to steps to minimize adverse consequences,” Miran concludes. He is sensibly modest about the chances of following that path and states in the paper that it is “not policy advocacy” — likely because he does not hold the utopian view that government will act as an economic practitioner fine-tuning the world economy for the good of the country.

 

Again, protectionism is the utopian view that individuals and businesses will act contrary to their self-interest, government will act in the national interest, and special interests will stay on the sidelines. That doesn’t happen in real life. Free trade, on the other hand, happens all the time.

 

The Constitution prohibits the states from levying tariffs on one another, which effectively created the world’s largest free trade zone when it came into effect in 1789, growing as the country expanded. Internal trade barriers were common in other countries at the time of the Founding, and they still exist in some countries today, including Canada.

 

If the protectionist argument is right, why is it right only for countries? Many U.S. states are larger than many countries, so it’s not a geographic or population issue. It’s not as though there isn’t significant variation in wealth between states: Massachusetts has roughly double the GDP per capita of Mississippi and an average hourly wage over $14 higher.

 

If anything, the case for protectionism between the states should be stronger than between countries because it’s much easier to move production to another place under the same laws where the people speak the same language and have access to many of the same public goods than it is to train new workers on a different continent. The manufacturing center of the U.S. has in fact moved: historically, from the Northeast to the Midwest, and now, from the Midwest to the South.

 

If the Constitution didn’t prohibit it, should Massachusetts have tariffs to protect its workers from Mississippians? Maybe some protectionists would be consistent, but it’s doubtful. When the level of analysis is changed from international to interstate — or, even more absurdly, intercity — it’s clear that free trade is superior, even though it will also result in job losses for some people as production moves from place to place.

 

Trump gives away the game on this when he talks about how tariffs would disappear if Canada became a state. He’s right, they would, but that would mean that the same people would be buying and selling the same stuff, so the basic economic picture wouldn’t change at all. The biggest difference would be that around 30 million Canadians would be voting in U.S. elections, swinging our politics sharply leftward. It seems better to have the economic gains without the political consequences by having a free trade deal with Canada, which is exactly what the U.S. has done, starting under Reagan in 1988.

 

In your day-to-day life, you run up enormous trade deficits with the grocery store, the gas station, restaurants, and Amazon. They take your money and give you stuff, and you never give them any stuff in return. This is a good deal for you because it means you don’t have to can tomatoes, refine oil into gasoline, learn how to make Indian food, or build your own toasters, televisions, and tables.

 

There are of course things that you think are important that you keep “in house,” your familial “national security” exceptions, as it were. But there are plenty of very important things — food, water, children’s education, religious services, home security — that the vast majority of families “outsource” to others, and it works fine because that’s a normal human thing to do. You probably outsource more in your day-to-day life than the U.S. does at a national level. For all the talk about how “we don’t make things here anymore,” imports of goods and services equaled only 14 percent of U.S. GDP in 2024, one of the lowest rates of any developed country.

 

Rather than make more stuff on your own, you specialize in the job you want to do and get money for it. When you take that money into a furniture store, it functions as a certificate that says, “I did the work required to have this couch, but I did it doing something else I’m better at than couch-making, and other people paid for my work, so you should let me buy this couch in exchange.” You exchange the money for the couch, and both you and the furniture store are better off, with your labor magically transformed into something you didn’t make.

 

That’s free trade. You were free to go to that store or to a different one. If you weren’t, that lack of competition would be considered a problem, and it might be against the law. The government doesn’t tax you at a higher rate in one store than it does in another, regardless of whether anyone feels bad for the store’s workers or because the store’s owner donated to a certain politician’s campaign. Nobody seriously believes that the government could “restructure the furniture store system” in such a way that everyone would be better off.

 

The argument for free trade doesn’t require a suspension of disbelief, which protectionists need to make their arguments. You can accept human nature as it is, and you don’t have to believe that the government is a benevolent planner that can make the country richer, safer, and fairer by taxing imports. In other words: Sure, we’d all love for there to be protectionism, sounds nice in theory, but in the real world it can’t happen.