National Review Online
Monday, December 08, 2025
Our Constitution was framed by wise men, and it has
served us well. But they were also wise to give us the power to amend it. The
time has come to use that power to rein in or abolish presidential pardons.
Article II gives the president the sole and unchecked
“Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States,
except in Cases of Impeachment.” This is limited only in two ways: it cannot
prevent removals from office by impeachment, and it applies only to federal,
not state, crimes. It is the closest thing to a royal power possessed by any
one official of the national government. Once issued and accepted, a pardon
cannot be stopped by legislation or the courts, or undone by a subsequent
president. The only real remedies for presidential abuse are political and
reputational.
From the beginning, the pardon power had its republican
critics, but it long served its purpose. Alexander Hamilton argued, in Federalist No. 74,
that presidential pardons could be best deployed in negotiating with rebels to
lay down their arms. It was instead more commonly used to close eras of
rebellion after the fact, from George Washington pardoning the leaders and
participants in the Whiskey Rebellion six years later to more controversial
pardons after the Civil War and after the draft resistance of the Vietnam era.
Abraham Lincoln commuted a great many death sentences for deserters and Native
American rebels, showing how clemency can be balanced with law, order, and
justice. Warren Harding pardoned the unpopular socialist dissenter Eugene V.
Debs. Gerald Ford’s pardon of Richard Nixon after Watergate now looks like an
act of self-sacrificing statesmanship that ended a long national nightmare but
may have cost Ford reelection. Presidents have also used pardons to end abuses
of lawfare, as George H. W. Bush did in pardoning Caspar Weinberger.
But several factors have conspired to produce more
abusive pardons and fewer constraints for an already overbroad power. Since the
failure of the Clinton impeachment, our presidential politics has de-emphasized
character. The decline of Congress has left presidents less able to be checked.
Lawfare and the vast expansion of federal criminal law have led partisans to
rationalize tribal protection of their own side. Successive White Houses have
grown bolder in disregarding an institutional pardon process, in back-loading
pardons to the end of a presidency when political checks are least effective,
and (in a Biden-era innovation) in letting staffers mass-produce pardons signed
by autopen that are only nominally presidential decisions. Hamilton argued that
federal justice might be too “sanguinary” without pardons, but that was in an
era when felonies commonly led to executions; today, the federal death penalty
is rare, and Joe Biden used commutations to all but abolish the federal death
penalty without going through Congress to do so.
Recent Democratic presidencies have produced enough
shocking examples of pardon abuse to convince any Republican that the process
is hopelessly poisoned. Bill Clinton effectively sold pardons, even to the
fugitive from justice Marc Rich. Political accountability for this fiasco was
so tepid, the Justice Department flunkey who carried
it out (Eric Holder) later became Barack Obama’s attorney general. Joe Biden
handed out pardons like candy to his corrupt family members to cover the tracks
of his family influence-peddling business — including pardons announced so late they were publicly
known only after dignitaries were seated to witness Trump’s inauguration — then
let his staff cover those tracks by mass-producing autopen pardons. That’s without even discussing the various
left-wing radicals and terrorists pardoned by the Clinton, Obama, and Biden
administrations for reasons of vote-buying and ideological sympathy for
political violence.
Donald Trump’s presidencies have offered Democrats plenty
of reasons of their own to mistrust the pardon power. Trump has openly used
pardons, commutations, and clemency as leverage to gain political support from
corrupt Democrats, to reward factional allies within the Republican Party such
as Roger Stone, Steve Bannon, and Joe Arpaio, and to mass-absolve participants in the January 6 riot at the Capitol. Trump
has capriciously bulldozed the long-standing Justice Department process for
issuing pardons. His latest pardons include Democratic Congressman Henry
Cuellar, whom Trump seems to hope can be induced to switch parties; fraudster
David Gentile, whom Trump freed from paying $15.5 million in restitution to his
victims; and former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández, a convicted
narco-trafficker of the sort that Trump is simultaneously claiming the
authority to kill by drone strike without trial.
Enough is enough. None of this benefits anyone outside
the privileged circles of Beltway influence or the cesspools of ideological
extremism. If Congress passes a constitutional amendment to reform or abolish
the pardon power on a timeline that is not obviously partisan, there might be
enough popular support to get state legislatures on both sides of the partisan
divide to prevent future mischief. A popular constitutional uprising against
bipartisan elite corruption would be the healthiest sort of civics and would
have met with the Founders’ approval.
Reforms short of complete abolition should be considered
first. The easiest is that departing presidents could be prevented from issuing
pardons between Election Day and the end of their terms, or at least have their
power to do so curbed by their successors or by Congress. That would end
pardons for which nobody could be accountable. Some classes of recipients —
such as blood relatives, close aides, or alleged co-conspirators of a president
— could be removed from the list of recipients of a unilateral pardon.
Alternatively, the pardon process could be subjected to
systemic checks. Presidents could be required to post potential pardons for a
notice and comment period, after which they might require the assent of other
political actors, including leaders of Congress and the courts — or at least
see their pardons subjected to a veto by either chamber of Congress. A separate
body might even be created to review pardons. An amendment that strips
presidents of their unilateral pardon power might even expand the scope of that
power, allowing a politically accountable consensus to pardon worthy targets of
state as well as federal offenses.
Another approach would be to resurrect a proposal that
Roger Sherman made at the Constitutional Convention that would subject pardons
to Senate approval just like appointments.
All of these are worthy topics for legislative debate, if
we still do such things in Washington. Failing a thoughtful consensus, it would
not be the worst outcome if the pardon power was outright abolished. It now
engenders more mischief and scandal than the good it does.
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