Just Say No

By Mike Coté

Thursday, June 18, 2026

 

According to the leaders of Iran and the United States, Tehran and Washington have reached a deal to conclude hostilities between the two nations. This memorandum of understanding, the text of which was released on Wednesday by the U.S. at the conclusion of the G-7 summit in France, is an extension and expansion of the current cease-fire — if the still-ongoing, low-level combat between the U.S. and Iran can even be called that — and a step toward a broader agreement to resolve the issues between the opposing sides. The agreement, brokered by Pakistan, would add, at minimum, another 60 days to the cessation of combat, including on the Lebanese front, immediately reopen the Strait of Hormuz to all shipping, end the U.S. blockade of Iran and the Iranian threats to commercial vessels, release frozen funds to Iran, work to reverse American and international sanctions on the regime, and fast-track further talks on nuclear weapons.

 

Although we now have the text of the agreement, the argument over whether this is a good or bad deal has not abated. In fact, it seems to have just started. The memorandum is short on details and is extremely open to interpretation. No enforcement mechanisms have been discussed, implementation processes are nonexistent, and the 60-day timeline is quite open-ended — something acknowledged by President Trump himself. Despite the fact that there is very little substance to this memorandum, opinions on the deal have already hardened. Critics have labeled it a total American capitulation, arguing that the details we do have are already far worse for American interests than the failed Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), “the nuclear deal,” under Obama. They focus on the early release of Iranian monies, the inconclusive nuclear clauses, and the failure to address Iranian support for global terrorism. Supporters, including Vice President JD Vance, have countered these claims, suggesting that Iran will only benefit from the deal if it holds up its end of the bargain and accedes to U.S. demands. President Trump, in a press conference at the G-7, stated that this was a “historic deal” that our allies were “thrilled” with, but also that he will not hesitate to resume American bombardment if Tehran fails to comply.

 

In many ways, this whole back-and-forth misses the forest for the trees. It does not particularly matter if this deal is in some ways better or worse than the JCPOA. It does not much matter whether Iran has agreed to our demands or we have agreed to theirs. What matters is the ground truth: No deal that could possibly be agreed to by the Islamic Republic of Iran is a good one for the United States. Three major structural factors internal to the Iranian regime itself ensure that this is the case.

 

First, the regime’s domestic legitimacy depends on its stringent opposition to America. Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the regime has rested on three pillars to justify its existence to the Iranian people. It claimed to be a better steward of the country than the government of the shah, it repudiated the hereditary monarchy and replaced it with a theocratic government of Islamic jurists, and it promoted itself as the mortal enemy of the United States, orienting all foreign policy to defeating the “Great Satan.” Today, two of those three foundational claims have collapsed. Over the past 47 years, the mullahcracy has proven to be a complete failure at improving the lives of its citizens, funneling funds best used to face down domestic challenges into foreign terrorist proxies, allowing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to co-opt much of the country’s productive economy, and brutally repressing ordinary Iranians who dare speak up in protest. After the killing of longtime leader Ali Khamenei, the second pillar has fallen as well; his son Mojtaba, nobody’s idea of a respected Islamic jurist, has been appointed supreme leader with the backing of the IRGC. All the regime has left is staunch opposition to Washington, something on which it has doubled down for the past three months. There is no way for the regime to surrender to American terms and continue to rule Iran, so any deal must be heavily biased toward the interests of the mullahcracy.

 

Second, the regime as it exists today — massively degraded, with less centralized control than ever before — may not even be in a strong enough position to enforce a deal on its own radical cadres. Since the decapitation strikes that began this war in February, the Iranian response has relied on disparate and self-directed regional factions within the IRGC, granting serious autonomy to each sector to prosecute the war; this at least partly explains the continued cease-fire violations and the maintenance of the threat to commercial shipping. Our Iranian interlocutors may not be in control of the kinetic situation, especially if they are, as media reports suggest, politicians, not military leadership. If a deal is viewed as suboptimal by the most fundamentalist segments of the IRGC, even if leadership disagrees, they simply will not comply with it. And when the biggest current issue, the disruption of Hormuz, is being carried out entirely by rhetorical threats, the suggestion of mines, and occasional low-level drone launches, those independent actors within the system have immense ability to ruin the bargain. This has the potential to scuttle any deal we make, even if it receives widespread buy-in at the top levels of the regime. Hoping that our negotiating partners are able to enforce our demands on intransigent armed radicals is at odds with the evidence of reality.

 

Finally, we come to the Iranian regime’s specialty: deception. The Islamic Republic has routinely dissembled in the past. It says one thing and does the opposite. It talks out of both sides of its mouth, making conciliatory noises in discussions with credulous Westerners while simultaneously redoubling its malign efforts. Nowhere was this more obvious than with respect to the JCPOA. Iran repeatedly averred that it would never seek a nuclear weapon and solely intended to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. This was a lie, as we discovered when the Israelis spirited away the regime’s secret nuclear program archive from Tehran in 2018. It turns out that they never stopped working on weaponization, never intended to stop working on weaponization, and sought to use the fig leaf of the nuclear deal to protect its clandestine program until breakout was assured. They have returned to this strategy of mendacity throughout this war, including in the current cease-fire, during which the Strait of Hormuz was supposed to be open to all shipping. Clearly, it isn’t. Their continual redefinition of terms in these very negotiations similarly shows their deceitfulness.

 

Believing that Iran will comply with an agreement it makes is foolish in the extreme. The regime has proven again and again who they are and how they act. They lie, they cheat, and they find any and every way to undermine what has been agreed to. This constant deception, paired with the other structural factors detailed above, makes it impossible for any deal we sign with Iran to be a good or durable one for us. This agreement with the Iranian regime is not worth the paper it is written on. American leaders must recognize this fact and act accordingly. Anything less is courting disaster.