By Nick Catoggio
Tuesday, April 29, 2025
“Trump just ‘Georgia-ed’ an entire country,” financier Clifford Asness
declared this morning about the results of Canada’s parliamentary
elections.
It’s funny ’cause it’s true. For those who have
(mercifully) forgotten: In January 2021, the then-president visited Georgia to
campaign for Republicans in two nailbiter runoff races that would determine
control of the U.S. Senate. His pitch to voters: Not only had the recent
presidential election been rigged against him, the Senate runoffs were also “illegal
and invalid.”
MAGA diehards got the message and stayed
home, not bothering to participate in our supposedly sham democracy.
Democrats ended up winning both seats. Unable to contain his authoritarian
impulses, the leader of the American right had needlessly sabotaged
his own allies. And not for the last time, it turns out.
On Monday, Canada’s Liberal Party completed a political
comeback that needs to be seen in graph form to
be believed. Three months ago, Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre and his
party were about 25 points ahead, cruising toward a dominant parliamentary
majority. Then Donald Trump took office, promptly slapped steep tariffs on
Canadian imports, and told anyone
who’d listen that his goal was nothing less than crippling that country’s
economy until it begged to be annexed by the United States.
He was still barking about making Canada the 51st
state as recently as yesterday
morning, as voters were headed to the polls.
About 12 hours later, the Georgia effect was complete. Liberals
won the election, boosted by fears that a Conservative government wouldn’t
be as willing to stand up to Trump. Poilievre, a member of parliament since
2004, lost
his own seat. Unable to contain his authoritarian impulses, the leader of
the American right had again needlessly sabotaged his own ideological allies.
Prime Minister Mark Carney was pugnacious in victory, warning the White
House that his country has other economic and security partnership “options”
besides America. “Our old relationship with the United States, a relationship
based on steadily increasing integration, is over,” he told a crowd of supporters.
“We are over the shock of the American betrayal, but we should never forget the
lessons. We have to look out for ourselves.”
“The American betrayal.” If I ever get tired of Boiling
Frogs as the name of this newsletter, that’s what I’m switching to.
The Liberal resurgence, like the Senate elections in
Georgia before it, has frustrated traditional conservatives here in the United
States. “What concrete, useful, good-for-conservatism thing has Trump achieved
with his ‘Canada should be the 51st state’ line?” an exasperated Charles Cooke of
National Review vented yesterday afternoon, with Carney’s party
poised to win. “Doing it would massively empower the American Left. Talking
about it has massively empowered the Canadian Left. How is that winning?”
Trump and his movement have always seemed to me to be
more concerned with vanquishing conservatism than with vanquishing
progressivism. Wrecking conservatives, in fact, is sort of his
specialty.
I’m afraid I don’t understand the question. Why would
Donald Trump want to do something that’s good for conservatism?
Foils.
Partly it’s a matter of ideology. On policies as varied
as tariffs, taxing the rich, and military interventions, the populist right has
more in common with the populist left than it does with traditional
conservatives.
Partly it’s a matter of political turf. Having toppled
Reaganism as the GOP’s approach to government, Trump and his postliberal
revolutionaries are keen to maintain their grip on the party by extinguishing
alternate models of right-wing politics. Their conflict with the left is
eternal, but they’ve won the war with conservatives and have spent years
roaming the Republican battlefield, shooting the survivors.
Partly it’s a matter of authoritarian political dynamics.
Conservatives offend Trump and other populists because the loyalty those
conservatives feel toward their belief system exceeds the loyalty that, as
members of the right, they’re supposed to feel towards him. They’re more likely
to make political trouble for him than the average sycophantic modern
Republican is.
And partly it’s a matter of demagogues requiring
convenient foils. Trump is comfortable sparring with Democrats because right
and left are traditional enemies. Sparring with conservatives is trickier
because the criticism he receives from fellow right-wingers can’t be dismissed
on tribal “Team Red/Team Blue” grounds. Which probably explains why MAGA
invective about Mitt Romney or Liz Cheney always seems to carry more venom than
invective about, say, Bernie Sanders does.
If the president were granted a wish to divide America
between Trumpists and hostile progressives on the one hand or between Trumpists
and hostile Reaganites on the other, I’d bet every dollar I own that he’d
choose the former.
Is it surprising, then, that he’s sounded excited about
Pierre Poilievre’s polling collapse in Canada?
In an interview
with The Atlantic this week, Trump himself, not the reporters,
brought up the right’s tailspin in Canada. “You know, until I came along,
remember that the Conservative was leading by 25 points,” he remarked, almost
boastfully. Last month, with the Canadian left surging in the polls, he told
Fox News that he’d “rather deal with a Liberal [as prime minister] than a
Conservative.” When asked why, Trump explained: “The Conservative that’s
running is, stupidly, no friend of mine. I don’t know him, but he said negative
things. When he says negative things, I couldn’t care less.”
Poilievre failed every test that Trumpism requires
conservatives to pass. His ideology is distinct from, and more traditional
than, Trump’s nationalism. His victory in Canada would have offered the
international right an alternate and potentially more successful model of
right-wing governance than Trump’s. The outrage in Canada at Trump’s tariffs
and his “51st state” idiocy forced Poilievre into a confrontational
stance with the White House, not “loyal” in doing Trump’s bidding. And
Conservative leadership would have denied Trump the easy ideological scapegoat
for lingering poor relations with Canada that he’ll now enjoy with Mark Carney
and “the libs” in charge.
It may even be that, because the president views
international relations (and everything else) as a zero-sum game, he regards
“weak” left-wing leadership up north as necessarily better for him and the
United States than “strong” right-wing leadership would be.
Whichever way you slice it, Donald Trump gives exactly
zero craps about doing “concrete, useful, good-for-conservatism things.” To the
contrary, with rare exceptions like Argentinian lib-owner extraordinaire Javier
Milei—whom American populists seem not to realize has a view of trade roughly
the opposite of Trump’s—the White House betrays precious little interest in
seeing right-wingers succeed internationally unless they’re aligned with the
president’s brand of postliberal authoritarianism.
And that’s probably for the best. The way things are
going, right-wing victories abroad might soon be hard to come by.
International nationalism.
A few days ago, Bloomberg
reported that some members of Australia’s center-right party greeted news
of Trump’s reelection last fall by throwing parties in their offices, viewing
it as the latest sign of a “global shift” to the right that would soon bring
them to power in their home country.
Then “Liberation Day” happened.
Déjà vu: The ruling left-wing Labor Party began to climb
in the polls. One-third of Australian voters said they were less likely to vote
for right-wing leader Peter Dutton because of Trump; a separate survey found
that trust in the United States had plummeted to its lowest point since the
question was first asked. Recently, Dutton has begun reversing himself on some
policy proposals, like forcing
government employees to return to working in offices, because those
policies would be too reminiscent of you-know-who.
We shouldn’t overinterpret a single election in Canada
and a few polls in Australia as proof of a global, Trump-fueled, left-wing
resurgence. But if you’re looking for evidence that an international political
backlash to the dumbest trade war in history is in motion, it isn’t hard to
find.
A recent Ipsos
poll found that, in 29 countries surveyed, the inhabitants of 26 are now
less likely to say that the U.S. is a positive influence in the world than said
so last October. In Canada specifically, the share dropped from 52 percent to …
19. Averaged across all 29 nations, China—China—is now cited slightly more
often as a force for good than America is. And the Ipsos poll was conducted
mostly before “Liberation Day”; the numbers are surely worse, and
possibly considerably worse, now.
Anecdotally, look around at international news and you’ll
stumble across “the Trump effect” in one country after another. The United
Kingdom is reportedly on the brink of signing
a free trade agreement with the European Union in what’s being described
unofficially as a post-Brexit “reset.” Vietnam, which was bludgeoned with a 46
percent “Liberation Day” tariff before the president announced his 90-day
pause, recently signed
a series of cooperation agreements with China. Some of the president’s
best-known international toadies are also suddenly keen to rid themselves of
the political baggage his trade war has saddled them with: Earlier this month,
British nationalist Nigel Farage called the tariffs “too
much, too soon” and begged his buddy Donald to ease off.
The big winner from the president’s first 100 days,
though, is Xi Jinping. It’s worth your time to read this
Bloomberg report—about how Trump’s belligerence on trade has rescued
the Chinese leader at a moment when discontent with his economic stewardship
was rising—in full:
Interviews with dozens of people in
China across business and government circles, many who asked not to be named to
speak freely about a sensitive topic, showed a solid consensus is emerging to
fight back hard against Trump’s move to rapidly increase tariffs on many
Chinese goods to 145%—a level that threatens to effectively wipe out trade
between the world’s biggest economies.
Financial investors, manufacturers
in China’s eastern coastal region, policymakers in a range of departments and
even elite factions that have lost out from Xi’s power grab are all rallying
behind him.
…
“Most of the things that the
Chinese government would have to justify or explain in terms of hard economic
conditions, it’s possible they could now blame them on the imposition of
tariffs,” said Rana Mitter, ST Lee chair in US-Asia relations at the Harvard
Kennedy School. “Even if in reality tariffs don’t have that much to do with
it.”
The phrase “Comrade Trump builds China” has reportedly
become common on the Chinese internet.
In other words, from Canada to Australia to Beijing,
Trump’s decision to threaten America’s trade partners with economic ruin has
sparked surges of nationalism—and unusually, because it’s grounded in antipathy
to a right-wing U.S. leader, that nationalism has tended to be left-coded.
It’s too soon to guess how that might affect the prospects of the far-right
Marine Le Pen faction in France or the AfD in Germany, but one would think that
the more hardship a crazed America gratuitously inflicts on the rest of the
world, the less likely it is that the president’s closest political cousins in
other nations will be trusted by voters with power.
Once international relations become consumed with solving
“the Trump problem,” the last people anyone should want in charge of managing
the crisis are those perceived as fellow Trumpists. Right, Pierre?
‘Clown-show fascism.’
To return to Charles Cooke’s question of what Trump hoped
to accomplish with his “51st state” gambit, I see two possibilities.
One is that he didn’t intend to accomplish anything. He
so relished taunting a smaller, weaker neighbor that he couldn’t resist doing
so even as evidence mounted that he was alienating, well, everyone: Carney and
Poilievre, Canadian voters, U.S. allies who are anxious about being menaced
next, even most
of the American public.
There’s no strategy. He’s a bully and a troll, so that’s
how he behaves. To paraphrase his favorite lyrics, it’s
in his nature.
But the second possibility is more probable: He thought
it would work. He earnestly believed that, with a big enough stick in the form
of tariffs and a big enough carrot in the form of admission to the United
States, Canadians really might be bullied into shedding centuries of
national pride and hastily joining the union. “I run the country and the
world,” he told
The Atlantic this week, which isn’t quite true but certainly helps
explain why he expected America’s neighbor to kneel before him.
In fairness, a sociopath who feels no allegiance except
to his own self-interest might honestly struggle to grasp why Canada wouldn’t
take the deal he’s offering. But if that doesn’t explain his behavior here,
then another explanation is unavoidable: He’s tremendously stupid.
And that’s the big problem for postliberal ideologues
right now in trying to spread their movement internationally. It’s not that the
president is ruthless, as both the left and right abroad have traditionally had
a high—and I mean high—tolerance for ruthlessness in politics. It’s that
his ruthlessness is so often deployed to plainly idiotic ends.
“Clown-show fascism” is how The New Republic editor
Michael
Tomasky described the first 100 days of an administration “marked
simultaneously by hubristic and defiant assaults on the democratic and
constitutional order on the one hand and, on the other, a nearly laughable
incompetence.” The last thing a person who takes up fascist politics wants to
feel is silly. In fact, I suspect most people become fascists because they already
feel silly for one reason or another and revel in the fantasy of ruthlessly
terrorizing those who made them feel that way.
But the fantasy is spoiled when the leader of the
movement is transparently an idiot. Turning your neighbor to the north into an
enemy with a “51st state” delusion that won’t work and that
practically no one supports is stupid. Declaring a trade war on every country
in the world all at once, then backing off the moment markets get rattled, is
stupid. Placing ridiculous blowhards like Pete Hegseth in positions of immense
power and opting to let them embarrass you rather
than hand the media “a scalp” is stupid. Straining relations with Europe
and the Far East so that you can impress the chuds in charge of “sh-thole
countries” like Russia and El Salvador is stupid.
Trump is discrediting right-wing nationalism
internationally because the movement is now led by a glowering dope who plainly
doesn’t know what he’s doing even with respect to his highest policy
priorities, like trade. With Vladimir Putin, postliberals had an ideological
icon who at least created a compelling illusion of strategic competence
until his army went belly-up in Ukraine. But with the president of the United
States now unofficially the face of global authoritarianism, there are no more
pretenses that adults are leading the war against liberalism. Signing up for
fascism means signing up to be a clown at a circus that grows more ridiculous
every day.
The “ugly American,” a post-war stereotype of boorish
U.S. imperiousness, has been fully realized in the ugly figure of Trump—and
right-wing movements across the planet may soon need to answer for it at the
polls. How’s that as a recruiting message for nationalism?
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